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Introduction
Philip Hirsch and Nicholas Tapp
How are scholars shaped by their times, experiences, political inclina-
tions and other dimensions of the contexts in which they are studying
and writing? What are the legacies of influential individual scholars as
contexts change but their writings and teachings remain etched on the
printed page and in the minds of their students, followers and critics?
And what is the continuing or residual relevance of social science scho-
larship of a generation ago in as rapidly changing a society and aca-
demic environment as Thailand?
In this collection, we address these key questions in the field of Thai
studies through the wide-ranging, some would even say eclectic, anthro-
pology of one scholar – Andrew Turton. The intent of the volume is not
to review, summarise, laud or critique one scholar’s work per se. Rather,
it is to address the question of how ideas produced at a particular time
reflect on that time, the differences and continuities between that time
and the present, and the potentials of scholars and scholarship of one
generation to transcend and adapt into the next.
In the chapters that follow, and through a series of reflections on key
themes and key writings of Turton, some prominent scholars of Thai-
land make a number of links between various aspects of Turton’s di-
verse anthropological writing and current scholarship and politics in
Thailand. Despite the recognised influence of different strands of his
scholarship, and perhaps because of its diversity and the extent to which
it has been a product of its times, Turton’s body of scholarship has not
been considered as a whole, nor has there been a coherent reflection on
how it has worked its way into subsequent scholarship on Thailand. The
same could be said of a number of scholars and social scientists whose
work informs a similar breadth of scholarship in any one of a number
of country contexts, so why Andrew Turton and why Thailand?
Andrew Turton, who retired in 2004 from the School of Oriental and
African Studies (SOAS), University of London, has for many years been
a leading light and inspiration to younger generations of Thai scholars,
activists and others working on Southeast Asian issues. His work has
covered diverse fields of anthropological economics and ritual. Issues of
power and its representations have been key in this work, relating to
matriliny, gender and kinship; political economy – class, state, local, su-
pra-village, political process, violence and illegality; slavery, ethnicity and
social identity, minority and state; agrarian socio-economic relations
and change; social development, social change and popular participa-
tion; ideology, culture, local knowledge; practice and discourse; ethno-
graphy of modern diplomatic missions; non-academic anthropology and
pre-modern vernacular architecture. In other words, Turton’s writings
have spanned an exceptional range of themes relevant to late twentieth
century Thailand and potentially of continuing relevance.
As an activist scholar, Turton is a more complex product of his times
than many less engaged academics. With a biography that spans either
side of the turmoil of the 1970s that marked what many see as Thai-
land’s fundamental political schism, and with a written output whose
first peak coincided with the events around and subsequent to the mili-
tary coup of 6 October 1976, Turton as a person and as an author is
embroiled in that country’s recent political history. In part because it
was situated temporally between his earlier establishment role as Brit-
ish Council representative and his later writing on the ethnography of
encounters by early diplomatic missions (Turton 1997; 1999; 2001;
Grabowsky & Turton 2003; see Grabowsky, this volume), this period of
his scholarship has been characterised as his ‘red period’, with an im-
plication that this was relatively short-lived, although Reynolds in this
volume questions the ephemerality of such a rubric. But what is unde-
niable is that the conflicts and values of the time shaped key aspects of
Turton’s writing and, by implication, this raises important questions
about its continuing relevance and influence a generation on, which we
believe this volume addresses.
Turning to the question of why we choose to focus on scholarship on
Thailand, this collection situates Turton’s work not just within its country
context but within that particular scholarly space of area studies known
as ‘Thai Studies’. Thai Studies has for many years been prominently re-
presented by the triennial International Thai Studies Conference, which
began through meetings with South Asian scholars in the early 1980s.
The notion of ‘Thai Studies’ itself has often tended to represent an image
of Thailand as a homogeneous society with a unified history and a united
population. Over the years it has become more and more apparent how
increasingly misleading this image is. Thailand is, of course, a complex
society with a number of alternative histories and social tendencies all
pulling in often quite contrary directions (cf. Bowie 2000; Thongchai
2000). Turton’s work has been fundamental in bringing about an aware-
ness of this shift, and it is therefore quite fitting that we should be able
to offer this volume regarding his work and influence out of a panel
which was organised by the editors, together with Craig Reynolds, at the
10th International Thai Studies Conference at Thammasat University in
January of 2008.
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The papers in this book tease out Turton’s relevance, influence and
links to the work of others – including his contemporaries, students
and today’s generation of Thai scholars – in some of his key writings.
Each paper draws on a single theme or piece of work and considers
how the ideas therein have traveled in the changing world of ideas and
events. The contributions overall reflect both the strength and diversity
of Turton’s influence and the de-centredness and lack of harmony of
Thai society itself, in a collection of essays that deliberately focuses
neither on the entirety of Turton’s work nor solely on the nature of Thai
society, but rather on aspects of Thai society and culture as understood
in the light of some of the works of Turton. For example, an outstand-
ing piece is his paper on the limits of ideological domination in Thai
society (Turton 1984), to which many of the contributors refer in track-
ing some of the contours of the current situation in Thailand.
The extent to which such a collection must be a partly fragmentary
and diverse one does no more than reflect the nature of Thai society as
some of us have come to understand it in the light of this very wide-
reaching work. The topics covered here – slavery, ideology, political lea-
dership, popular participation, agrarian social structure and develop-
ment, radical analysis, citizenship and social subjectivity, the role of tra-
dition, ritual power, pre-modern cultural encounters and ethnoregional-
ism – certainly do not exhaust the range of Turton’s writings and
interests. In particular, his earlier work on matriliny and his essay on
the political symbolism of vernacular architecture remain largely unexa-
mined here, although several of the papers do refer to these (Jamaree,
for example, on matrilineal descent cults, Tapp on vernacular architec-
ture). The Select Bibliography of Turton’s main works which we have
appended at the end of this book will give an idea of what has not been
adequately covered here.
Nor is this is a collection that would provide an overview of Thai so-
ciety as a whole, yet any collection that sought do so must now be deep-
ly suspect, for reasons which the articles in this collection may make
apparent. Nevertheless, there are many common themes that reflect the
changing nature of Thai society as examined through Turton’s work, for
example the historical continuation of forms of debt bondage examined
by Craig Reynolds as well as the continuing debates on the ‘self-suffic-
iency economy’ (Jamaree, Rigg) and the ‘community culture’ school of
thought (Keyes, Jamaree). What the papers do together as a whole,
therefore, is provide what we find to be a remarkably revealing insight
into the way understandings of Thailand have changed over the past
several decades and the crucial role many of Turton’s work have played
in this change.
Returning to the three key questions set out above that inspire this
collection, we are making links between past and present scholarship,
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tracing the threads that tie together an understanding of Thailand as a
dynamic and rapidly changing society. The first part of establishing
such links is to examine what is specific to the time of writing. But
what is specific is not necessarily or only in the nature of the research
subject, for example the class characteristics of peasant society. It is also
the assumptions and theoretical framings behind the understandings of
the subject. Jonathan Rigg comments on the rather homogeneous re-
presentation of the peasantry in Turton’s 1980s work on participation.
Interestingly, this contrasts with the emphasis on class and conflict
within rural Thailand that Glassman brings out as a key theme in Tur-
ton’s (1978a) article in his co-edited collection Thailand: Roots of Conflict,
and which we find in Anan and Hirsch’s discussion of the neo-marxist
political economy that shaped earlier framing of agrarian transforma-
tions. Jamaree’s contribution points to some hesitancy in Turton’s earl-
ier work about the capitalist or pre-capitalist nature of the ‘dominant
class’, while Paul Cohen examines Turton’s analysis of ‘non-state mani-
festations of local power’. Charles Keyes’ paper also looks at these cult-
ural conceptions of power in the historical context of the ‘ethnoregional-
ism’ with which Northeastern villagers have critiqued elite conceptions
of dominant power. The papers move generally from issues of power
and economy considered in the first four towards three papers con-
cerned with ideology, discourse and participation, before concluding
with two papers that are unique in bringing out Turton’s sometimes
neglected historical contributions, on slavery and diplomatic missions
respectively.
The second aspect of linkage is to trace influence through individual
scholars who have taken ideas forward, directly or through less direct
influence in their own work. It is notable that three of the authors in
this volume (Jamaree, Hirsch and Tapp) are Andrew Turton’s students
– one from Thailand and two non-native scholars. Another four (Anan,
Cohen, Keyes, Reynolds) are Turton’s contemporaries, whose ideas and
writing have developed in parallel with, and at least in part influenced
by, Turton’s work. Jonathan Rigg, who was a student in the Geography
Department at SOAS while Turton was teaching in the Department of
Anthropology and Sociology there, went on to become a junior collea-
gue of Turton on the staff. One ‘outlier’ here is Jim Glassman, whose
scholarly activism is so clearly inspired by Turton, and whose impas-
sioned essay in this volume so radically asserts relevance of the social
critique of the 1970s to an era in which there is a crisis of confidence
in class-based analysis, that he is every bit as much a ‘luuk-sit’ (student,
or disciple) as those with more immediate connections with the scholar
at the centre of our discussion. A second ‘outlier’ would be Volker
Grabowsky, who as a younger colleague of Turton has been inspired by
his work and through a highly fruitful research collaboration with him.
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A final aspect of tracing the legacy of critical scholarship is to exam-
ine how it set the intellectual and political agenda for subsequent de-
bates, and to examine its heuristic significance for the present. The dis-
cussion in the chapters that follow on participation, on power, ideology
and hegemony suggests a persistence and contemporary relevance of
Turton’s ideas, notwithstanding a continuing awkwardness in the pre-
sent-day application of intellectual categories and seemingly naive politi-
cal optimism that marked the earlier era. And yet, with the reference to
Thaksin’s Thailand in so many of these essays (Keyes, Cohen, Tapp,
Glassman, Jamaree), with discussion of power in a country as divided
now – albeit along different lines – as it was during the 1970s, and
where scholarship and politics continue to shape each other, where his-
toriographies collide and debates over allowable discourse rage as never
before, the salience of Andrew Turton’s work remains much more than
merely apparent.
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1 Opening Reflections:
Northeastern Thai Ethnoregionalism Updated
Charles Keyes
Introduction
On 20 August 2007, the electorate in Thailand was asked to vote on
whether to adopt a new constitution that had been drafted under a mili-
tary-led government. Although the referendum passed with 57% of the
total vote, the vote also demonstrated the ‘limits of ideological domina-
tion’, with 44% of the total population of the country not going to the
polls and, especially, with 62% of the population of northeastern Thai-
land voting against this military-backed social contract. I see the vote
among northeastern Thai (or Khon Isan) as derived from conceptions of
power that contrast with those held by members of the urban middle
class or the traditional elite.
Northeastern Thailand has long been home to the largest percentage
of rural people in the Thai population. Historically, these people were
‘peasants’ (chao na) in that their livelihood was based primarily on the
cultivation of wet rice. Today, while most living in the region pursue
many economic activities other than rice farming, and while a very
large number spend extended periods living and working in the indus-
trial and service sectors of urban Thailand, most still identify them-
selves as ‘villagers’ (chao ban) because they remained deeply rooted in
kin and communal groups associated with their natal villages. Over
two-thirds of Northeasterners share common linguistic and cultural
practices that link them with the Lao of lowland Laos. For this reason, I
will use the term Thai-Lao interchangeably with Khon Isan to refer to
these people.
In his essay on the ‘Limits of Ideological Domination and the Forma-
tion of Social Consciousness’, Andrew Turton demonstrated that in
Thailand ‘ruling power is maintained through a combination of ideolo-
gical and violently coercive forms of domination, rather than by morally
persuasive, hegemonic leadership’ (Turton 1984: 19). In this paper I ar-
gue that, even nearly three decades after the events that Turton was pri-
marily concerned with, this conclusion remains true for most Thai-Lao.
In particular, I will show that the marked dissent from support of the
new constitution in northeastern Thailand was not a consequence of
vote buying or political arm-twisting by supporters of former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Rather, I maintain that this vote – as well
as the large-scale support of Northeasterners for Thaksin’s Thai Rak
Thai party in the parliamentary elections of the first years of the 21st
century – represents the updating of a distinctive ethnoregional critique
of an elite-constructed ideology of national integration that I previously
identified as having emerged in the middle of the 20th century. Today,
however, this critique is more potent because it is embraced not by tra-
ditional peasants but by villagers who are deeply involved in the capital-
ist economy, and by their kinsmen who make up the overwhelming ma-
jority of Bangkok’s working class.
In his paper Turton also observed that ‘even in cultural products
clearly inherited from much earlier times we can discern the making of
the people’s (peasants’) own “selective tradition”: in religious and magi-
cal texts, proverbs and sayings, … folk opera, ritual practices …, forms
of social relations at village and local levels, etc’ (Turton 1984: 65).
Those who still live (at least for periods) in northeastern villages and
their kinsmen who work in Bangkok and elsewhere still draw on cultur-
al conceptions of power that are rooted in the Thai-Lao traditions of
northeastern Thailand. In other words, I maintain, the ‘selective tradi-
tion’ of Thai-Lao people underlies the conceptions of power held by
those from Isan.
Roots of a Thai-Lao Culture of Power
A century ago, at the very beginning of the 20th century, thousands of
people living in what is today northeastern Thailand joined the first ma-
jor ‘peasant’ uprising in modern Thai history.1 Rural people living
throughout the region became followers of men whom they recognised
as being phu mı bun – literally, ‘those having merit’. That is, they were
recognised as having exceptional powers that were understood to be the
legacy of their positive kamma2 from previous lives.
The charisma of these men (and they were all males) was manifest in
their magical rites and, especially as the revolt grew, their apparent abil-
ity to ward off the weapons wielded by the security forces sent from
Bangkok. Chatthip interpreted these revolts as having their origin ‘in
the primitive commune’ (Chatthip 1984: 127) and as aiming at the es-
tablishment of a ‘free peasantry’ (1984: 128) without a state.
My own interpretation was rather different. I saw the revolt as a re-
sponse to a ‘crisis of power’ that came about because of the extension
of the authority of a now centralised Thai state in a frontier region into
which French colonial authority was also expanding. ‘In the context of
an acute political crisis, the peasantry of NE Thailand turned to ideas
with which they were intimately familiar – i.e., ideas derived primarily
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from their Buddhist beliefs’ (Keyes 1977: 302). The phu mı bun sought
to demonstrate that they had the Buddhist charisma to be alternatives
to the king of Siam. These beliefs were embedded in ritual practices as-
sociated with village wat (temple monasteries), in folk operas (môlam
mu) that contained narratives of mythical and legendary kings and other
powerful persons, and in folklore.
For the ruling elite in Bangkok, the belief in phu mı bun was deemed
to be rooted in the ‘stupidity’, ’savagery’ and ’ignorance’ of the people
of the Northeast. Official documents referred to the leaders of the
movement as phı bun, an oxymoron since it combined the term for
‘spirit’ or ‘ghost’ with bun, a word meaning ‘merit’ or ‘positive karma’3
According to the ideology that informed the political decisions of the
court of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), only the king of Siam pos-
sessed sufficient baramı – a more sophisticated word for the bun that
legitimated the exercise of power – to be ruler. Moreover, King
Chulalongkorn demonstrated his charisma through effective actions in
extending his power throughout his realm. This was especially manifest
in the centralisation of authority and establishment of a uniform bu-
reaucratic order following reforms instituted in 1892 (Tej Bunnag
1977).
The phu mı bun uprising in northeastern Thailand early in the 20th
century entailed a rejection by people in the region both of the claim of
superior charisma on the part of the Siamese king and of the new poli-
tical system that Bangkok sought to impose on the regime. The upris-
ing did not, however, entail – as Chatthip has argued – an attempt ‘to
establish a society of village “socialism” free from state power’ (1984:
111). Rather, villagers in the region shared with the elite in Bangkok the
belief that legitimate power could be exercised only by men with Bud-
dhist charisma. They differed radically from the Bangkok perspective in
their belief about who possessed such charisma.
The uprising failed in part because the reputed magical powers of
the phu mı bun were no match for the Gatling guns – the equivalent of
more modern assault rifles – and disciplined military forces that Bang-
kok deployed to suppress the insurgents. The ultimate failure, however,
came about because many of the most revered senior monks in north-
eastern Thailand eventually convinced their followers that the Siamese
monarch did have superior baramı. This they did because many of
them were members of the Thammayut-nikai, the reformed monastic
order that had been founded by King Mongkut, King Chulalongkorn’s
brother, and was headed by Prince Wachiriyan (Vajirañaņa-varorasa), a
monk who was also the brother of King Chulalongkorn.
Although occasional claimants to being phu mı bun would arise from
time to time in later years, none ever again succeeded in persuading
any significant number of people that they were more charismatic than
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the King of Siam. Ironically, as non-royal members of the military and
civilian elite in Bangkok began to become disaffected with absolute
monarchism, the people of northeastern Thailand were beginning to
view the Thai monarchy as the ultimate source of legitimate power in
their world.
Northeasterners embrace parliamentary democracy
In June 1932 some of the disaffected elite succeeded in staging a coup
and compelling King Prajadhipok (r. 1924-1935) to accept a constitution
(ratchathammanun) which vested ultimate authority of the state in the
‘people’ (ratsadôn or prachachon) who would express their will through
‘democratically’ (prachathipatai) elected representatives. The ‘Promoters’
of the 1932 coup did not, however, eliminate the monarchy. By retaining
the monarchy, the ‘Promoters’ created a crisis of power because those
who exercise power (amnat) through having been authorised by an
elected parliament are not the same as a king who continues to be re-
cognised as having charismatic authority.
Following the coup, Prince Bovaradej, who commanded troops based
at Khorat in the Northeast, led his troops to challenge the coup makers
and to restore the monarchy as the sole source of authority. Although
the rebellion was mainly backed by elite royalists, ‘it was generally re-
cognised … that the aims of Bovaradej were shared by the more conser-
vative elements throughout the country, and many provincial officials
and officers had openly sympathised with the rebels’ (Thompson 1941:
81). New research is needed to be able to determine how much support
for the rebellion came from the peasantry in northeastern Thailand.
There is evidence, nonetheless, that the government made up of the
‘Promoters’ was concerned about the ‘rebelliousness’ of the people of
the region. In 1934 the government erected the first monument in the
post-1932 period to the memory of a woman from Khorat who in the
early 19th century demonstrated her support for Bangkok by leading a
resistance to forces sent by the Lao king, Cao Anu. Although prior to
(and after) 1934, Thao Suranarı (Thaoying Mo) was revered locally as a
powerful spirit, the monument re-positioned her as a heroine of the
Thai nation. The building of this monument so soon after the Bovara-
dej rebellion has been interpreted as an act to ensure the loyalty of
northeastern people (Saipin Kaewngarmprasert 1995; also see Keyes
2002).4
After the Bovaradej rebellion was successfully put down, King Prajad-
hipok left the country for exile in the United Kingdom. When he died
in 1935, the government engineered the choice of his nephew, Ananda
Mahidol, to be king. Because King Ananda was a minor and continued
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to live in Switzerland where he was studying, the country was without
an active monarch until after World War II.
More research also needs to be done on what reactions northeastern
villagers had to the absence of a monarch whose Buddhist charisma
(baramı) might have been seen as a source of power. What is known is
that villagers responded very positively to the opportunity to elect repre-
sentatives (phuthaen) to provincial and national assemblies (Keyes 1967;
Dararat Mettarikanon 2003). In a real sense, during the 1930s villagers
turned to phuthaen instead of phumıbun as those who could wield power
for their benefit.
Representative democracy would not, however, prove to be a lasting
resolution to the crisis of power that began with the coup of 1932. By
1938, Field Marshal Phibun Songgram succeeded in assuming pre-
eminence among the ‘Promoters’ and adopted a pro-Japanese style fas-
cism with himself as ‘leader’ (prathan). There is clear evidence (Keyes
1967; Dararat Mettarikanon 2003) that Phibun’s ultranationalism did
not become hegemonic for Northeasterners. On the contrary, after Phi-
bun allied Thailand with Japan, Northeasterners gave significant sup-
port to the pro-Allies Free Thai movement.
The resignation of Phibun in 1944 and the defeat of Japan in 1945
seemed to open the way for the restoration of parliamentary democracy
in Thailand. However, the governments of the immediate postwar peri-
od, led by Pridi Phanomyong and other Free Thai leaders, were under-
mined by economic problems and, most of all, by the death of King
Ananda.
The ‘Northeastern Problem’ and the return of the monarchy
After Phibun returned to power in 1947, he and General Phao – the head
of the police and Minister of Interior – moved to suppress the leading po-
liticians of the Northeast who were deemed to be supporters of Pridi. In
1949 three leading MPs from the Northeast were arrested and then
killed ‘while trying to escape.’ In 1952 another leading northeastern MP
was assassinated. The ostensible reason for these extrajudicial murders
and for other repression of politicians from the Northeast was that they
were proponents of separating the Northeast from Thailand and joining
it to Laos. In fact, as Dararat and I have documented (Dararat
Mettarikanon 2003; Keyes 1967), the real reason was that these politi-
cians sought to promote policies that addressed the conditions of north-
eastern people. These policies were actually threatening because they
were populist and thus represented a challenge to the control of power
by security forces. Northeastern MPs were acutely aware of the poverty
endemic in the region and the growing disparity between the northeast-
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ern agriculturally based economy and the national economy, which was
growing in part because the rice premium (essentially a farm gate tax)
was being used to fund investments in Bangkok and the central region.
In 1957 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who had headed the army un-
der Phibun, broke with him and General Phao and took power in a
coup. After doing so, Sarit presented himself as a Northeasterner, as he
had been born of an Isan mother in Mukdahan, although his father
was in fact a Central Thai military officer. Sarit began to promote poli-
cies designed to help address what had come to be termed the ‘North-
eastern Problem’ (panha Isan). This problem was construed to be mani-
fest in political dissent that could lead to separatism but, in contrast to
the Phibun government, the problem was also seen as rooted in the
economic conditions of the region.
Sarit and his government decided to adopt a development pro-
gramme specifically designed for the Northeast as part of the first Na-
tional Development Plan in 1961 (Thailand. Khanakammakan phatthana
tawanôkchiang nüa 1961 and Thailand. The Committee on Development
of the Northeast n.d. [1961]). When this plan began to be implemented
in 1962-63, there was initially a positive reception in the Northeast.
This was made apparent to my wife and I when we were undertaking
fieldwork in a village in Mahasarakham at this time. When Sarit died in
December 1963, many villagers told us that the government would now
no longer take an interest in the Northeast since his successor, Field
Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, was not a Northeasterner. That Sarit was
a dictator was also acceptable to many Northeasterners because he was
recognisable as a macho type well known to them as a nakleng. Thak
Chaloemtiarana, in his study of Sarit, has characterised the nakleng as:
‘a person who is not afraid to take risks, a person who “lives danger-
ously”, kind to his friends but cruel to his enemies, a compassionate
person, a gambler, a heavy drinker, and a lady-killer’ (1979: 339).
Although the ideal male as understood in northeastern Thai culture
is a man who has tempered his desires by having served a period as a
Buddhist monk, the nakleng still inspires admiration as well as fear. In
a real sense, Sarit was acceptable to northeastern villagers because he
used his nakleng status to promote a paternalistic concern for the pro-
blems of the Northeast.
The Sarit era, however, was much more significant because it was as-
sociated with the restoration of the monarchy. The young King Bhumi-
pol had returned to Thailand in the early 1950s: ‘In 1955, the king made
a ceremonial progression through the northeastern region of the coun-
try and was enthusiastically welcomed by the people’ (Wilson 1962:
114). Phibun, who had always been deeply skeptical of the monarchy,
was not pleased and disallowed any more government funding for the
king’s travels within the country. Sarit, by contrast, saw the monarchy
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as the source of legitimacy which he lacked, not having been one of the
Promoters of the 1932 coup (Thak 1979: 311).
Despite his own personal relationship with the Northeast, Sarit was
aware of the widespread disaffection of Northeasterners that had grown
since Phibun had returned to power. The ‘Northeastern Problem’ had
become more worrisome because representatives of the Communist
Party of Thailand had begun to capitalise on this disaffection in seeking
the support of villagers. With the Communist-led Pathet Lao in Laos
holding half of that country, the fear of separatism was now linked by
the Sarit government to the fear of communist revolution. The King
was recruited to deploy his charisma in persuading Northeasterners to
resist both separatism and communism.
In August 1962, the king addressed a meeting of commune and vil-
lage leaders from the Northeast to warn them against adverse propagan-
da and subversion. He urged them to think about national unity and in-
tegration and told them: ‘Being Thai does not necessarily depend on the re-
ligion one follows nor the customs and language used. There may be
variations, but we are all Thai. We follow the same flag and share common
aspirations.’ (quoted in Thak 1979: 318; original emphasis).
Villagers clearly were impressed by the visits of King Bhumipol, and
his role led to the development of a new culture of power among north-
eastern villagers. He was seen unequivocally as possessing baramı, or
in northeastern terms, he was a phumıbun. At the same time, they re-
cognised that those who exercised power in his name – the bureaucrats
known as kharatchakan, ‘servants of the king’ – and especially the mili-
tary (thahan) were not their own chosen representatives. What north-
eastern villagers in the 1960s came to hope for was a political order
headed by the King in which their own representatives (phuthaen)
would have a significant voice in shaping policies affecting their own
quotidian lives.
The upheavals of the student-led overthrow of the dictatorship in
1973 and the counter-coup that restored the military to power in 1976
were viewed by villagers as events of the capital. Meanwhile, the Com-
munist Party succeeded in attracting a growing following among north-
eastern villagers who had strong grievances against Bangkok-appointed
bureaucrats and Thai military forces. The Party, however, never under-
stood the attachment of villagers to the King nor the roots of their poli-
tical culture in Buddhism.5
Development of populist democracy
Beginning in the 1980s there was a marked change in Thai politics that
created a space for Northeasterners to begin again to have a political
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voice again through their elected representatives. A faction of the mili-
tary whose leaders – especially Generals Kriangsak Chamanand, Prem
Tinsalanond and Chawalit Yongchaiyut – had long experience in trying
to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of northeastern villagers in combating
the communist insurgency, saw a role for an elected parliament. At the
same time, the new economic elite of the country began to see parlia-
mentary democracy as a means to force the military and bureaucracy to
share power with them. From the 1980s on, many candidates for parlia-
ment as well as workers for political parties received substantial finan-
cial support to ensure election of candidates favourable to their inter-
ests. Other factions of the military, in alliance with some senior mem-
bers of the bureaucracy and royalist elite, resisted these developments
and in 1991 and again in 2006 staged successful coups to restore their
dominance of the political system. These coups notwithstanding, by the
mid-1980s the principle that power in the name of the King should be
exercised by an elected parliament became firmly established.
Northeastern villagers have felt increasing empowerment under parlia-
mentary democracy because their votes constitute nearly a third of the
electorate. This became especially true after the advent of Thaksin Shina-
watra and the Thai Rak Thai Party. Although some politicians and parties
in previous elections had sought the support of Northeasterners – former
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan had made Khorat in the Northeast
the base of his own personal parliamentary support and General Chawalit
Yongchaiyut campaigned by identifying with the Northeast – none suc-
ceeded in gaining the support that Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai did.
In 2005 my wife Jane and I were engaged in a restudy of Ban Nông
Tün, the village in Mahasarakham province where we had first carried
out fieldwork in the early 1960s. We were there in February 2005 when
a national election resulted in the landslide victory for Thai Rak Thai.
The almost total sweep of seats in the Northeast clearly demonstrated
that this region was a primary base for Thaksin.
Many critics of Thaksin have suggested that he ‘bought’ this and pre-
vious elections. While the TRT was certainly well-financed and candi-
dates for TRT were able to make their presence better known in the re-
gion than were the candidates of any other party, our own interviews with
voters in Ban Nông Tün demonstrated that they enthusiastically sup-
ported Thaksin because of his populist policies – the 30-baht health
scheme, the million baht fund for loans in each village, real devolution
of power and taxing authority to Tambon Administrative Organisations
being the most prominent. Several people we interviewed told us that, to
paraphrase, in the past, politics was always controlled by people in Bang-
kok; today they could see that their votes had helped elect a government.
Since the early 1960s an increasing percentage of villagers from the
Northeast work for extended periods away from the village, mostly in
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the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Region. The urban workforce in
Bangkok is overwhelmingly made up of Northeasterners. Most of these
workers identify themselves as ‘villagers’ (chao ban) rather than as ur-
ban workers. And because they travel back and forth to their home
communities and join with other ‘villagers’ in Bangkok in attending
events where Isan music (notably môlam) and Isan comedians perform,
they remain deeply rooted in the cultural traditions of the Northeast.
They share the same culture of power with those who still live in the vil-
lages – a culture of power that, as I have tried to describe here, is signif-
icantly different to that of the Bangkok elites.6
The coup that occurred in September 2006 has been interpreted by a
number of analysts as rooted in an effort on the part of the old mili-
tary/bureaucratic/royalist elite to re-assert its authority against those
who would rule the country through buying votes and corruption. Since
the King has been clearly linked in a variety of symbolic ways to the
coup group, it has puzzled many as to why Northeasterners can con-
tinue to see the King as the charismatic source of political legitimacy
and yet reject those who wield power in his name. That this was the
case was evident in the overwhelming rejection by Northeasterners of
the new constitution. I would note that the rejection was probably much
greater than the actual numbers showed because it was so difficult in
that election for those living in Bangkok and elsewhere outside the re-
gion to return to their home villages to vote.
There is, however, no contradiction in the minds of Northeasterners.
The failure of the phumıbun uprising in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury effectively ended efforts by local charismatic figures to challenge
the authority of the King of Siam/Thailand. And since the restoration of
the monarchy in the 1950s, Northeasterners have demonstrated that
they widely revere King Bhumipol as the ultimate source of legitima-
tion. At the same time, they have also long come to understand that
those who actually exercise power in the King’s name may do so against
the best interests of Northeasterners. The representatives they have sup-
ported are seen as men who are loyal to the King, but who will also give
voice to the concerns of the ‘people’, meaning the chao ban of Isan. It is
this continuity of a distinctive ethnoregionalism in northeastern Thai-
land that shows the limits of ‘ideological domination’ for those who
would seek to join autocratic rule with royal legitimacy.
Epilogue
Throughout 2008 and early 2009, the difference in political culture be-
tween those who have sought to perpetuate (or, perhaps, re-establish) a
‘guided’ democracy predicated on royal legitimation and those who seek
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to ensure that the moves towards a popular democracy that began dur-
ing the governments of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra continue
became much more pronounced. The roots of the confrontation be-
tween the proponents of these different visions of political order can be
traced to protests against Thaksin that began in late 2005.
These protests were organised by the People’s Alliance for Democ-
racy (PAD) led by Sondhi Limthongkul, a media magnate, and General
Chamlong Srimuang, a former mayor of Bangkok and leader of a now
defunct political party. Both had been erstwhile supporters of Thaksin.
PAD gained wide support not only from among the urban middle class
but also from many academics and activists working with non-govern-
mental organisations who were upset by Thaksin’s extra-legal repres-
sion of drug dealers, his authoritarian prosecution of the war against in-
surrectionists in the Malay-speaking Muslim area of southern Thailand,
and his use of power to enrich his family and cronies. PAD also re-
ceived support from high-ranking Privy Councillors and military and
bureaucratic officials with strong links to the palace whom McCargo
has characterised as forming a ‘network monarchy’ (2005).
The protests organised by PAD coupled with a court decision that in-
validated a snap election Thaksin had called in April 2006 led to a poli-
tical stalemate that was seemingly ended by a coup in September 2006.
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the commander-in-chief of the army who
led the coup, and General Surayud Chulanont, whom the junta chose to
lead an interim government, promised that political order would be re-
stored and elections held under a new constitution.
From September 2006 until December 2007, the Surayud govern-
ment backed by the junta sought to ensure – through the constitution-
drafting process and the strengthening of conservative judicial institu-
tions – that new elections would lead to the formation of a government
that excluded Thaksin and his allies and was led, instead, by ‘good
men’. In December 2007, elections were held for the first time since
the coup of 2006. Under acts promulgated under the government in-
stalled by the coup leaders and the new constitution, the Thai Rak Thai
Party had been banned and most of its leaders not allowed to stand for
political office. Despite these strong constraints, a successor party to the
Thai Rak Thai and its allies still won a majority of seats in Parliament.
The Democrat Party, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva with backing from the
royalist-military elite and strong support from the urban middle class,
became the opposition in Parliament.
The governments formed during 2008 were crippled and ultimately
brought down not by a new election in which the Democrats gained a
majority but by a series of legal actions that led to the resignation of
one prime minister, the banning of more members of parliament asso-
ciated with the successor parties to the Thai Rak Thai, and by the inepti-
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tude of a number of government ministers. Most of all, political change
was a consequence of intensifying street demonstrations organised by a
resurgent PAD.
In December 2008, the PAD led its members, who had been occupy-
ing the prime minister’s office and other government buildings for sev-
eral months, to take over Bangkok’s international airports. The military
and police, although called on by the then government to restore order,
failed to do so. When a Constitutional Court determined that the lea-
ders of the successor party to the Thai Rak Thai were no longer eligible
to serve in parliament, and when a faction of this party defected, the
Democrat Party was able to gain sufficient parliamentary support to
form a new government.
A movement known as the National United Front of Democracy
against Dictatorship (UDD) whose support was overwhelmingly drawn
from rural Northeasterners and their urban working class kinsmen, be-
gan protests against the Abhisit government. Whereas the followers of
the PAD had worn yellow shirts to demonstrate their loyalty to the
King, whose birthday colour is yellow, the followers of the UDD donned
red shirts. Although why red had been chosen as the colour for their
movement is somewhat unclear, it is widely seen in Thailand as a col-
our associated with revolution.
At the time of the traditional Thai New Year (Songkran) in April
2009, there were very large Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok and
in the eastern resort town of Pattaya. These demonstrations culminated
with the Red Shirts taking over the streets of Bangkok and forcing the
cancellation of an Asian summit that brought together the leaders of
the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to-
gether with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia
and New Zealand. That the Red Shirts could accomplish this at a hotel
on a bluff in Pattaya stunned the government and even many sympathi-
sers. The movement had, however, become a mob, with many members
no longer following their leaders. Like their ancestors who had joined
the phumıbun uprising a century earlier, their strong belief in their
righteous cause was no match for the military force that was belatedly
deployed against them.
As of late 2009, the significance of the events of Songkran 2009 was
still being vigorously debated. While the PAD interprets the Red Shirt
movement as having been recruited with money provided by the very
wealthy Thaksin, and advocates strong punishment for the leaders of
the movement, it seems clear that the Red Shirt movement is far from
being the creation solely of a politician who often used power for perso-
nal gain rather than for the benefit of the country or even his suppor-
ters. Rather, the mass support for the movement, like the large electoral
majorities for the Thai Rak Thai and successor parties, indicates that
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Northeasterners are not willing to give up the significant political in-
fluence they gained during the Thaksin period and to return to being
‘happy peasants’. To the contrary, they seek to have their own political
culture given greater recognition and respect than it had been under
previous governments or would be under a government acceptable to
the PAD and others who favor a version of guided democracy.
Notes
1 There were other uprisings during the period from the late 1890s through the first
decade of the 20th century (see Tej Bunnag 1968; also in Tej Bunnag 1981; Tanabe
1984; Wilson 1997). The ones in the Northeast were, however, much larger (Tej Bun-
nag 1967; also in Tej Bunnag 1981; Ishii 1975; Murdoch 1975; Keyes 1977; Chatthip
Nartsupha 1984; Wilson 1997).
2 Kamma is the Pali-language version of the Sanskrit-derived Karma. Pali is the lan-
guage used for Buddhist texts in Thailand. [Eds.]
3 These designations were used in documents written by officials at the time. I have
given the full references to these documents in previous publications (Keyes 1973,
1977).
4 The term ‘rebelliousness’ appears in a flyer circulated in Khorat in 1996 when
Saipin’s book became a source of controversy (see Keyes 2002: 113)
5 I have provided the detailed basis for this conclusion in a forthcoming paper (Keyes,
forthcoming).
6 Pattana Kittiarsa (2001, 2005, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) has written the most in-
cisive analyses of how Isan popular culture in its more modern guises shapes the
identities of Northeasterners.
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2 Transforming Agrarian Transformation
in a Globalizing Thailand
Anan Ganjanapan and Philip Hirsch
In a country whose countryside has changed so fundamentally since
the 1970s, what is the continuing relevance and significance of frame-
works, empirical investigations and analyses of agrarian transformation
from the previous era? In this chapter, we consider changes in the study
of rural change, looking at new contexts of study and new conceptual
lenses through which we now view social and agricultural relations and
their change in the Thai countryside. We also reflect specifically on An-
drew Turton’s contribution to questions of power and contestation in
the agrarian change literature of the time he was writing, and its legacy
for the current scholarship on agrarian transformation. We try to con-
textualise Turton’s work within the times he was writing, draw attention
to some of the changes that have taken place since then and to ap-
proach some of the themes his work raises in a new light.
Agrarian transformation in Southeast Asia, and in Thailand in parti-
cular, is a key theme of Turton’s anthropological writings during the
1970s and 1980s. His concern for rural social justice is also an impor-
tant part of his reputation as an activist scholar. Beginning with his
PhD thesis in 1976 and extending to various essays in his seminal co-
edited book on agrarian transformation of 1989, his works made an im-
portant contribution to our understanding of agrarian changes, to the
contemporary situation of the Thai countryside, and to ways in which to
understand power and its (ab)uses in governing rural social relations.
Turton’s co-edited collection with Hart, White and others was part of
a project that set out to do two things: ‘… to integrate and compare evi-
dence on the rapid and profound agrarian changes taking place in dif-
ferent countries in [Southeast Asia], and to address the conceptual and
methodological problems involved in understanding these changes’
(1989: xiii). The study of rural change during the period on which the
book was based – the 1970s and 1980s – was thus specifically set with-
in both the material conditions and the framing concepts of the time.
Empirically, there were some defining contexts for the Agrarian Trans-
formations book, and it is to those contexts that we now turn. First and
foremost, the cases chosen from four Southeast Asian countries includ-
ing Thailand were deliberately focused on core rice-growing areas. Rice
was taken as the heartland crop around which the mainstay of agrarian
society was based. Second, the green revolution and its accompanying
technological and social changes formed the backdrop to changes in
production methods, labour relations, land ownership and tenancy, the
role of capital and so on. Third, the increasing level of inequality in the
countryside and between the countryside and the city was a generic
phenomenon to be explained and critiqued.
Conceptually, Agrarian Transformations was shaped around the theme
of rural differentiation; that is, the processes of class formation and
sharpening of power difference in the countryside between different
groups of rural producers and social actors. With this core and contested
process in mind, the second key conceptual concern was linking local
processes at the village level to wider political and economic currents,
processes and structures. The role of the state and its relationship with
capitalist-oriented economic development was a key to the analysis,
which ‘emphasise[d] the need to take explicit account of the power struc-
tures within which technological change and commercialization occur’
(ibid. 2). This required a linking of the hitherto rather separate detailed
village ethnographies by anthropologists, on the one hand, with wider
political-economy framed analysis of state and class at the national level
and with an emphasis on urban, industrial ‘fractions’ on the other.
More specifically on Thailand, about which Turton contributed two
chapters in Agrarian Transformations – one national overview on the
agrarian underpinnings of the Thai state, one on local powers – we see
a state framed in the 1980s as having a power base contingent on a par-
ticular agrarian social formation. Turton represents the Thai state as a
predatory one, in the sense that it had always taken much more out of
the countryside than it had put back, in part through surpluses extracted
from the smallholder-based rice economy. In turn, the state had pro-
gressively entrenched itself at a local level through ‘local powers’ to con-
tain disquiet and unrest, and to give key gatekeepers a stake in the sta-
tus quo. Thailand was represented at that time as a country that, despite
accelerating industrialisation and diversification, remained a largely
agricultural society at least in a demographic sense, and still heavily de-
pendent on rice farming within the agricultural sector. Detailed discus-
sion of the local power elite revealed them to have significant agricultur-
al interests in land and other factors of production, but also pecuniary
benefits from their position as interlocutors of state-led and financed
development programmes, often through positions of formal local lea-
dership as village heads and kamnans. Processes of incipient class for-
mation were identified, for example in the notion of ‘wage labour
equivalence’ among peasants who maintained formal ownership of
small plots of land but lost autonomy over decisions on how to farm it.
However, it must be said that the Thai countryside has changed in a
number of key respects in the three decades since the 1970s, and the
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lenses through which we look at such change have also been reshaped.
A number of authors have addressed the empirical changes head-on. Jo-
nathan Rigg’s work on de-agrarianisation (2001) emphasises the declin-
ing role of agriculture in the portfolio of individual, household and vil-
lage economic activities in favour of migration and remittances, service
and manufacturing-based incomes. Hirsch (1994) identifies changes in
the Thai countryside that challenge assumptions and stereotypes of rur-
al life as agriculturally based and rice-dominated, of agrarian relations
and social differentiation as geared mainly around land rather than
other factors of production, of environmentalism as a preoccupation of
a small educated urban elite rather than a concern relevant to liveli-
hoods of the rural poor drawn into the wider sweep of development, of
rural dissent as based mainly in core rice-growing areas rather than at a
periphery where conflicts over forest and forest land shape the ‘front
line’ of agrarian conflict, and of village communities as the social field
within which most agrarian relations are played out. Agriculture, it
should be pointed out, now employs less than half the country’s work-
force, and most of that minority draws significant parts of their income
from outside the agricultural sector, while agriculture now accounts for
less than 10 per cent of the total value of national economic production.
Within the agricultural sector, enormous structural changes have taken
place including agribusiness and vertical integration, while organic
farming and associated influences of consumer preferences, sufficiency
economy programmes and discourses, together with other new cur-
rents, frame the current context in which farming continues to change
in complex ways. The implications of such radical changes for the study
of rural change are enormous, and they do make the class-oriented poli-
tical economic analysis of an earlier era more difficult to apply and less
immediately resonant with understandings of the key issues in rural
change than they were in that earlier era.
Some of the new lenses through which we look at agrarian change to-
day reflect dominant issues and concerns that are closely related to
Thailand’s societal evolution and place in the world. For example, the
emergence of environmentalism (Hirsch 1997) would have been diffi-
cult to envisage even as late as the 1980s, yet it fundamentally affects
the conditions under which rural people farm, their access to land and
other natural resources, their relationships with the state and state de-
velopment projects and, increasingly, the markets for which they pro-
duce (Vandergeest 2008). Globalization and the ways in which it ties
the Thai countryside into neoliberal currents is materialised through
trade and vertically integrated production, but it is also discursively sig-
nificant in the ways in which countryside values are shifted beyond the
production of crops to recreation and other spheres of consumption.
Despite being shaped by its times, there is much in Turton’s work
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that presaged some of these new directions in the study of agrarian
transformation, and there is also much that influenced these directions.
He specifically identifies a need for poststructuralist analysis to be
brought into the study of power in class as well as non-class processes
in rural Thai society. The discursive bent reflected in his ‘Limits of
Ideological Domination’ (1984) and his framing of participation as an
arena of contestation provided his students and others who took up the
study of power in the Thai countryside with approaches that sat easily
with the still embryonic ‘post-development’ approach at the time he was
writing.
Turton’s key insight into studies of agrarian transformation was,
therefore, to invite us to turn our attention to the reality of social actors
through their discursive practices of power as manifested in local pro-
cesses and social relations. This invitation was conceptually an impor-
tant turning point because it opened up a critical approach to agrarian
studies with a strong emphasis on the politics of transformation itself
(Turton 1989a).
Such an invitation was also methodologically significant because it
suggested an escape from the mind-trap of a peasant-state dichotomy,
which was an approach so dominantly subscribed to by most scholars
at that time. Following this methodological guideline allowed for an
early interest in the complexity as well as dynamism of rural processes
as the study of the in-between.
To guide us into this line of research, Turton introduced various ways
of operationalising his study of the in-between space and processes,
ways that have since become common practice. He began with an em-
phasis on power relations between key actors. Not focusing exclusively
on the process of agrarian differentiation as seen at a village level, he
also brought to our attention the powerful group of intermediaries
which he called ‘local powers’ who exercised their power in between the
state and peasant at the so called local level (Turton 1989a; see also Co-
hen, this volume). These local powers were neither an integral part of
the state, nor could they simply be considered as villagers. Instead, they
manipulated their power through maintaining their close connection
with both the state and market while dominating villagers through pa-
tronage relations.
What was most significant in his study of complex power relations is
that Turton managed to go beyond a unitary level of analysis by focus-
ing on the multiplicity of power relations. In addition to the materiality in
political-economic levels of power relations, his major contribution was
in the analysis of ideological domination, which he managed to argue
convincingly was a key part of the exercise of power, yet was limited in
practice (1984). Underlying such limitation is the subject matter of
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what Turton had long researched and revealed as one of the key contra-
dictions in the process of agrarian transformation.
Most of Turton’s works on agrarian transformation concentrated on
the study of such contradictions within the in-between spaces of power
relations that he characterized conceptually through his notion of parti-
cipation (1987). These contradictions were understood not only in ab-
straction but also in practices as politics of negotiation, although Turton
at that time had not yet used this specific word (see Rigg, this volume).
Thus, in his works, he placed considerable importance on these contra-
dictions as politics of participation that were manifested in several
forms of struggle as found in the mixture of social movements and in-
dividualistic resistance in everyday life, both in ideological space as well
as in the socio-political sphere.
In short, the analysis of ideological limits of domination appears to
be Turton’s most significant contribution to the understanding of the
politics of agrarian transformation. Superficially, one might find such
analysis today encountering its own limits, since many of the contextual
underpinnings of the analysis are, it is true, specific mainly to the con-
text of those two decades (the 1970s and 1980s), relating mainly to
land-based agricultural production and state ideology. The agrarian
transformation spoken of then was more or less about market integra-
tion of the peasant economy, mainly in the area of commodity markets
with limited opportunities in off-farm labour markets.
But processes of agrarian transformation of the subsequent two
decades have changed greatly in terms of content. It can be consid-
ered that agrarian transformation itself is transforming in the context
of a globalizing economy of neoliberalism. The clearest manifestation
of this is that rural societies themselves have been rapidly restruc-
tured. They can no longer rely mainly on land-based agricultural pro-
duction under the state and market control, of the type considered by
Turton, but depend more on capital-based production and labour mar-
kets with complex connections to the global market and regionalisa-
tion of development.
These changes notwithstanding, Turton’s approaches, as highlighted
above, continue to be conceptually relevant to the study of current pro-
cesses of agrarian transformation, even within the context of globaliza-
tion. Globalization during the past two decades has increasingly become
a major force for rapid structural changes in contemporary rural South-
east Asia and Thailand in particular. Its effect may even be charac-
terised as another ‘great rural transformation’ in Polanyian terminology
(Polanyi 1957). But rather than being embedded in the social structure,
as Polanyi tried to argue, the current transformation has an ability to
transform the agrarian transformation itself, in a form of rural restruc-
turing. This ongoing rural restructuring is clearly manifested in at least
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three overlapping areas, and here we consider the themes raised by Tur-
ton in a more contemporary context.
Natural resources are the most basic area of rural restructuring,
where so-called ‘market-based land reform’ is actively carried out by
most Southeast Asian governments. The privatisation of property or the
commoditisation of land is the most common strategy. The rapid expan-
sion of commercial plantations, notably rubber trees, is an important
example. Another strategy is the capitalisation of resources that can be
frequently seen in the form of dam constructions for generating electri-
cal power. The unintended consequences of these changes on the one
hand intensify resource competition between various actors, both with-
in and outside the rural sector, who have competing or conflicting uses
for those resources. On the other hand, they reinforce livelihood inse-
curity for the marginal groups, notably ethnic minorities living in up-
land areas (Hirsch & Wyatt 2004).
The second new area of rural restructuring can be found in the flex-
ible and diversified employment of labour, where agriculture is being
displaced by sub-contracted manufacturing, small-scale industry and lo-
cal tourism. Together with industrial expansion into rural areas, the rur-
al sector is increasingly being integrated into the global market without
a clear mechanism for negotiation. At the same time, the rural environ-
ment becomes more and more polluted. Not only faced with insecure li-
velihoods, rural labourers become even more invisible in the eyes of
the state welfare systems that treat them merely as informal workers.
The last area of recent rural restructuring occurs at the regional level
across national borders in the name of regionalisation of development,
particularly in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Here, market-
driven mechanisms are working at bridging rural interconnectedness
through various networks of highways, cross-border trade, and tourism,
as well as power and water grids. These regional connections not only
encourage greater resource mobilisation but also spread epidemic dis-
eases through cross-border labour migrations and other forms of popu-
lation movements. Under the borderless situation, contradictions often
result. Although Southeast Asian rural people’s lives are being brought
into closer proximity with one another than in the past decade, many of
them have become even further excluded from their access to both nat-
ural resources and secure livelihoods (Hirsch 2001) in ways that earlier
analyses could not have foreseen.
In this sense, the ongoing rural restructuring in Southeast Asia can
be seen more as a contradictory process than a golden road to moder-
nity because of its many unintended consequences. Underlying such
transformation is the intensification of the competition for control over
common natural resources. In fact, it can be considered more as a ‘poli-
tics of exclusion’ because of the marginalisation of livelihoods of the
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majority of the rural population whose life has become increasingly in-
secure and fraught with environmental risk.
However, most studies on the relationship between globalization and
rural society tend to be one-sided by emphasising mainly the powerful
forces of globalization on restructuring rural economies, especially
those grounded in regulation theory. Alternatively, other approaches
have focused more on local enclosures of globalization or the global em-
beddedness in locality (Korff 2003). It is only recently that some scho-
lars have begun to call our attention to the politics of globalization,
along quite a similar line of argument to Turton’s politics of agrarian
transformation a few decades earlier. They argue that ‘the impact of glo-
balization on rural localities is revealed not as domination or subordina-
tion but as negotiation, manipulation and hybridization, conducted
through but not contained by local micro-politics’ (Woods 2007: 487).
Although politics have increasingly been perceived as a critical di-
mension in the globalization process, most studies conceptually remain
focused mainly on the level of the socio-political sphere. In his studies
of the politics of agrarian transformation, however, Turton tried not to
limit himself only to that particular level but strongly engaged in the
multiplicity or dialectic of power relations by taking the politics of ideol-
ogy and knowledge as practices in forms of resistance. This was clearly
seen in his analysis of ‘invulnerability’ as an important concept in
northern Thai local knowledge that is both discourse and practice of re-
sistance at the same time (1991a). Such conceptualisation also remains
crucial to the study of the current politics of globalization and rural re-
structuring with a focus on differentiated social actors.
The outstanding problem with this kind of conceptualisation, how-
ever, is that local knowledge often seems to be primarily understood as
given or existing by itself. Even though it can be reproduced in the con-
text of conflicting power relations, such an approach seems somewhat
limited in its understanding of generative and practical complexities of
knowledge. Here, some kind of reconceptualising of knowledge may be
required. It could begin firstly by following Turton’s conceptualization
of knowledge as both discourse and practice. However, instead of taking
the existing forms of knowledge that are more essentialistic in nature,
it might alternatively be reconceptualised through the concept of ‘knowl-
edge space’.
The concept of ‘knowledge space’ was first introduced in mathemati-
cal psychology by Doignon and Falmagne in 1985 as a combinatorial
structure describing the possible states of knowledge of a human lear-
ner (1985). In 1994, Pierre Levy, Professor of Hypermedia at the Uni-
versity of Paris, applied the concept to cyberspace and digital communi-
cations (1997). But it was not until 1997 that David Turnbull gave the
concept its socio-cultural dimension (1997: 553). He began by recognis-
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ing that knowledge production is a social activity as well as a social his-
tory of space. It involves contingent processes of making assemblages
and linkages, of creating spaces in which knowledge is possible. The
emphasis on this spatial dimension of knowledge opens up the possibi-
lity of seeing knowledge more clearly as practices by knowledge produ-
cers. These practices, especially through social strategies of negotiation,
allow knowledge producers to create spaces that can generate new
forms of knowledge from heterogeneous and isolated knowledges.
Based initially on Turnbull, the concept of ‘knowledge space’ is
further conceptualised as forming places of both knowledge and power
production in the sense that they are contested spaces associated with
complex social relations. Following this conceptualisation, knowledge
spaces can be seen to represent the very regimes through which truth,
knowledge and powers are created (Wright 2005: 904). In contrast to
situated forms of knowledge, or ‘negotiating’ forms of knowledge,
which are only conceived as generating knowledge in a particular con-
text of contestation (Nygren 1999; Pottier et al. eds. 2003), knowledge
space is considered as a third space of practice which also creates that
context.
The concept of ‘knowledge space’ may go somewhat beyond Turton’s
idea of knowledge in terms of its dynamism and multiplicity. However,
it still concurs with his strong interest in the politics of knowledge as
well as the study of the in-between. In this sense, the notion of ‘knowl-
edge space’ helps to bridge the spheres of power and knowledge, or the
politico-economic sphere as well as ideological space, through a third
space of practice that implies a politics of knowledge as resistance in a
multiplicity of spaces and as a practice of changing power relations.
Thus, it seems to provide a meaningful framework for the contempor-
ary analysis of agrarian transformation in the current context of globali-
zation because so many key actors are shifting their spaces of struggle
in more complex ways than hitherto.
Under globalization today, agrarian transformation is not only about
rural restructuring in the socio-economic sphere, but also about the
changing politics of increasingly contested forms of knowledge. In addi-
tion to market-oriented ways of thinking, most so-called development
programmes are carried out in the name of scientific knowledge. But
such claims of scientific knowledge involve a strong degree of shifting
justification. In many cases, for example, the state highland develop-
ment programmes which claim to be a strategy to civilize the margins
in fact are merely an excuse to exclude upland ethnic minority groups
from their resources (Duncan 2004).
Sometimes, this type of transformation in development can be clearly
seen as expressing a politics of conservation. In the case of the policy of
eliminating shifting cultivation in favour of sedentary agriculture, swid-
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den agriculture – which is often a form of agroforestry – is generically
stigmatised as a kind of forest destruction that flies in the face of apply-
ing modern knowledge of science in agriculture. In this sense, state con-
servation policy can simply be considered a myth because it is only
strictly enforced on the marginal ethnic groups while at the same time al-
lowing for greater expansion of plantations at the expense of forest and
shifting fields. Underlying such a politics of conservation, then, is actu-
ally an intensive competition for resources by various actors who use dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge to justify their claims and policies (Anan
1997), and it is important to recognise this in the current situation.
The current processes of agrarian transformation and rural restruc-
turing in Southeast Asia are in fact dominated by such contesting forms
of knowledge. Under these contradictions and conflicting relationships,
differentiated actors in rural communities do not merely remain pas-
sive. On the contrary, they are actively engaging through their everyday
life in what can be considered as ‘negotiating livelihoods’ within ‘knowl-
edge spaces’ where development strategies can be locally initiated and
can contest mainstream practice.
In the case of highland communities, a knowledge space can be in-
itiated in the process of negotiating livelihoods around practices such as
shifting cultivation. By diversifying their shifting farming patterns,
some communities can adopt biological diversity as their adaptive strat-
egy under pressures of relocation by the state. Others may choose to
frame their practices by employing the terminology and dynamics of
agroforestry as a practice of negotiation with state policy, which tends to
favour commercial plantations.
After a long engagement in the struggle for their negotiated liveli-
hood, several villages may also join together in performing rituals in a
way that embodies another form of their knowledge space, such as the
rituals of forest ordination that are currently performed both as contest-
ing and negotiating practices in the discourses of conservation (Isager
& Ivarsson 2002). These rituals are not only spaces for identity con-
struction but, as a type of new knowledge space, they also allow for the
participation of a wide diversity of actors with multiple interests, such
as NGOs, officials and academics. They also create a context for the
kind of learning process and network that is so essential for generating
new forms of knowledge, especially the complex knowledge of rights,
power and governance in negotiation through debate.
These engagements are not always carried out in isolation but, in sev-
eral cases, ethnic minority communities have been able to form ethni-
cally based knowledge networks as a ‘knowledge space’ in which their
contesting identities can be expressed. Some such networks can also be
further developed into social movements, such as in the case of the
campaign for community forest law in Thailand.
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Many rural communities are also engaging their knowledge spaces as
practices of learning processes through the so-called ‘people’s research’
(in Thai, Thai Ban research) in order to contest and negotiate with the
domination of scientific knowledge. For some peri-urban areas where
industrial pollution has become a major problem of environmental risk,
community-driven regulations occasionally have taken over from state
law enforcement. Such practices can also be seen as new knowledge
spaces where a particular form of governance can be generated.
In this sense, the new knowledge spaces that are formed not only al-
low for negotiating livelihoods but also help in engaging rural actors
more and more in participatory development and shifting spaces of
struggle. This kind of participation has given rural actors a crucial role
in transforming the transformation that tends to be based only on cer-
tain knowledges within neoliberal ideology. The emerging transforma-
tion can be seen in some kinds of alternative livelihoods and modes of
governance, albeit ones that are often only emerging in a few specific
areas.
In conclusion, the various forms of rural actors’ political engagement
in the knowledge spaces that have been carved out can, in the context
of globalization, encourage the formation of alternative systems of gov-
ernance. These new kinds of governance, both at the national and inter-
national levels, enlarge the social drivers that regulate rural restructur-
ing beyond those of only market-driven or state regulating mechanisms
as conventionally understood. As a result, agrarian transformation itself
continues to be transformed not just by global processes but also by dif-
ferential social actors who are engaged in the politics of transformation.
At one level, these politics and modes of governance are a long way
from the radical class-based agrarian politics of a generation ago. At an-
other level, Turton’s early forays into discursive struggles, powerful
elites articulating local and wider processes, and contestation based on
cultural practices and recognition of the limits to domination can all be
seen to resonate in the new nature and understanding we have of Thai-
land’s agrarian transformation today.
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3 Local Leaders and the State in Thailand
Paul T. Cohen
Andrew Turton’s analysis of local leaders in Thailand is best viewed in
terms of his attempt to unravel the relationship between violence and
consent in relation to state power, and the limits of that power, drawing
on a diverse range of theorists (poststructuralist, neo-Gramscian and
neo-Marxist). In this paper I outline and evaluate Turton’s writings on
local leaders and the state in Thailand. I also endeavour to trace the re-
levance and connections of his work to earlier, contemporaneous and
more recent scholarship relating to local headmen, dissident peasant
leaders, provincial bosses, Village Scouts, urban gang leaders and char-
ismatic Buddhist monks.
‘Local powers’
Turton’s key argument in several papers published in the 1980s is that
ruling power is not maintained through ‘morally persuasive’ hegemonic
leadership (in the Gramscian sense) based on the shared values of all
classes of Thai but rather through ideological and violently coercive
forms of domination. Turton sets himself the task of elucidating pre-
cisely the connections between ideological and (violently) repressive insti-
tutions. In doing so, he does not restrict his analysis to ideological or
repressive state institutions. Rather he focuses on non-state local mani-
festations of power (which he refers to variously as ‘local power struc-
tures’ or ‘local powers’) and which constitute a ‘secondary complex of
predatory interests’ (1984: 30).
According to Turton, these ‘local powers’ in the 1970s and early 1980s
comprised a small minority (perhaps 5 per cent) in rural villages: large
landowners, commodity dealers, shopkeepers, village officials, rice mill-
ers and money lenders. They gained advantages from external connec-
tions and alliances in linking the mass of villagers to state and market
structures and in their ability to accumulate village surplus through rent,
wages, retail prices, commodity dealing and interest (1984: 30; 1989a:
82). They maintained their dominance in village society through their
controlling position as members of village committees and through per-
sonal patronage. Increasingly these ‘community leaders’ (phunam chum-
chon) were referred to by the village poor as klum itthiphon (influence
groups) who had established themselves as a separate, cohesive ‘society’
(sangkhom) from which the poor felt excluded (Turton 1984: 31).
A key member of these ‘local powers’ was the kamnan (sub-district
headman). The kamnan’s position of power and wealth was consider-
ably enhanced in the mid-1970s with the establishment of the Tambon
(sub-district) Development Fund as a potential source of graft. Also, the
kamnan became a crucial link between the village ‘upper stratum’ and
outsiders with political and commercial interests in villages, a link
which he could exploit to his and their own advantage but often at the
expense of the rural poor. This role of the kamnan reflects the radical
changes in village political leadership.
Based on fieldwork from 1959 to 1961, Michael Moerman charac-
terised the village headman as a synaptic leader. He provided a key link
between state officials and rural villagers but, despite the conflicting de-
mands of villagers and state officials, he generally worked to protect vil-
lagers against state exactions. ‘His rewards of exercising power, skim-
ming wealth, disseminating knowledge, and receiving respect all stem
from his appearing to lead a strong community which he protects from
powerful outsiders whose interests his villagers think are opposed to
theirs’ (Moerman 1969: 546). Turton, in one of his early papers that fo-
cused on his own fieldwork in Chiang Rai province, acknowledges the
existence of this type of headman for the period 1950-1970: ‘Villagers
are making increasing use of headmen – as arbitrator, as middleman
agent to deal with the bureaucracy, and as defender of community inter-
ests’ (1976a: 283). However, he notes the emergence towards the end of
the period of a ‘second type of headman’ who is ‘more assiduous in his
search for powerful economic and political patronage, and cultivates se-
nior officials and urban traders whose interests are further removed
from those of the headman’s village constituency’ (ibid. 284). Thus, the
situation was ‘one of considerable variation and change’ and the rela-
tionship between headmen and fellow villagers had become ‘increas-
ingly contradictory’ (ibid. 276). However, by the mid-1970s this contra-
diction had come closer to resolution as the headmen increasingly and
consistently aligned their interests to those of the village ‘upper stra-
tum’ and to the state. The kamnan was by then the ‘eyes and ears’ of
the District Office (Turton 1984: 31). The kamnan and other members
of the village ‘upper stratum’ were also strategically connected at the
district level (in part due to their better education and knowledge of
Central Thai) to large-scale landowners and merchants, millers and con-
tractors and transport owners who often served as their patrons or even
‘godfathers’ (chao pho) (ibid. 32).
These mafia-type chao pho emerged in the 1970s with the growth of
provincial capitalism but the heyday of these provincial businessmen
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and their influence on national politics was between the mid-1980s to
mid-1990s. Their political power reached its apogee under the adminis-
tration of Banharn Silpa-archa (1995-1996) – the first provincial boss to
achieve national leadership. During this decade, after the publication of
Turton’s initial paper on ‘local powers’ (1989a), the phenomenon of
chao pho attracted considerable media attention and also scholarly analy-
sis (in particular, in Ruth McVey’s edited volume Money and Power in
Provincial Thailand, 2000). It is worth noting that, according to Pasuk
and Baker (2004), the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001-2006)
launched an attack on the ‘dark influences’ of these provincial bosses as
a means to remove competition to corporate business and Thaksin’s po-
litical party.
‘Local power structures’ provide the main milieu for what Turton re-
fers to as ‘restrictive ideological practices’. His analysis of these prac-
tices reflects the influence of Foucault’s study of the ‘political technol-
ogy of the body’ and the ‘micro-physics of power’ (and the way power
operates in a ‘capillary’ or net-like fashion from below) (Turton 1984:
38; 1986: 39, 41). It is from this perspective that Turton explores in
depth the connections between ideological and violently coercive (repres-
sive) forms. He singles out one extreme form of restrictive ideological
practice that was common in the 1970s, namely the labelling, accusa-
tions and surveillance of virtually anyone who criticised local leaders or
the government as ‘communist’ (1984: 50-56). This was a form of ex-
communication that had its traditional expression in practices such as
accusing people of being a witch (phi ka), with the potential for these
accusations to be used by wealthy villagers to target the poor (see Anan
1984).
A more recent example of restrictive ideological practice that culmi-
nated in violence is Thaksin’s ‘war on drugs’ in 2003 in which drug
dealers became the new external/internal ‘Other’ that threatened the
‘geo-body’ of the Thai nation. Thaksin likened methamphetamines (ya
ba) to a cancer in the body politic, and the metaphor of disease from
the communist era re-emerged in the context of the drug war. This pro-
vided the discursive climate for dehumanising drug dealers and the ex-
trajudicial killings of them during the three-month war.
The process of labelling, accusation, surveillance, intimidation and
dehumanisation of subjects as ‘enemies of society’ or ‘enemies of the
nation’ serves to instil fear. Turton declares (quoting Therborn): ‘Force
and violence operate as a form of rule only through the ideological me-
chanism of fear’ (1984: 60; original emphasis). Through the creation of
a climate of fear, assent to the dominant discourse is increasingly ‘de-
manded with menaces’ (Turton quoting Gellner, 1984: 60; 1986: 43).
Turton also explicates the connection between ideology and (violent)
coercion through the semantics of the word ‘inculcation’, which he
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translates as ‘forcible teaching’. The word has the root meaning of
stamping or impressing with the heel (Latin calx). The inculcation of na-
tionalist and anti-communist ideology and its potential to culminate in
violence is well demonstrated in his analysis of the Village Scout move-
ment (luk seua chao ban). The movement was founded in 1971 by the
Border Patrol Police and reached a peak in popularity in 1976. Turton
notes: ‘At the local level they are sponsored by officials of all kinds …
and local landowners, traders, bankers, and politicians – in other words
the milieu of “local power structures” identified earlier’ (1984: 53).
More than a decade later, Katherine Bowie explored the process of in-
culcation of this nationalist ideology in her anthropological study of the
Village Scout movement in Sanpatong district, Chiang Mai. Loyalty to
national symbols was most visibly instilled in villagers during initiation
rituals that Bowie describes as a five-day ‘psychological drama’. The ri-
tuals were so emotionally charged that they created a sense of euphoria
and even hysteria among participants. The villagers’ emotions reached
a climax on the final day of the initiation when they were presented
with royal kerchiefs that were blessed by the King and ascribed magical
powers similar to that of Buddha images and amulets. Ritual symbo-
lism did not only inculcate a strong sense of loyalty to Nation, Religion
and King but also political unity against external enemies as well. ‘The
scout instructors were clearly trying to portray Thailand as a nation
whose cultural survival was being threatened by external enemies who
were infiltrating the country’ (Bowie 1997: 191). This view was used to
justify the extreme violence and atrocities inflicted by Village Scouts
(along with Thai police and other right-wing groups) at Thammasat
University on 6 October 1976 on students ‘deceived’ by communists,
socialists or the Left.
The limits to state power: resistance
However, there are limits to ideological domination, as the title of Tur-
ton’s 1984 paper signals: ‘A fundamental, axiomatic limitation of ideo-
logical domination is the impossibility of total subjection’ (1984: 62) – a
point Turton reinforces by quoting Gellner that ideologies ‘do not really
have the conceptual power to make rival positions unthinkable’ (ibid.
64). Resistance to dominant ideological discourse can be exposed in ‘re-
ceived or inherited popular culture’. This resistance may take the form
of more individualistic ‘everyday forms of resistance’ or more collective
and violent regional rebellions (such as the 1901-02 ‘Holy Men’ upris-
ing in the Northeast and the 1889 Panya Pap rebellion in the North). In
another paper, Turton (1986) also identifies ‘in-between’ forms of resis-
tance (or ‘middle-range forms of struggle’) such as new forms of auton-
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omous peasant associations that emerged during the 1970s in Thailand
(larger in scale than isolated acts of individual resistance and smaller
than peasant uprisings) which develop ‘new and transformed practices’
(sharing information and experiences, travelling and visiting to extend
links and alliances, new forms of knowledge and communication) – all
of which encourage ‘a new self-confidence and boldness’ (1984: 66;
1986: 45)
In his analysis of the limits of ideological domination, Turton focuses
on the discourse of invulnerability as a form of popular culture or local
knowledge that serves to overcome or, at least, lessen fear by subordinate
classes (1984: 61) and that has had an important place in ‘everyday’
forms of peasant resistance and in peasant rebellions (1991a: 156). This
theme Turton explores in depth in a paper dedicated specifically to
Northern Thai ideas and practices of invulnerability, based on his own
fieldwork and work by other anthropologists working in the North, and
which I consider to be arguably his finest piece of ethnographic writing.
The term commonly used in Northern Thailand for invulnerability is
kham (‘able to withstand’). A person becomes kham through possession
and use of verbal formulae called katha which may be memorised, in-
scribed in the form of yantra or tattooed on the body (Turton 1991a: 161).
Kham knowledge is used for individual protection in dangerous and
frightening circumstances, especially in encounters with aggressive or
malevolent humans (ibid. 159). Usually kham knowledge is acquired
through a teacher (khru), and effective use is dependent on certain obser-
vances such as respect and offerings to ‘spirit teachers’ (phi khru), food
taboos and appropriate forms of mental attitudes (such as meditation).
While Turton refers to kham knowledge as a form of ‘local knowl-
edge’ or ‘popular culture’, he emphasises that such ideas traverse the
elite/popular divide in what he calls a ‘cross-hatching of discourses’ (a
term coined by Reynolds in the same volume). Thus the themes of
khongkraphan (‘invulnerable’) and khongkraphan chatri (‘invulnerable
warrior’) were common in Siamese court literature (Turton 1991a: 164-
167) but also entered the popular discourse of invulnerability, indeed
sometimes in a quite subversive way (ibid. 159; see also Cohen 1987).
Turton attests to the pervasiveness and importance of kham discourse
in Northern Thailand (1991a: 163). Indeed he opines that ‘It is virtually
a requirement of leadership’ (ibid. 170). In this respect he identifies a
‘range of instances’ whose reputation and power was linked with invul-
nerability ideas. He also asserts that invulnerability knowledge may be
found in the context of ‘competition for leadership or peer group pre-
eminence’ (ibid. 162). Implicit in his analysis is that this competition is
most likely to be associated with younger, aggressive and intimidating
men engaged in socially dubious activities, such as daredevil youths
and various types of nak leng (tough guys or bandits). Pertinent here is
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Anjalee Cohen’s recent study of Chiang Mai gangs (kaeng wai run) that
numbered as many as 70 in 2003. These urban youth gangs draw heav-
ily on the enduring Northern Thai popular culture of masculinity that
values fearlessness, courage, risk taking, capacity for violence, and in-
vulnerability. With reference to Turton’s paper on invulnerability and lo-
cal knowledge, she describes the common use of katha, yantra (in the
form of tattoos) and amulets to acquire magical protection in fights with
other gangs. Furthermore, she argues that invulnerability (through tat-
toos, amulets, etc.) is ‘perceived as an essential attribute of gang leader-
ship’ (2006: 198). Here we have an analysis of the ideas and practices
of invulnerability in a hitherto relatively unexplored field of urban youth
culture and a telling example of what Turton, in another context, refers
to as the ‘remarkable resilience of Khon Muang culture’ (2006: 170).
At the other end of the ‘range of instances’ are the older, less aggres-
sive leaders such as irrigation chiefs, headmen, senior monks (khuba
acan) and millenarian leaders (phu mi bun) (Turton 1991a: 163,171). My
interpretation of Turton’s analysis is that at this end of the spectrum
there is much more emphasis on Buddhist morality, merit and medita-
tion as an essential component of invulnerability. Millenarian leaders
(phu mi bun) in the Northeast, who were attributed powers of invulner-
ability, stressed the importance of observing moral precepts, and of pur-
ification and meditation (ibid. 171). The same can be said of their ton
bun (‘meritorious persons’) counterparts of the North. The most famous
of these, Khuba Siwichai, was renowned for his building of religious
monuments as well as his strict asceticism (including vegetarianism
and meditation). The most recent and best known ton bun in the North
is Khuba Bunchum (considered by some a reincarnation of Khuba Siwi-
chai). He spends long periods during the Buddhist lent (vassa/phansa)
meditating in remote caves in Burma and even as far as Bhutan. Ton
bun are attributed a range of supranormal powers, including invulner-
ability (Cohen 2001). This highlights what has been called the paradox
of power in Buddhism: virtuoso, ascetic monks who seek to renounce
the world and worldly desires inevitably acquire supranormal powers
(iddhi) that are world affirming and used by others for mundane ends.
This leads me to Turton’s recent biography of a particular Northern
monk, Khuba Wajiraphanya (c.1853-1928), who is locally renowned in
the Mae Sruay district of Chiang Rai and is still memorialised there
through regular cedi ceremonies (2006: 160-164). Khuba Wajiraphanya
was said to have known and visited Khuba Siwichai, though he himself
was not identified locally as a ton bun. Nevertheless, he was considered
by villagers to be saksit tae tae (‘most sacred’) and to possess a range of
supranormal powers. The latter included ‘knowledge of “magic” for in-
vulnerability,’ imperviousness to being photographed and the capacity
to produce or prevent rainfall (ibid. 156). His kham knowledge, com-
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bined with knowledge of religious texts and secular arts (such as build-
ing construction and traditional medicine), made him a prominent local
leader (ibid. 157).
Indeed, Turton claims that Khuba Wajiraphanya ‘exercised a kind of
sovereignty’ (ibid. 158) in the region of Mae Sruay. This prompts me to
underscore the historical ambivalence of the Thai state towards virtuoso
charismatic monks. On the one hand, the state has tended to use such
monks as pliant tools to domesticate frontier regions (as in the case of
the Acan Man lineage of forest monks in the Northeast); on the other
hand, they represent a potential political threat by virtue of their special
knowledge and powers and the loyalty of local populations to them.
This is evident in the case of Khuba Wajiraphanya who served officially
as a Chao Khana Amphur (district ecclesiastic head) in the new Siamese
instituted sangha administration but at the same time was a dissident
advocate of muang (Northern Thai) liturgy and contested the authority
of the (Siamese) state-appointed local headman (ibid. 158).
Conclusion
Turton has made a significant contribution to our understanding of lo-
cal leadership in Thailand. His analysis of ‘local powers’ or ‘local power
structures’ in particular was groundbreaking. Indeed, as he argues,
such local realities of power did ‘deserve greater theoretical prominence
and conceptualisation; they tend to be largely “invisible” in much aca-
demic writing, perhaps because they defy analysis in existing para-
digms’ (1984: 33; 1989a: 88). Turton managed to identify and elucidate
these local manifestations of state power by putting ethnographic flesh
on the bones of Foucault’s concept of the ‘micro-physics of power’. He
has also made a lasting contribution to the study and our understand-
ing of the limits of state ideological domination in Thailand and of pop-
ular culture as a source of dissidence and resistance.
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4 Roots of Ongoing Conflict: Reflections on
Andrew Turton’s Analysis of Thailand in the 1970s
Jim Glassman
Introduction
In 1978, responding to the aftermath of the coup of 6 October 1976, a
group of Thai scholars produced the volume Thailand – Roots of Conflict,
published as a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Asia (volume
8, number 1) and also as a book (Turton et al. 1978). Some of the pre-
dictions made by the editors of the volume – if they were in fact predic-
tions – seem, with historical retrospect, off base. This is scarcely unu-
sual for work in the social sciences, and indeed what may be one of the
deepest illusions held by many social scientists, whatever their political
stripe, is that well-done academic work can effectively predict what will
happen next (Kolko 2006: 9-12). Certainly if humans have any capacity
to make choices, and if social processes are the results of many, many
such choices, then prediction seems more like a vain attempt to impose
mechanistic intellectual precepts on living agents than a viable scholarly
project.
Even with this qualifier, one cannot help but wince when reading state-
ments like the one that concluded the editorial introduction to the Thai-
land – Roots of Conflict volume: ‘As the Thai people say, “The longer the
sky suppresses, the longer the land resists.” The 1980s look set to be a
truly revolutionary decade’. One cannot help but wince not only because
this statement turned out to be off the mark but, even more so, because
in the wake of its failure, a self-satisfied triumphalism on the Right made
it difficult to appreciate how many of the issues and problems effectively
analysed in these articles remained salient – and how this, in turn, illu-
strated the ongoing salience of political economic analyses of the Left. In
short, the failures of the Thai Left’s political project were opportunisti-
cally interpreted on the politically victorious Right as proving the irrele-
vance of the Left’s political economy. This intellectual manoeuvre – by
helping to exclude the Left’s political economy perspectives from most
debates in Thailand since the 1980s – has left many analysts of Thailand
today bereft of adequate intellectual tools for assessing matters such as
the political imbroglio that has engulfed the country since 2005, when
military forces descended from those that had launched the 1976 coup
and began mobilising to oust the government of Thaksin Shinawatra.
I want to reclaim the articles from the Roots of Crisis volume and il-
lustrate some of their continued salience by first placing them in their
geographical-historical context and then noting, especially, the impor-
tant contribution of the piece authored by Andrew Turton, ‘The Current
Situation in the Thai Countryside’ (1978a). I argue that even though
much has changed in the countryside since Turton wrote this piece –
changes that Turton himself has helped track – there is also much that
has remained strikingly similar. Moreover, while social theory necessa-
rily evolves with new struggles, there is also too frequently a strained ef-
fort to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in much analysis of contemporary Thailand,
and against this backdrop I suggest that analyses like Turton’s might ef-
fectively inform our understanding of struggles today, including the po-
litical crisis of 2005 to the present.
The Roots of Conflict volume in geographical-historical
perspective
To appreciate the contribution to Anglophone Thai and Southeast Asian
Studies made by the Roots of Conflict volume, it is important to empha-
size the state of the field as of the 1960s.1 Before the Vietnam War be-
came a major political issue in the United States, much Southeast Asia
scholarship – notwithstanding many remarkable and intellectually valu-
able works – was marked by a deep political conservatism, some of this
informed by Orientalist precepts about Asian Others. Representative in
this regard was David Wilson’s by now much-maligned claim that Thai
peasants were deeply apolitical (1962: 58; cf. Anderson 1978; Bell
1982), a claim very quickly disproved by political events.
A dialectical process connecting protests against the Vietnam War to
the aspirations of various dissident scholars began to change this ter-
rain by the late 1960s. Reflective of the changes was the emergence of
two new Asian Studies journals committed to promoting radical, left-
leaning interpretations of issues in the region – the Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars (now called Critical Asian Studies), founded in 1970, and
the Journal of Contemporary Asia, also founded in 1970 (Allen 1989; He-
wison 2007). The two journals have had, from their inception to the
present, overlapping and generally complementary approaches. Based
primarily in the United States, the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars/
Critical Asian Studies has perhaps placed a slightly greater emphasis on
the impact of forces ‘external’ to Asia, such as US imperialism during
the Vietnam War era. Based primarily in the Philippines, the Journal of
Contemporary Asia has placed a slightly greater emphasis on the impact
of forces ‘internal’ to Asia, such as local and national class processes.
While there is always ample scope for differences of opinion as to the
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relative importance of such forces in any given context, neither journal
has been entirely doctrinaire in its approach, and collectively the two be-
gan to transform the field of Asian Studies by creating more space for
radical and heterodox opinion.
These two journals have, in recent years, been subject to the same
commercial pressures as all academic journals: both are now published
by Routledge (Critical Asian Studies since 2000 under its new name,
and the Journal of Contemporary Asia since 2006). The varied effects of
increased corporate ownership of journals on radical academic work is
an important topic that I cannot address here. I note the matter in pas-
sing solely because whatever may be the new constraints on attempts
by radical academics to find a substantial audience, we should not ima-
gine that these constraints were minimal in the 1960s or 1970s. As a
number of reflections on left-leaning analysis of Asia during the Viet-
nam War era have noted, the environment for production of such work
was generally stultifying and even intimidating, with scholars being en-
couraged by received academic habit to produce work that was either
politically irrelevant or conservative (Anderson 1978; Bell 1982). At the
same time, the incentive structure and social environment of the acad-
emy made it difficult for many younger, radical scholars to produce
their work and find their way into rewarding and socially comfortable
academic careers (Allen 1989).
Against this backdrop, the production of radical, left-leaning scholar-
ship on Asia was not a trivial accomplishment, and the contributions of
the Roots of Crisis volume should be placed in this context. Even by the
mid-1970s, with the emergence of more radical scholarship throughout
the academy, perspectives like those expressed in the Roots of Crisis vo-
lume were having to prove themselves against considerable institutional
inertia, scholarly criticism and even politicised retribution (see e.g. Wi-
kipedia 2008). Moreover, although area studies had begun to transform
methodological and theoretical approaches to the study of places like
Southeast Asia (Wallerstein et al. 1996: 36-48; Anderson 1998: 9-12),
the politics of Asian Studies proved somewhat more challenging to
transform than those of fields like Latin American Studies, whose ma-
jor scholarly organisation was antagonistic to various US imperial ven-
tures in ways that had been far less characteristic of Asian Studies orga-
nisations (Chomsky 1988: 204-205; cf. Wakin: 1992).
As a result of the efforts of the new generation of radical Asian scho-
lars in the 1960s and 1970s, the public terrain of intellectual struggle
in the Anglophone world was transformed. Bruce Cumings has noted
that in the 1950s, when the Korean War broke out, there was little scho-
larly or journalistic work being done to place the war in a radical or cri-
tical interpretive framework – one of the major, honorable exceptions
being the courageous and relatively far-sighted work of I.F. Stone
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(Cumings 1990: 106-107, 638, 642). By the middle of the 1970s, when
the coup in Thailand occurred, people wishing to read critical accounts
of such events could find them in a number of places beyond stray
newsletters produced by individuals. In 1977, for example, Thadeus
Flood published an early and remarkable analysis of the coup in a news-
letter for the Indochina Resource Center (1977). In the same year, the
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars ran an issue with a number of ana-
lyses of the coup, including Benedict Anderson’s important and much-
cited article (1977).
The Roots of Conflict issue of the Journal of Contemporary Asia built on
this body of radical analysis of contemporary events. Most of the articles
were not on the coup per se, but attempted to provide the kind of geo-
graphical-historical and analytical perspective that could make sense of
the coup and ongoing social struggles in Thailand in its wake. The titles
of the articles in the volume give a sense of the breadth and depth of
the concerns the authors raised as they attempted to anticipate likely fu-
ture developments by placing the most recent events in the context of
longer-term trajectories: ‘Thailand and Imperialist Strategy in the
1980s’ by Malcolm Caldwell; ‘The Socio-Economic Foundation of Mod-
ern Thailand’ by David Elliott; “Cycles” of Class Struggle in Thailand’
by Peter F. Bell; ‘Causes and Consequences of the October ’76 Coup’
by Kraisak Choonhavan (writing under the pen name of Marian Mallet);
‘The Current Situation in the Thai Countryside’ by Turton; and ‘History
and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand’ by Patrice de Beer.2 In
what follows, I focus especially on Turton’s article, but I also make re-
ference to some of these other pieces, as well as to the general context
of their production that I have outlined here.
‘The Current Situation in the Thai Countryside’ – then
Although Turton’s article addressed the situation in the countryside, it
in fact did much more than focus on peasants, farmers or rural com-
munities. Turton situated these actors in relation to the broader array of
forces at work in Thai society. Indeed, he began with an overview of
how Thai agriculture and agrarian social relations had been trans-
formed by the Bowring Treaty of 1855 and tracked many of the changes
set in motion by this event up to the 1970s (1978a: 105-6). Turton did
devote considerable space to the details of agrarian social life: rural de-
mographics and social structure, rice yields and other such mainstays
of agricultural economics occupy an important position in the analysis
(ibid. 106 ff.). But Turton also articulated this analysis with a discussion
of various aspects of the Thai social structure that must be dealt with in
broader political economic terms. For example, Turton noted that gener-
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alisations about the incomes of agrarian households and rural regions
masked crucial distinctions within these regions – e.g. between local of-
ficials and small to medium-scale capitalists on the one side, and house-
holds still involved in near-subsistence agriculture, on the other (ibid.
109). Turton was to make much more of these kinds of distinctions in
his subsequent work in the 1980s, helping to fill out a detailed and ro-
bust picture of the complex social transformations occurring in Thai
rural society (e.g. Turton 1989a, b; cf. Hirsch 1989).
While ‘The Current Situation in the Thai Countryside’ thus focused
on many crucial local social relations that articulated agrarian change, it
did not neglect broad regional manifestations of these changes – includ-
ing not only the clearly disadvantaged positions of Northeastern and
Northern villagers as a whole (1978a: 108, 112-3) but the ways govern-
ment policies targeted these regions – both to further ongoing transfor-
mations and to suppress opposition (ibid. 115-121). In this context, Tur-
ton analysed the activities – and state repression – of the Peasant Fed-
eration of Thailand (PFT), one of the most important manifestations
during the 1970s of peasants’ autonomous capacity to struggle for the
improvement of their lives (ibid. 121 ff.). While the PFT was defeated by
force, it was an important indicator of both the gnawing inequalities of
Thai society and the will of the least privileged to challenge them.
What Turton’s analysis of the current situation in the Thai country-
side was thus able to do was to map out some of the socio-spatial differ-
entiation occurring as part of counter-insurgency/development, while
making a strong case for the ways this geographically-variegated process
of class differentiation was contributing to the forms taken by resis-
tance. Turton noted that the PFT developed an especially strong base in
the Chiang Mai Valley, where landholding was highly concentrated, and
tenancy and indebtedness considerable (1978a: 111-114, 122-125). This
crucial observation has been much neglected by subsequent analysts
who – following the thinking of the counter-insurgency leaders them-
selves – have tended to identify discontent solely with groups such as
ethnically Lao peasants from the Northeast, ‘hill tribes’ from the North
and Muslim Malays from the South, groups that are portrayed as mar-
ginal and as having been ‘excluded’ from development (cf. Rigg 2003:
162). What Turton’s analysis of the PFT clearly showed was that discon-
tent with capitalist development outcomes was being produced precisely
among groups that were being fully included in development, the very
peasants who were being forcibly converted into cash crop farmers,
agricultural tenants and farm workers (Glassman 2004a: 65-71).
Like Turton’s analysis, other pieces in the Roots of Conflict volume
brought into focus how development was not merely a technical process
that brought new opportunities to the countryside but a deeply political
process that stimulated considerable political conflict. Bell’s analysis of
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the ‘cycles of struggle’, for example, placed the political upheavals of
the 1970s in the context of different waves of political struggle through-
out the 20th century, thus adding historical depth to the debunking of
Wilson’s claim about the apolitical character of the Thai peasantry. He
also focused specifically on how a number of the rural development
schemes promoted as part of counter-insurgency/development were
contributing to a further polarization and intensification of conflict (Bell
1978: 62-70). Similarly, Mallet’s piece associated the rise of radicalism
in the 1970s with not only student activism but also worker and peasant
discontent over the conditions of life connected with Thailand’s process
of development (1978: 80-82).
In all of this process of class-based upheaval, issues of ideological
struggle and transformation were clearly of central significance.
Although only devoting a few pages to ideological aspects of the con-
flict, Turton made several observations that have special resonance. Ad-
dressing the fact that Thai peasants were typically seen – by Thai elites
and American development specialists – as conservative and deferent to
the traditional Thai triumvirate of ‘nation, religion and king’, Turton
pointed out that ‘villagers have begun to adopt more questioning atti-
tudes, and newer concepts have begun to acquire high or equal priority:
democracy, justice, equality, liberty, and national sovereignty’ (1978a:
127). Indeed, even within areas such as the Chiang Mai Valley, where
considerable repression was exercised by Thai state officials (ibid. 122-
123), the emergence of the PFT allowed villagers to become ‘more inde-
pendent, outspoken, and confident’ (ibid. 129). In short, Turton was
alert to not only the interests of peasants in challenging authority but
their ability – in the right circumstances – to do so, and to do so of their
own highly conscious accord, a point deserving emphasis in the present
moment of political struggles in Northern and Northeastern Thailand.
Indeed, it is in this assertion regarding the interests and conscious-
ness of villagers, I believe, that Turton’s analysis of the situation in the
1970s retains its salience. To be sure, much has changed since he wrote
this article. Little remains today, for example, that could truly be called
subsistence production, and it is probably more accurate to think of most
agrarians now as at least semi-commercial farmers rather than simple
peasants. Nonetheless, those farmers, like their peasant and PFT fore-
bears, still struggle, using multiple livelihoods (and political) strategies,
to limit the incessantly growing gap between their prospects and those of
privileged groups in Bangkok as well as among the provincial elite. The
triumphalism that overtook much conservative Thai scholarship by the
1980s and 1990s temporarily made this easier to overlook: the 1980s
had not become revolutionary and the peasantry had not gone Maoist –
indeed most had steered clear of or rejected the Communist Party of
Thailand (CPT). Therefore, argued those who were satisfied, the regional
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and social disparities that had agitated some analysts so much were not
as crucial as they were made out to be – indeed, they were inevitable and
temporary – and Thailand could now concentrate on becoming the next
‘tiger’ or ‘newly industrialising country’ (see e.g. Muscat 1994: 248).
But the 1990s were to prove nearly as cruel to the celebrants of capi-
talist victory as the 1980s had proved to those who hoped for capitalist
defeat. Amid both booming growth and booming disparities, new
rounds of social struggles emerged with renewed vigour – those of
Bangkok workers (Glassman 2004a: 101-104), Northeast farmers (Som-
chai 2006) and villagers throughout the country whose livelihoods were
being destroyed by development projects (Missingham 2004). Then the
boom went bust, leaving many struggling not only to recover but to ex-
plain. And while the bust also forced forms of restructuring that helped
weaken many of the renewed social struggles, it also made clear that
Thailand’s development trajectory was never going to be smooth and
conflict-free (Bell 2003; Glassman 2004a: 174-202).
‘The Current Situation in the Thai Countryside’ – now
Indeed, many of the kinds of savage disparities Turton had outlined,
and the social struggles they helped produce, have become yet more
salient amid the recent changes in Thailand. Indicative here is the way
Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party was able to build
broad support for an agenda that promised to redress many of these in-
equalities. While TRT started out as a party of big business, it made it-
self a formidable force by enrolling both many of the small and med-
ium-scale rural businesses whose importance Turton had noted earlier
and – sometimes through such actors – the much broader communities
of farmers and villagers whose fortunes had not been well served by
either the boom or the bust (Glassman 2004b; Pasuk & Baker 2004:
80-82; Ungpakorn 2007: 16-17). Certainly, not all had remained the
same in the countryside since the 1970s. Overall, in spite of highly un-
even development, material standards of living had generally improved,
in part because counter-insurgency/development had in fact bequeathed
some material benefits, in part because there was eventually some
‘trickle down’ from urban-industrial growth, and in part because nu-
merous villagers migrated in increased numbers to Bangkok and else-
where for industrial employment, while their households learned to get
by through increasingly diversified economic strategies (Glassman
2004a: 160-161). None of this, however, prevented an ongoing process
of polarization that left increasing numbers of people up-country feeling
even poorer relative to better-off groups that included most Bangkok
middle classes (ibid. 161-168).
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At the same time, and in part because of the efforts of rural and ur-
ban working class groups (Ungpakorn 1997; Ockey 2004), new demo-
cratic spaces were opened in Thailand by the end of the period of eco-
nomic boom (from 1986 to 1996). Within these spaces, those who had
benefited less from the boom began to register a number of demands,
ranging from higher wages and better working conditions to mainte-
nance of rural livelihoods and control over the resources necessary for
this (Hirsch 2001; Glassman 2002, 2004a: 102-103; Missingham
2004). In addition, with the opening of more parliamentary space, the
kinds of rural political leaders who had been spawned by the processes
Turton described began to descend on Bangkok, using the state and
their majority constituencies as a means by which to try to extract more
resources for themselves and their backers (McVey 2000). Conservative
and traditional elites within the national state contrived a number of
means to try to limit the new forms of political participation by subal-
tern groups, while Bangkok middle classes grumbled about the rather
sordid image of a Thai democracy putatively subverted by rural political
bosses (Pasuk & Sungsidh 1994). By 1997, these tensions were in-
grained within the new constitution, a document that managed to pro-
tect many forms of traditional authority, including that of the monarchy,
while institutionalising in limited forms some of the gains made by so-
cial movement actors earlier in the decade (Connors 2007, 2008).
Against this backdrop, Thaksin and TRT ended up posing a challenge
to specific forms of elite power. Using the backing he could get from
villagers for TRT’s ‘populist’ programmes in the countryside, Thaksin
gained a considerable hold on portions of the state. Notably, his ap-
proach was entrepreneurial and openly pro-capitalist, promising villa-
gers support for their commercial activities and opportunities to be-
come rich like the prime minister himself (Pasuk & Baker 2004: 112-
118). This was not an approach that played well with rural groups that
remained committed to direct class struggle, such as members of the
Northern Farmers Network, fighting to gain title to the land of absentee
landlords in Lamphun in the Chiang Mai Valley (Glassman 2004b: 52).
But for a number of other agrarian groups, TRT policies at least offered
forms of economic support – such as debt moratoriums and loans, not
to mention the highly popular national health insurance scheme – that
had not been on offer before. As such, TRT consolidated considerable
popularity within rural areas of the North and Northeast (Somchai
2008; Walker 2008).
Yet popularity was not enough to preserve Thaksin’s regime. To deli-
ver the goods to the countryside, TRT had to begin co-opting or displa-
cing some of the local state leaders who had come to power within the
Cold War state. This put TRT on a collision course with royalists in the
Thai state, especially when Thaksin began to try to replace the military-
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administrative structures of the South (McCargo 2005, 2006). While
Thaksin’s regime had committed numerous human rights abuses and
violations of civil liberties that would have provided ample basis for le-
gitimate popular opposition (Glassman 2004b; Pasuk & Baker 2004:
144-167), most of Thai society remained mute on these issues until roy-
alist and elite sentiment turned against Thaksin in 2005 (Kasian 2006;
Thongchai 2008; Ukrist 2008). Indeed, even some of Thaksin’s most
egregious policies, such as the extrajudicial slaughter of more than two
thousand people during the 2003 ‘war on drugs,’ may have gained him
a certain popularity among those who saw him as a decisive leader at-
tempting to deal with social problems (Walker 2008: 100). More gener-
ally, whatever people in the countryside liked or disliked about Thaksin,
they saw the TRT government as providing some forms of support that
addressed their concerns about long-standing Bangkok-centrism, as well
as about corrupt and violent local leaders, who they hoped would lose
power in the context of the TRT state’s attempt to create new patronage
networks (Somchai 2008; Walker 2008).
This was not the view of either the royalists or the Bangkok middle
classes, and they thus played a central role in backing the military ous-
ter of Thaksin’s government in 2006 (Pasuk & Baker 2008; Ukrist
2008) as well as in destabilising the People’s Power Party (PPP) govern-
ment, which was elected in late 2007 on the strength of its association
with TRT policies (Glassman 2009). In short, as Thailand’s develop-
ment processes have evolved, the growing, class-based divide within the
country, with its profound and obvious spatial dimensions, has comple-
tely overtaken intellectually lazy, modernisation-theoretic and neoliberal
assumptions about the natural flowering of democracy in a context of
‘free markets’. In this sense, the socio-spatial polarization of Thailand
that Turton highlighted in 1978 has evolved even further, and the failure
of mainstream social theorists to adequately comprehend its basis and
significance when they dismissed arguments like those put forward in
the Roots of Crisis volume has come back to haunt them.
Conclusion
In 2008, the Journal of Contemporary Asia devoted a special issue to the
2006 coup in Thailand, the first full issue of the journal devoted to
Thailand since its Roots of Crisis collection twenty years earlier. As the
editors of the 2008 special issue, Michael K. Connors and Kevin Hewi-
son, noted (2008, 2):
The articles of the 1978 special issue focused on … the unprece-
dented social divisions and class struggles that had been revealed
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… That a second Journal of Contemporary Asia special issue on
Thailand should be produced following another coup is entirely
appropriate. Thaksin Shinawatra, the only Thai prime minister
to win two successive general elections, was overthrown on 19
September 2006. Projecting himself as the political saviour of
the domestic capitalist class following the 1997 economic melt-
down, Thaksin led a political party that had changed the nature
of Thailand’s politics while also generating remarkable divisions
within the country.
Yet Thaksin’s regime did not merely create remarkable divisions; it both
remade and exacerbated older ones, including Thailand’s intertwined
class and urban-rural divides.
In this sense, even though the PFT and CPT have long since collapsed
and been displaced by right-wing populist political structures, the strug-
gles that animated their existence have continued into the present
(Hewison & Rodan 1994). And what is illustrated by Thailand’s current
political imbroglio is that if these struggles do not gain expression
through leftist parties and organisations committed to progressive politi-
cal transformations, like the PFT, then they will gain expression through
actions such as attempts of opportunist populists to capture and use
those struggles. Indeed, the increasingly loud expression of discontent in
the North and Northeast since 2006 at the policies and preferences of
the coup makers in Bangkok speaks to the continuing relevance of the re-
gionalised social divisions Turton analysed in the 1970s (see Keyes, this
volume). Moreover, while numerous foreign observers continue to be
dazzled by images of love for the King, a not-so-subtle subtext of distaste
for the ways royalism is used to subvert democracy has become readily
evident to those who care to look (Glassman, forthcoming). The mere
fact that TRT/PPP have repeatedly won elections, even when they are un-
derstood to be disliked by the royalists, and that charges of lèse majesté
are once again being liberally used against any and all perceived oppo-
nents of royalist power, indicates that values such as democracy and so-
cial justice are coming into conflict with the privileges maintained by
elites through traditional forms of institutional authority. As Turton and
his co-authors in the Roots of Crisis volume rightly noted, Thai villagers
are not incapable of developing quite critical perspectives on power, and
indeed it is in their interests to do so.
Turton’s analysis of the severe socio-spatial class divide in Thailand,
and the political-ideological possibilities this generates, is thus an im-
portant and enduring contribution, as I see it. Turton’s conclusions,
while far more conditional than those of the lead editorial in the Roots
of Conflict volume, also pointed to the prospects for revolutionary strug-
gle: ‘If the opposition, and crucially the poor peasants and their allies,
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make this [revolutionary] choice then it is hard to see how the conflict
could be resolved without armed struggle of a qualitatively new kind
and level of intensity’ (1978a: 135). Of course, with historical hindsight,
we can say that although the armed struggle did briefly intensify in the
late 1970s, not as many peasants made this choice as the CPT might
have hoped, and some relatively adroit ‘velvet-glove’ counter-insurgency
strategies implemented from 1978 onwards by the Thai state in fact pre-
vented the revolutionary struggle from reaching the level of intensity
that the CPT had hoped it would reach (Gawin 1990). But the fact that
the revolution did not occur has not relieved Thailand from having to
deal with social problems like those Turton so carefully outlined.
A comforting myth beloved of capitalist planners is that the problems
of capitalism – uneven development, growing social disparity, political
conflict and so on – are fundamentally external to the system, caused by
loathed ‘Others’ who range from ‘terrorists’ and communist infiltrators
to criminals and ‘welfare cheats’. This comforting mythology is just
that; many of capitalist societies’ most crucial social problems are en-
tirely ‘endogenous’, generated out of the social struggles that are central
to capitalist development. Even if the loathed ‘Others’ disappear or their
institutions collapse – as with the PFT and the CPT – the problems and
social struggles generated by capitalist social relations will remain, in
Thailand as elsewhere in the world.
Turton’s analysis of Thai society in the 1970s powerfully highlighted
these problems internal to capitalism: the growth of the PFT and the
CPT was not their cause but their expression. When the PFT and CPT
collapsed, the form of expression of those struggles changed, mutating
further as the rural social structures in which many of them were em-
bedded were further transformed by capitalist development. Like Turton
himself, social scientists studying current Thai social conflicts will have
to continually build and adapt their analytical tools, but they have no
reason to abandon the crucial insights about the enduring features of
social struggles that Turton called attention to three decades ago.
Notes
1 I focus here, for reasons of the limits of my own competence and familiarity, solely
on the English-language scholarship on Thailand and Southeast Asia. This includes
work by scholars not only from the Anglophone world but scholars from elsewhere
writing in English. Needless to say, this cannot be taken to adequately represent what
was being written in other languages.
2 The identity of Marian Mallett was only revealed as Kraisak Choonhavan, a well-
known scholar and political figure in Thailand, in 2008 at the ICTS Conference
where the chapters in this book were first presented, by Andrew Turton with Kraisak’s
permission. [Eds.]
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Turton dancing with Thai woman in Lumpini, 1 May 1976
5 Censorship and Authoritative Forms of
Discourse: A Reconsideration of Thai
Constructions of Knowledge
Nicholas Tapp
Introduction: coherence
In this paper I attempt to locate Andrew Turton’s work (notably Turton
1984; 1991b) within the context of a post-structuralist mode of social in-
quiry which was replacing earlier assumptions of social and cultural
homogeneity. The trend away from a purely class-oriented analysis in
Turton’s work at this time was typical if not prophetic of new under-
standings of Thailand as a rapidly changing, dynamic and complex so-
ciety, and his emphasis on the power of dominant forms of discourse
as well as the exceptions to this in popular consciousness and practice
has continued to prove salient to appreciations of the role of informa-
tion control and censorship in the Thaksin era. These works can be un-
derstood not only in terms of the changing nature of Thai society but
also in terms of a general theoretical shift towards interpretive ap-
proaches in anthropology. Some recent approaches, which I examine in
conclusion, seem bound to an interpretive mode of analysis while hav-
ing lost some of the rootedness this earlier work had in an analysis of
the suppressed and subordinated, with its faith in the importance of
the unrecognised. At the same time, new moves toward a post-hegemo-
nic understanding of power – of power understood as a kind of potenti-
ality – ironically reflect the same kind of discomfort with totalisation
that Turton’s works considered here displayed.
Turton’s work has probably always been deeply concerned with the
interface of the elite with the popular, or local, and in the introduction
to the co-edited collection Thai Constructions of Knowledge (Manas & Tur-
ton 1991), this was expressed particularly clearly, in a new mode that be-
came paradigmatic for studies of Thai society that followed it. Here we
find the concern expressed with ‘what becomes interesting, useful and
proper to know’, and a focus outlined on ‘how topics and discourses be-
come authorised, constructed, regulated, suppressed, and subverted’.
These theoretical orientations were outlined against a backdrop of cur-
rent analyses of Thai society itself and its changing historical forma-
tions. The argument was against ‘the idea of a unitary, essential Thai
culture’ based on ‘fundamental cultural axioms or principles’. The work
raised the question of what, given the Foucauldian connections of
power with knowledge taken up in this work, makes particular forms of
knowledge, textualised or otherwise, ‘doxic’, in Bourdieu’s sense of that
which makes the natural and social worlds appear self-evident to us
(1977: 167), which ‘goes without saying because it comes without say-
ing’. It also raised the question of whether it is the case that those
forms of knowledge that tend towards the ‘unstatable’ are thereby, since
they are less explicit, less contestable? So the attention is turned to the
power of rhetoric, where the work of Maurice Bloch (1975) on formal
rhetorical political speech in its Bernsteinian ‘restrictive code’ aspects is
referred to, and discourse is located within a continuum, from poetics
towards political speech, and then towards political executions and ex-
trajudicial killings, seen as examples of the force resorted to when the
persuasion required for hegemonic domination fails.
Turton’s own article in this collection is crucial, for here he outlined
his discomfort, although it is a respectful one, with Tambiah’s unitary
structuralist model of ideological coherence of disparate elements in vil-
lage spirit worship (1970); there may in fact be real cognitive disso-
nance, Turton argues, when villagers take off their amulets before per-
forming Buddhist rites (1991a). Catherine Bell (1989, 1992) ably
sketched a new phase of religious studies in her description of the post-
modern paradigms of heterogeneity and dissonance that replaced ear-
lier structuralist coherences. And in Turton’s article in this collection
(1991a) one could see this new phase clearly signalled, with constant re-
ference to the ideas of invulnerability which, Turton suggests, may form
some kind of response to power, and to the ‘immobilising’ effects of
fear and silence that mechanisms of social exclusion and terror, asso-
ciated with powerful forms of domination, bring about. Notions of in-
vulnerability, as he had said previously, are crucial if fear can be seen as
mediating ‘between coercion and consent’ in a society (1984), and such
an approach was predicated on the vision of a complex society in which
dominant ideas could be contested. In Thai Constructions of Knowledge
(TCK), Thai society itself is painted in terms of fragmentations and dis-
sonances, contradictions and heterogeneities (‘heterogeneity, decentre-
deness, dispersal, fragmentation’), in startling contrast to earlier para-
digms of Thai society in terms of changeless consistency and cultural
homogeneity. It was this of course which led to Turton’s later work on
ethnicity and social identities in Thailand (2000).
However, many of these concerns had been flagged much earlier, in
the short introduction to the (1984) collection History and Peasant Con-
sciousness in Southeast Asia, which was written together with Shigeharu
Tanabe (Turton & Tanabe 1984b), and in Turton’s own major article in
that collection (‘Limits of Ideological Domination and the Formation of
Social Consciousness’). Many of the remarks in this article are so topi-
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cal that it is needful to remind oneself that it was written some time be-
fore 1984. Here we have the direct attempt to engage critically with the-
ories of ideology in the context of the Thai social formation, a social for-
mation which, it was becoming increasingly clear, could not be reduced
in any simplistic way to the mechanisms of exclusively defined classes
as they had been classically understood (Laclau 1977; Laclau & Mouffe
1985, 2001).1 It is here that the project to look at the ‘relation between
ideological and other forms of domination or subjectification or reifica-
tion’ was announced, and this was explicitly associated with how we
were to understand the changing nature of Thai society, and the ques-
tion of the ‘relative autonomy of local communities’ in their relation-
ship with the state, both in fact and as a ‘cognitive/ideological construc-
tion’ (Turton & Tanabe 1984b). There is great attention paid here to the
apparently successful way in which, in Thailand, alternative forms of
discourse appeared to have been ‘co-opted’ by the state, and to the dia-
lectical relations between forms of dominance, persuasion and consent.
A Gramscian model of hegemony was adopted, which forced the atten-
tion not just towards local institutions, but also towards ‘non-institu-
tional, informal, extra-judicial ... social forces’ (Turton 1984). Here al-
ready we were enjoined not only to focus on fixed or structured forms
of identity, but on ‘fragmented, less articulate, and everyday forms of
popular culture and consciousness’ (Turton & Tanabe 1984b). There is
a constant concern with creativity – with what has since then come to
be called ‘agency’ – in many of these statements, and at the same time
with informal power structures at the local level, typified by such apical
figures as thugs, spies and informers.2 What really could be more sali-
ent or important in the Thaksin era, when we saw an effective silencing
of media debate under the guise of a self-censored ‘free press’ (see Thi-
tinan 1997; Ubonrat 2007), itself challenged by the reversion to an ear-
lier and more overt form of militaristic state force?
Consciousness
Although difficult to summarise in its reach, the ‘Limits of Ideological
Domination’ article particularly highlighted the ‘constitution’ (and ‘re-
constitution’!) of social subjects through ritual discourse, such as ‘ri-
tuals of expulsion’ and inclusion, from suukhwan (‘calling the spirits’)
to ‘Village Scout’ rituals, the importance of understanding ‘local power
structures’, and the prevalence of violence in Thai society.
Nobody perhaps has yet really come to grips with a genuine analysis
of these local forms of power so prevalent in Thailand and some neigh-
bouring countries, associated with magical beliefs and masculinity and
status, tattooing and blessing and, indeed, beliefs in ‘invulnerability’.3
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Yet these discussions of state ideology and popular forms of resistance
and autonomy certainly pointed research towards this direction. Here
we had something of a framework for the theoretical understanding
and analysis of mechanisms of violence and consent within a historical
framework. The struggle of Turton and others in this field has perhaps
constantly been against both a kind of ‘culturalism’, which was seen to
be the result of a certain kind of conservative anthropology concerned
with the reproduction of social forms, and at the same time against a
dominating nationalist rhetoric in Thailand, which constantly sought to
downplay the realities of social difference in the interests of a common
assumed unity. It has now become almost commonplace to see culture
as a site of struggle, and the older disciplinary boundaries between poli-
tics and culture, economics and ritual have largely broken down or dis-
solved entirely in new understandings of the politics of cultural differ-
ence.4 Yet in the Thai, and wider, context, I would argue that the work
of Turton has been fundamental in opening paths and guiding the way
towards new forms of engaged research, more nuanced understandings
of historical processes, and the mechanisms of social exclusion and in-
clusion, accommodation and resistance that build up a complex and
highly differentiated society.
What has interested me particularly as a result of all this, and in my
own work, has been the attempt to understand tacit or implicit forms of
knowledge, which have exercised indeed many anthropologists and so-
cial scientists. It seems clear that the old ‘dominant ideology’ thesis, as-
sociated with a functionalist Marxism, had much in common with clas-
sic anthropological understandings of society and culture which tended
to depict them as seamless wholes, unitary bodies with – as Turton says
in the introduction to TCK – fundamental guiding principles of an ex-
plicit and articulate kind. The primacy of assumptions of ‘false con-
sciousness’ that arose from the holistic thesis of a monolithic, dominant
ideology was modified on the one hand by Gramsci, who pointed to the
importance of what he called ‘common sense’ as a fragmentary dis-
course of scattered folk perceptions that could not always be made into
the sort of seamless wholes beloved of elites, and on the other by
Althusser, who showed ideology as working not only through the re-
pressive apparatus of the state, but also through other everyday ‘ideolo-
gical state apparatuses’ such as the family, media, church or school, and
moreover working at a semi-conscious and barely realised level, to con-
stitute its ‘subjects’.5 To that duo, who broadened and expanded the no-
tion of ideology beyond formal state structures and beyond the level of
conscious awareness, we should add Foucault. Foucault has been a ma-
jor influence on Turton and colleagues in many ways, but let us just
consider him here as yet another theorist who showed us the ‘uncon-
scious’ workings of ideological ‘discourse’ in its materiality and practical
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implications, in our everyday lives. And Raymond Williams’ notion of
the ‘structure of feeling’, that ‘particular sense of life’ or ‘community of
experience hardly needing expression’ (1961) was another important in-
fluence on the approach to ideology and consciousness considered here,
marking a new reconsideration of the role of emergent cultural activ-
ities in potentially transforming or changing formal social structures.6
Space and architecture are of course primary arenas in which this
kind of semi-conscious, ideologically informed knowledge has been
shown to particularly express itself, and Turton’s earlier work on domes-
tic architecture in North Thailand showed an awareness of this (1978b).
Bourdieu’s work on the Kabyle house was similarly influential in con-
structing a theory of the habitus that was largely unconscious, or ‘doxic’
as Turton was later to put it (Bourdieu 1977, 1979; Turton 1991b).
Gramsci’s notion of ‘common sense’ was as something fragmentary
and incoherent, full of contradictions and incoherencies which to some
extent escaped the frameworking of dominant ideologies, since it was
partly based on a direct perception of the world and tied to practical ac-
tivity in the world. This opened a space for the reconsideration of popu-
lar knowledge as potentially liberating, a contrast Bloch (1977, 1991)
was also to build on his argument for a radical difference between a so-
cially determined ‘ritual consciousness’ and unideological ‘practical’
knowledge, although to some extent this still reflected the older positi-
vistic Marxian divisions between ‘science’ and ‘ideology’.7 For Gramsci,
‘common sense’ might be found in folk tales and folk perceptions,
myths and fragmented memories, songs, superstitions and proverbs of
varying truth value, and while expressing a habituated view of society
and the world, was potentially free from susceptibility to the bricolaging
activities of dominant ideologies, as a result precisely of the ‘unsystema-
ticness’ which – as Turton remarked in the TCK article on ‘Invulnerabil-
ity and local knowledge’ (1991a) – may be the ‘normal condition of pop-
ular knowledge’. It was in that unsystematicness of popular wisdom,
then, that some ability to contest the dominant representations of power
might perhaps be located. Just how ‘doxic’ was this practical, or popular,
consciousness, and to what extent did it form an implicit critique of
dominant social forms?
On the one hand, then, we had an argument tending towards a new
view of practical common sense and popular consciousness as poten-
tially escaping the bounds of the ideological, something in touch with
what Margaret Archer (2000) calls the orders of nature and practice,
after a more Gramscian than a Foucauldian model. On the other hand,
we had Clifford Geertz – the American cultural anthropologist and har-
binger of the new turn towards an ‘interpretive’ anthropology which
some have glossed as post-modern – arguing for common sense as dee-
ply ideological, in the older sense of that term, as precisely that which
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is, as Turton said it might be, uncontestable because it is so deep-rooted
in our psyches and everyday practices (Geertz 1983a). Geertz’s view had
more in common with Foucault than with Gramsci and, as with much
of Foucault’s work, raised the question of how social change could ever
occur, what were the limits indeed of an ideologically conditioned and
coloured view of the world. If state-sanctioned force and violence could
be seen as marking the breakdown of hegemonic power, might popular
consciousness be approached as a kind of repository of passive resis-
tance to the domination of the powerful, or did it mark an even deeper
encroachment of the ideological into the very fabric of our everyday
lives?
One of the best examples I know of the kind of unsystematic, deep-
rooted tacit or habitual knowledge of which Geertz and in a different
way Foucault both spoke, comes from Chinese ethnography, in an arti-
cle by Xin Liu on the cave dwellings of Shaanxi (1998), which showed
how implicit social hierarchies (between seniors and juniors, men and
women), which were reflected in the habitual use of domestic space
(like seating arrangements), remained almost entirely untouched by the
efforts of the Maoist revolution to radically disrupt and alter such hier-
erachies, precisely because they were so silent, accepted, unthought and
unspoken. That kind of silence of course is quite different from the si-
lence that results from fear and intimidation, of which Turton (1984)
speaks often, the ‘khit ork phuut mai ork’ of the weak farmer confronted
by the powerful official.8 Yet it reaches to a further depth of tacit, impli-
cit, popular knowledge and ways of being that Turton’s work also often
touches. Indeed Xin Liu expresses his awareness of the strength of such
unarticulated consciousness, if we can call it consciousness at all, when
he begins his article with a quotation from Bourdieu: ‘It is because
agents never know completely what they are doing that what they do
has more sense than they know’ (Bourdieu 1990).
And of course that perception is itself deeply sociological, speaking of
a profound depth of unawareness which calls for analysis rather than
description, and for explanation rather than mere understanding. As
Stephan Feuchtwang (1975) once put it, ‘If social relations were self-
evident there would be no need for social science’. Some form of ‘false
consciousness’ assumptions are indeed embedded in mainstream social
theory itself, without any necessary recourse to Marxist paradigms.9
Although we have been talking here more about a level of knowledge
that is partially conscious, partially unconscious, something like an ice-
berg partially submerged, this also involves the assumption of a level at
which actors may not realise why or how they really behave. It is aware-
ness of these levels of suppressed, unreflected, or simply unrealised
consciousness which, I think, much so-called ‘postmodern’ analysis
misses, and I return to this point in the final section of this paper.
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The attempt to archaeologically excavate such depths of perception,
or semi-perception, raised important questions about the ‘textuality’ or
otherwise of discourse, and pointed towards the importance of oral nar-
ration techniques and folk transmissions of knowledge in a way which
has maybe paralleled the swing in social theory towards first an anthro-
pology of practice, and then an anthropology of embodiment. Again
Turton signalled this swing very clearly when he spoke of techniques of
‘manual knowledge’, in reference to Viggo Brun’s work (Turton
1984).10 Later this kind of embodied consciousness was to be referred
back to the notion of ‘social memory’ which became popular in the
works of Connerton (1989) and Fentress and Wickham (1992), and
somewhat similarly could be seen as a site of passive resistance to
dominant powerful interests. Xin Liu’s example is interesting, though,
because while the unreflective continuation of everyday spatial practices
might be seen as a ‘doxic’ resistance to social change, to the extent that
revolutionary change was here imposed from the outside and with mas-
sive state sanction, it might also be seen as a form of passive resistance
or ‘weapon of the weak’, in Scott’s sense (1985).
With somewhat similar concerns, Bloch (1982, 1986) was to make
good use of Dan Sperber’s (1985) work on semi-propositional ‘represen-
tational’ beliefs, like convictions or culturally bound assumptions, which
might be only half-understood and therefore not of a verifiable, ‘propo-
sitional’ type. Bloch put forward an argument that ritual could not prop-
erly be understood either by intellectualist approaches which treated ri-
tual as a statement, as ‘saying something’ about the world, or by func-
tionalist approaches which saw ritual as an action, as a kind of activity,
‘doing something’ in the world. In actuality, ritual was neither state-
ment nor action, but something in between. Back in 1975, Sperber had
talked of the importance of ‘tacit knowledge’, which he saw as either
‘implicit’ in the sense that it can be made explicit, or ‘unconscious’, in
understanding cultural symbolism. He also distinguished an ‘encyclope-
diac’ knowledge (of the world) from the ‘semantic’ knowledge (of cate-
gories), and argued that ‘symbolic knowledge’ was something in be-
tween, a kind of learning and remembering, both ritual and verbal, and
not wholly expressible semantically (1975: 108). These distinctions be-
tween habitual or embodied knowledge and our more cognitive theore-
tical knowledge continue to be salient in cognitive anthropology and
neural psychology (Bloch 1991), and the related distinctions between
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ knowledges of a society, tacit and more ‘experi-
ence-distant’ forms of knowledge (Geertz 1983b) not necessarily related
to membership of a society, continue to be discussed.
Returning to Bourdieu’s remark about what agents do having more
sense than they know, which reiterates a classic sociological view as well
as general theories of false consciousness, it may also be taken to be a
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presumptuous one – that somehow we as analysts, as social experts,
must know better than the people who talk to us why it is that they do
the things they do; there is a privileged insight that belongs to the ana-
lyst rather than to the social actor who must remain mystified and con-
fused. And that, of course, raises the whole question of the authority to
speak for the subaltern, which has been most intensively discussed in
the context of South Asian studies, a field Turton has been very aware
of. Passing over Spivak’s notorious remarks about this in the various
versions of her speech questioning the possibility of resurrecting a gen-
uinely subaltern voice at all (e.g. 1988), more recently Hansen (1997)
has provided a useful overview of the subaltern debate and how the pro-
gramme to generate an indigenous voice was itself heir to what he calls
a ‘romanticist communitarian discourse born in the West’. Hansen is
positing a Hegelian kind of dialectic which took place through colonial-
ism, in which images of homogeneous autarkic local communities were
constantly being constructed by contrast with representations of the
dominant West as Other, as modern and progressive and advanced –
images of autarky, which then became necessary sites of struggle and
articulation in resistance to those impositions of state-related forms of
power and authority, in what Spivak (1988b) called a ‘strategic essential-
ism’; and then these images of unequal power relations were being re-
fracted onto the image of the social scientist with his (yes, ‘his’) infor-
mants and interlocutors (Hansen 1997). I think an awareness of subal-
tern studies has been important in Turton’s own work, as too the
familiarity with South American projects stemming from liberation
theology and the work of cultural theorists like the late Leo Alting von
Gesau, to give voice to the marginal and repressed, and to articulate the
unarticulated and perhaps inexpressible. Here social science found an-
other role: to reveal the hidden structures of exploitation and oppression
by articulating forms of cultural consciousness in which a critique of
those structures had been hidden, but at the same time needed to re-
main acutely self-conscious of the dangers of commandeering what
should ideally be an indigenous project of liberation from conditioned
thinking.
All of this leads us to a situation in which it becomes more important
than ever to discuss openly the freedom or monopoly of the press in
Thailand, to reactivate suppressed memories of the 1976 coup as
Thongchai (2002) did, to debate the role of the monarchy and its con-
tinued relevance and the strangely arbitrary laws of lèse majesté. The
processes of co-optation and censorship, of appropriation and domina-
tion, of violence and consent, to which Turton’s work has constantly
drawn attention, have perhaps never been so salient as today, in the very
fierce struggle that continues to take place between what one may still
fairly unblushingly call reactionary and progressive forces. These strug-
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gles are now very largely about what ‘may’ be said and what ‘may not’
be said. It is perhaps when compromise and accommodation become
impossible that power is handed, not to the people, but to extrajudicial
factions among the people that support certain tendencies within Thai
society rather than others (Anderson 1977, 1990; cf. Anderson 1978), as
we saw in the krathing daeng or ‘Red Gaurs’ of the 1970s, in the very
terrible killings and accusations that characterised the 2003/4 ‘war on
drugs’, and in the complete breakdown of communicative public space
which has resulted in the use of force in the South.11 Indeed it might
be argued that it was precisely Thaksin’s resort to popular might12 that
opened the way for his own removal by military force. In terms of the-
ories of social violence, Turton’s work has been fundamental in alerting
us to the importance of these normally suppressed issues of violence
and coercion in the Thai context, and their intimate relations with tacit
understandings and silences, strategic or otherwise. What is particularly
at issue here is those covert processes of subterfuge and silent refusals
to participate, these alternative spaces of identity formation and con-
struction of unorthodox perspectives, which much analysis misses.
Interpretive approaches
Some recent views appear to eschew analysis of this nature in favour of
a kind of appeal to populism. An article by Yoshinori Nishizaki (2007)
compares rural views of corrupt politicians in Thailand to the way Mar-
cos or the Burmese junta leaders may be perceived as ‘rural heroes’ by
farmers in villages.13 Despite the corruption scandals known to sur-
round the well-known figure of politician (and former prime minister)
Banharn Silpa-Archa, Yoshinori stresses that he is seen as a benevolent
pho muang by some.14 In a view that is admittedly social constructionist
and is akin to a stance of ethnomethodological ‘indifference’ (Garfinkel
1967), the argument is that there is no ‘essentially’ depraved or benevo-
lent Banharn; it is all spin (that is my gloss) – what matters is how mor-
al authority is constructed at the village and provincial levels, through
the kind of village ceremonies and meetings with school children the
article well describes.15 This is largely a matter of visibility. Villagers are
‘agnostic’ about Banharn’s corruption, Yoshinori argues, because they
do not see it, but they treat him as a ‘virtuous leader’ because this is
what they do see. Yoshinori explictly criticises ‘false consciousness’ ar-
guments and the condescension of arguments that villagers need edu-
cating in what democracy really means, and he specifically disagrees
with Turton’s ‘limits of ideological domination’ argument (1984) and
with Scott’s account (1985) of covert forms of resistance. This seems to
imply that Yoshinori (in a perhaps Foucauldian way) believes there are
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no limits to ideological domination, that ‘ideology’ is in effect all we
have, and hence constitutes a complete rejection of the sort of debates
we find in, for example, Butler, Laclau and Žižek (2000). Butler refers
there, for instance, to the ‘incompleteness of subject-formation hegemony
requires’ (Butler et al. 2000: 5; my italics). And that admission of in-
completeness in theories of hegemony is vitally important, because it
does open a space for creative reinterpretation and renewals beyond the
limits of what is normally accepted as natural and inevitable. It seems
to me the kind of approach represented by this description of rural un-
derstandings of authority begs important questions of truth and levels
of analysis that are barely touched on by such descriptive accounts.16
An article by Andrew Walker (2008) puts this in a much broader per-
spective. This is similarly a critique of the ‘negative portrayal of rural
electoral culture’ and the view (by both political commentators and the
recent coup leaders) that support for Thaksin provided ‘clear evidence
of voter irrationality’. It is a critique of the view that the ‘Thai populace
lacks the basic characteristics essential for a modern democratic society’
– a view that Walker, in other articles (2001, 2004) as well, also associ-
ates partly with the communitarian valorisation of rural culture as
against its commercialisation and the injection of large amounts of (as
he sees it, necessary) cash into the rural economy, and it forms a rous-
ing dismissal of the view of ‘gormless’ rural voters and a ‘failed demo-
cratic electorate’. Here the argument, following Kerkvliet (2002, 2005),
is for a broader understanding of local politics as involving debate and
cooperation between groups and individuals over local resource alloca-
tion and the values that underpin it and, following Nidhi (2003) on the
role of an unwritten ‘cultural constitution’ in Thailand, that these local
values embody a sort of ‘rural constitution’, which is what shapes the
processes of local elections and political behaviour.17 Relations with the
state are mediated through culturally embedded actors, argues Walker
(2008). The very skilful ethnography in this piece shows us how local
voters do indeed appear to particularly value leaders who are local, and
will therefore understand local priorities, and how they expect various
forms of assistance besides monetary assistance from their representa-
tives. They expect a certain amount of personal aggrandisement by their
leaders, but not too much; and in the case of Thaksin they took consid-
erable pride in the economic achievements of the country and in his
good English, which was seen as a sign of the educational status also
much valued in the local perspective. Thaksin was also admired, says
Walker, for his campaigns such as the ‘war on drugs’, which received
considerable local support and commendation.
It seems to me that the approach here (as in Yoshinori’s article) owes
something to Turton’s longstanding arguments for precisely this sort of
attention to the detail of local situations, yet the conclusions seem to re-
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flect local ideological misapprehensions in a somewhat mimetic way,
with no attempt (in true postmodern style) to ask where truth may actu-
ally lie, or perhaps more pertinently, to probe alternatives to the domi-
nant perspective, alternatives that may be barely discernible and cer-
tainly not overt.18 Besides local institutions of the state, the call in Tur-
ton and Tanabe (1984b) was to look particularly at ‘non-institutional,
informal, extra-judicial, sometimes illegal and subterranean, social
forces, processes, and milieux’. But there is no attempt in these more
recent works to deal, for example, with the power of fear and intimida-
tion, to come to terms with the surveillance capacities of the modern
state, or its powers to terrorize and the capacities of violence that the
‘war on drugs’ unleashed at the local level throughout rural Thailand.
That was an instructive case, for it was not just a matter of concerned
village elders and a feckless minority of youth, criminals, ethnic minori-
ties or other scapegoats, but a matter of very real conflicts and disputes,
hatreds and enmities between different individuals and indeed different
categories of individuals at the local level who resorted happily to the
violence that had suddenly been legitimated, and therefore unleashed,
in order to settle longstanding scores that ran beneath the surface of vil-
lage life. The appalling excesses of this time have been well documen-
ted, with cases of the planting of drugs on victims after their deaths,
the killing of children, and local police fulfilling their quotas. In many
areas there was open licence to shoot and kill those who stood in the
way of particular alliances between local officials, police and drug deal-
ers. In Khek Noi, a large Hmong settlement in Phitsanalouk which I re-
visited towards the end of 2003, extrajudicial killings had become al-
most the norm and an atmosphere of utter terror reigned.
In such recent literature there seems to be a worrying unconcern
with what Williams (1977, 1980 in Turton 1984) called ‘selective tradi-
tions’ and with what Therborn (1980 in Turton 1984) described as ex-
clusions from discourse, ‘restrictive’ practices such as scapegoating and
‘excommunication’, the complexities of actual consciousness at any one
time as a ‘multiply determined configuration of elements’. There is a
refusal to confront or even recognise the relations between domination,
persuasion and consent and the more structural aspects of power, in-
deed to deal with what Craig Reynolds (in his article in Thai Construc-
tions of Knowledge; Reynolds 1991) importantly called, in a literary con-
text, ‘state poetics’ (the rules about what can be said) which have be-
come too diffuse to be grasped at all. Perhaps what is missing is class
analysis. Perhaps that has just become too difficult, and too complex,
for a largely interpretive anthropology.
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Conclusions: power
Scott Lash (2007) has recently written interestingly on a post-hegemo-
nic phase of social understanding, in reference to Negri’s interpretation
(1991) of Spinoza’s distinction between two kinds of ‘power’: the indivi-
dual capacity of potentia, or ‘potency’, and the legislative authority of po-
testas or ‘power over’, later applied to contemporary politics in Hardt
and Negri’s Empire (2000). One should note that the idea of ‘potentia’
(as opposed to ‘actus’) was taken originally from Aristotle and has also
been influential (since the sovereign act is one which exhausts its po-
tentiality not to exist) in Agamben’s notion (1998) of the ‘sovereign
ban’19 which establishes that ‘state of exception’ (such as in an ‘emer-
gency’) to the law that nevertheless constitutes the law and political
life.20 While Aristotle had excluded the zone of ‘natural life’ (confined
to the household) from the zone of politics and the law, so foundation-
ally excluding ‘natural life’ from Western political thought, Agamben
(1998) posited that a zone of ‘bare life’, a politicised form of natural
life, emerged from the sovereign ban in which law and fact were indis-
tinct and which was directly subject (abandoned) to sovereign violence.
Agamben’s view differed from Foucault’s description of the replace-
ment of sovereign power by disciplinary power, as an aspect of bio-
power, in seeing the act of sovereign exclusion – the exercise of execu-
tive power over the exception – as still fundamental to Western political
thought. To some extent he was following what he sees as Walter Benja-
min’s revision (1969) of Carl Schmitt’s original argument (1985; cf.
Mouffe 1999) that sovereignty was based on an executive act of decision
that could suspend the law and establish the exception to it, since Ben-
jamin (1940, 1969) had argued that a state of emergency had already
become the rule rather than the exception for the oppressed.21 It is not
hard to see a general state of abandonment or the workings of a Guan-
tanamo-type of state terrorism (Fiskesjo 2003) in the ‘war on drugs’,
although the relations between that global state of the divestment of
rights and the extrajudicial killings that Turton and others had earlier
discussed may require further adumbration.
Lash’s argument (2007) for a post-hegemonic understanding of
power is complex but in outline suggests that power has now become
ontological rather than epistemological, or that the two have become
fused in the immanence of power. There is no ‘hegemon’ standing
above others. The idea of ‘discourse’ and hegemony was essentially
epistemological, and power formerly achieved through symbolic repre-
sentation has now moved towards a power accomplished more through
forms of communicative control. Žižek had argued (with Butler & La-
clau, 2000) that the resistance to the Lacanian, language-like ‘symbolic’
was now located in the ‘real’, the unutterable, the incompleteness of
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subjectivity (the limits of Althusserian interpellations). Lash partly
agrees but posits further that domination as well as resistance are now
located in the ontological ‘real’, and that invention (‘performing the ex-
ceptional’) has come to replace the merely negative notion of resistance;
performance (which is what ‘the communication’ works through) sup-
plants legality as a mode of legitimation. Hegemony presumes both le-
gitimate domination and sovereignty, and both presume a dualism be-
tween ruler and ruled. US power is now well beyond the phase of hege-
monic consent and alliance, he claims (against Hardt & Negri 2000); it
is a matter of absolute domination, achieved through the communica-
tions order rather than through social relations. Here is where we can
perhaps (not-very-finally) locate some of the past work of Turton; in
puissance and potentia (‘power to’ or ‘power within’) rather than pouvoir
and potestas (‘power over’), and moreover in a concern with that inven-
tiveness and creativity which may mark the limits of a domination that
has now gone beyond shifting alliance and allegiance to become insti-
tuted in what Lash (2007) calls the ‘vitalization’ of power and the ‘med-
iatization’ of life.22 And of course that remains an ongoing project.
Notes
1 See also Turton’s essays in Hart et al. (Turton 1989a, 1989b).
2 At the end of this article I relate this interest in creative agency to theories of puis-
sance, but it may be that these were reflected in notions of praxis theorised from Yu-
goslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, as a creative, committed relationship of theory with
practice. From a paper given by Turton just before the conference at which this paper
was first presented it became clear how important the notion of praxis has been for
him. For many of these theorists, free (‘good’) praxis was seen as working throughout
all Aristotle’s three types of science: 1) theoretical, or concerned with truth, 2) poetic,
concerned with making beautiful or useful things, and 3) the practical (praxis) science
of politics and ethics itself.
3 However, see forthcoming doctoral thesis by Benjamin Dierikx at the Australian Na-
tional University who has worked on the Thai-Cambodian border (‘Life in the Mar-
gins: Local perceptions of the Thai-Cambodian border’), and Anjalee Cohen (2007).
4 On this particular issue, see David Parkin’s introduction to the collection he edited
(1996) with Lionel Caplan and Fisher in honour of Abner Cohen. Abner Cohen’s
work on cultural politics (1976, 1993) was also most influential in the SOAS Depart-
ment of Anthropology where Turton worked, as this collection by their colleagues
showed.
5 Gramsci. Prison Notebooks (1992, 1996). Gramsci is actually ambivalent about com-
mon sense, which he contrasts to ‘good sense’ as something which is assumed by all
and may form the object of criticism – but both form a part of what he calls ‘sponta-
neous philosophy’ found in 1) language 2) common and good sense, and 3) religion
and general folklore. See Nun & Cartier (1986), where the influences of Vico and
Croce, William James and Bradley are considered on Gramsci. As they say, Gramsci
was within a tradition that considered common sense not as negatively defined by rea-
son but as importantly without or beyond rationality.
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6 See Williams (1977, 1980). Of course the general re-evaluation of the role of culture
and ‘ideology’ was an ongoing tendency associated with the Frankfurt School and, la-
ter, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies. The notion of ‘social experiences in
solution’ (Williams 1977) has been compared and contrasted with Bourdieu’s habitus,
Foucault’s episteme and Gramsci’s hegemony (Filmer 2003).
7 Bloch (1985) later glossed this as ‘ideology’ and ‘cognition’.
8 ‘I thought of what I wanted to say, but couldn’t utter it’ (Turton 1984: 67).
9 From that point of view one would have to take into account also Leach’s warnings
(1961) not to confuse the level of the ‘ideal’ stated by our informants with either the
level of statistical averages (the ‘norm’) or the level of everyday practice (‘actual beha-
viour’) or Firth’s endeavours (1964) to rescue a level of ‘social organisation’ from the
ideal models of ‘social structure’.
10 See Brun (1987, 1990).
11 For accounts of some of these issues, see Glassman (2005); Pasuk & Baker (2004);
McCargo & Ukrist (2005); McCargo (2006, 2007).
12 For a description and analysis of Thaksin’s emergent populism, see Pasuk & Baker
(2008).
13 This follows the context of other works by Arghiros (2001) and collections by Ruth
McVey (2000) and Kevin Hewison (1997).
14 Yoshinori translates this as a ‘paternal “father of the province”’, but it sounds almost
like a polite way of not saying ‘jao pho’ or local ‘godfather’.
15 What I see as ethnomethodological is the refusal to stray outside actors’ own por-
trayals of their social situations. Indeed this can lead to a radical relativist subjecti-
vism, which we can contrast to the views I have cited above from, for example,
Feuchtwang and Bourdieu, Leach and Firth. Yoshinori actually refers to Goffman
(1959), who may be regarded as a forerunner of ethnomethodology (despite his differ-
ences from Garfinkel).
16 And this does beg the question, for in the Foucauldian notion of ‘discourse’ there is
indeed no truth value outside of a highly conditioned regime of power/knowledge,
which may be taken as paradigmatic of the post-modern ‘turn’. Yoshinori refers both
to Foucault and to Geertz.
17 The logical end of such approaches may ironically be to question the role of formal
constitutional rule altogether, by pointing to the sort of originary violence Derrida
(2002) discusses in relation to the notion of the ‘mystical foundations of authority’
found in Benjamin and Schmitt.
18 Thus it is ultimately ethnomethodological in accepting informant statements and ac-
tions at face level, and eschewing the attempt at further analysis. Unlike Yoshinori,
however, Walker does note both Turton (1984) and Scott (1976) as pointing to the im-
portance of local political processes.
19 See also Nancy (1994) on the abandonment/banishment of Being to the law and so-
vereign power.
20 These divisions were enormously important in scholastic philosophy, where potentia
referred to potency, the aptitude to change, the determinable being rather than the de-
termined being, and was seen as a material characteristic unlike God who was Actus
Purus or perfect actuality. Any act has several potentialities; its potentiality not to exist
is negated when/if it comes to exist. For Spinoza, however, God as Nature seems to
have combined actuality with potentiality, while potestas referred to legitimate authori-
tative earthly power or sovereignty.
21 The relationship between Schmitt, who influenced Benjamin, and the latter’s own the-
ory of a pure revolutionary violence beyond the law is complex. One might say that
where Schmitt, for whom the state of exception and emergency were not synon-
ymous, sought to present a form of violence as necessary and constitutive of right,
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Benjamin envisaged a violence beyond the law which might transform it, if a genuine
(effective) state of emergency could be brought about. See Benjamin’s ‘Critique of
Violence’ (1921, 1977) and Derrida (2002) for a discussion of it in terms of the rela-
tionship of an originary violence to the law and the difference between law-preserving
and law-making violence, and Agamben (2005).
22 Vitalism as a philosophical tendency refers to a philosophy of becoming, flow, move-
ment and organic self-organisation by contrast with mechanistic theories of causation
and has been associated with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson and Simmel. Lash
discerns vitalism partly in Foucault, Deleuze & Guattari (1983) and Negri, rather than
say Durkheim or Bourdieu, and argues that there has been a shift from mechanistic
to vitalistic power; life is now conceived of in informational terms in a kind of neo-vit-
alism (Lash 2006; but cf. Ploger 2006).
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6 ‘Modernising Subjects’: Moral-Political Contests
in Thailand’s Drive Toward Modernity
Jamaree Chiengthong
Introduction: ‘Looking at the stars with feet firmly on the ground’
In 2000, Peter Hinton commented on an important regional 1994 con-
ference on ‘cross-border’ relations in Asia he had attended, which had
seemed to him to be full of hope and enthusiasm. The businessman
and the scholar who organised the conference were proposing an ‘Asian
form’ of capitalist expansion. Remarking on John Naisbitt’s view (1966)
that networks like that of the overseas Chinese were now replacing na-
tion-states, Hinton described this as a ludicrous attempt to combine
‘the gemeinschaft of the traditional kinship structure’ with ‘the gesellschaft
of the high technology global computer virtual society to create an in-
vincibly dynamic machine for capitalist expansion’ (2000: 13). Despite
such early optimism, which Hinton criticises while allowing for the im-
portance of national and regional differences, the Asian economic crisis
was to take place in 1997. Many large business families suffered se-
verely from the crisis, while others somehow managed to survive. In
2001 Thaksin and his party, the TRT (Thai Rak Thai), came to power
with a programme to restructure a more efficient and dynamic capitalist
economy, both in the urban and rural areas, and to renew such early
hopes and enthusiasm for a Thai form of capitalism. Illustrating such
renewed optimism and faith in material progress, there was a photo-
graph of him looking upward and far beyond during his first campaign,
pointing his finger ahead; the subtitle below said, ‘Looking at the stars
with feet firmly on the ground’.
In such a context of the drive towards modernisation, one may well
draw comparisons with the Italian futurists in the years before the First
World War, those who have been criticised as ‘passionate partisans of
modernity’ by Berman (1990). Citing their announcement ‘Comrades,
we tell you now that the triumphant progress of science makes changes
in humanity inevitable, changes that are hacking an abyss between
those docile slaves of tradition and us free moderns who are confident
in the radiant splendor of our future’, Berman concludes ‘There are no
ambiguities here: “tradition” – all the world’s traditions thrown together
– simply equals docile slavery, and modernity equals freedom’ (ibid.
25). But does it?
What I want to develop here are Andrew Turton’s insights into the
nature of conflict in Thai society, which I see as still useful today as a
foundation for understanding current developments in Thai society and
its ‘modernising subject’. I do this by showing how a complex interplay
between modernity, tradition and culture has been embedded in ideolo-
gical projects and moral-political contestations.
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first comprises a re-
view of Turton’s relevance and contributions to the understanding of
Thai power relations and processes of cultural and social change in
terms of the actual changes that have taken place, with some reference
to my own fieldwork. In the second part I consider the topic of the sub-
ject of change, and develop and elaborate further an interpretation of
the ‘modernising subject’ project, drawing on some comparable Italian
materials.
The modernity project in Thailand
The 1960s marked the initial period of ‘development’ in Thailand, with
the implementation of the first National Economic Development Plan.
This emphasized the central role of the state in the construction of ba-
sic infrastructure to facilitate the country’s process of industrialisation.
When Turton undertook fieldwork in Mae Sruay, some 60 kilometres
from the town of Chiangrai, the Mae Sruay-Chiangrai road was still a
dirt road undergoing construction. Some rich peasants, however, were
already beginning to own trucks and operate transportation services for
people and commodities between Mae Sruay and Chiangrai. Turton’s
doctoral thesis (1976b), entitled Northern Thai Peasant Society with the
subtitle ‘A case study of jural and political structures at the village level
and their twentieth century transformations’, revealed the growing en-
croachment of state power on the rural sector in the Mae Sruay area.
The thesis devoted a large part to the discussion of cases where pea-
sants had taken their disputes to court, accepting the authority of the
state in the settlement of their disputes. This modern judiciary system
had largely replaced local forms of traditional dispute settlement under
the authority of matrilineal descent cult groups (see Turton 1972). A
new consciousness of wealth and status differences had evolved; rich
peasants were beginning to associate themselves with traders and petty
officials, separating themselves from the poor peasants. The crucial con-
tradiction between the ‘modern’ (samai) and the ‘traditional’ (boraan)
was frequently used by the peasants themselves ‘to differentiate and
pass comment on the two orientations’ of society (Turton 1976b: 187).
Unlike earlier scholars in anthropology and political science, who had
generally described a smooth transition towards modernity and empha-
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sized a picture of harmonious coexistence and Thai tranquility, Turton
was among the first to point out the deeply conflictual nature of Thai
society at that time. In his Thailand: Roots of Conflict, where Turton ana-
lysed ‘the current situation in the Thai countryside’, he pointed directly
to the facts of rural differentiation and the class formation of rich pea-
sants as against poor peasants (1978a). The state had been very tough
in suppressing peasants’ and students’ movements. State-civil confron-
tations were the order of the day (see also Glassman, this volume). Yet,
as we will see below, Turton did not offer a simple class analysis of this
conflict.
Power relations and cultural construction; class and ideological
conflicts
One of the most important contributions of Turton to the understand-
ing of the Thai social formation was in his paper on the ‘Limits of Ideo-
logical Domination’ (1984), where the Gramscian concepts of consent
and coercion in establishing domination were employed to analyse
state-civil relations. There he noted explicitly that ‘… the bourgeois as a
class does not effectively or adequately control this state and its appara-
tuses; and so far it is certainly not opposed to it en bloc. Nor does the
state exist primarily to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. To some
extent it exists to serve the interests of the various elements which for-
mally comprise its ruling and governing classes, among which the mili-
tary are dominant’ (ibid. 29). The maintenance of the ruling class’s poli-
tical and institutional stability was achieved through the means of ‘both
ideological and violently coercive forms’ (ibid. 22). This concept of the
‘ideological’ did not imply ‘fixed meanings or systems of meanings or a
fixed structure or scenario, but … processes of the formation of ideolo-
gical elements, and the interaction of these processes.’ ‘Classes’ were
also not seen as ‘the subjects of fixed and ascribed class ideologies’ but
presented as ‘a field of struggle between social forces, involving not
only elements of discourse but also material forces which set limits to
the space of operations’ (ibid. 23). In the 1973-78 period, Turton had
seemed slightly hesitant about the nature of the dominant ‘class’;
whether it was capitalist, pre-capitalist or both (1978a: 127-129). But by
1989, when he discussed the discourse of development, he seemed cer-
tain that the dominant class constituted a new development of capital-
ism under the banner of national unity (1989a).
Turton (1984) also remarked that Thailand appeared to be ‘charac-
terised by greater historical continuities’ (when compared with other
countries in Southeast Asia) and a ‘remarkable degree of overall institu-
tional stability over the past fifty years’. This led to his other important
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observation on the ‘weak institutional development of civil society’ (ibid.
21). Moreover, he deconstructed these continuities to show instead the
‘discontinuities’ that were taking shape as the traditional Sakdina state
was recharged and fused with ‘the emergence of new capitalist classes’
(ibid. 27).
But despite these state attempts at cultural domination, charted by
Turton, counter-movements against state cultural domination also took
place. One of these, of course, was the communist movement that re-
cruited to its cause a number of students suppressed by the 1976 coup.
The other important counter-movement against the state, in my own
opinion, has been the ‘community culture’ school of thought led by the
respectable and well-loved Thai scholar Chatthip Nartsupha. Chatthip
founded a journal of political economy to which a number of young
Thai scholars contributed articles along Marxist lines on class and rela-
tions of production. Chatthip himself made a great impact on young
scholars in Thailand through two major works – The Political Economy
of Siam 1910 -1932 (co-authored with Suthy Prasartset), and Setthakit mu-
ban thai nai adit [Thai village economy in the past] – in which he dis-
cussed the ‘destruction’ of a subsistence economy by the penetration of
capitalist forces. He was against any form of state domination, whether
it was feudal, capitalist or ‘semi-feudal, semi-capitalist’.
Yet despite such cultural and political movements against capitalism,
the Thai economy continued to grow in the 1980s. The holders of state
power had eventually decided to make peace with the dissidents. Many
students who had gone to ‘the forest’ to take up arms against the gov-
ernment after the military coup of 1976 were ‘pardoned’ and allowed to
return home in the early 1980s. For those people, this was a time of de-
feat. Even among many of those who had not gone to the countryside
themselves but had sympathised with the movement, there existed a
sense of loss and regret and an unfulfilled yearning for social justice re-
mained. There had been a kind of dignity in fighting against capitalism,
even though it may have been an ‘impossible dream’, the kind of empty
fight that Don Quixote had to undertake.
The writings of the ‘community culture’ school, which had done so
much to contribute to the continuing critique of Thai capitalism
through the 1980s, were themselves strongly challenged by academics.
Bowie (1988) interviewed elderly peasants in many villages in the north
and consulted extensive past written records to show how very tough
rural life in the past had often been, contrary to the more idyllic picture
presented by members of the ‘community culture’ school, since pea-
sants faced a constant risk of insufficient production which led to peri-
odic threats of famine. This constant state of indigence was increased
by the heavy taxes in rice that peasants had to pay. Yukti (1991) similarly
remarked that representations of a peaceful way of life in the past were
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cultural constructions, a veritable ‘writing of culture’ achieved in part
with ‘techniques’ of drawings of a peaceful past way of life, like a small
hut under the moonlight. However, I wish to argue that one can also
see the community culture school as constituting a kind of moral con-
struction, forming an important terrain of contestation in civil society; it
signifies a real and deep-rooted battle on the moral-political front. This
moral-political battle, as I see it, has also been part and parcel of the
process and project of the formation of the conflictual modernising sub-
ject(s) in Thailand, to which I turn below. In the 1980s the contest had
been framed in terms of a ‘past peaceful way of life’ opposed to the ca-
pitalist rush, with the image of cooperative labour exchange (represent-
ing traditional social relations) pitted against the current realities of
hired labour, as labour itself became a commodity subject to cash rela-
tions. In the contemporary situation in the 2000s, however, the moral-
political issue has come to be centred more on the Buddhist virtues of
modesty and frugality on the one hand, as against what is often seen as
corrupt opportunistic capitalist money on the other. I expand on this be-
low.
The new poverty
My own field research in the early 1990s also revealed the continued
importance of the rural transformations that Turton had discussed ear-
lier. Coming from an urban middle-class background, and being famil-
iar with this ‘community culture’ school of thought and the charming
images it presented about pre-capitalist society, I remember I was ac-
tively surprised to find economic transaction activities in the village.
‘Time’ also seemed very precious, even in this rural setting. Though the
farmers did not work a strict nine-to-five day as in a modern office, they
still had to hurry to the fields in the very early morning so much that
they did not have time to cook. They bought their already cooked break-
fasts from shops in the village. Apart from farming, there were also sev-
eral woodcarving workshops in the village. In nearby villages, farmers
commuted to town to work as construction workers and they would re-
turn home very late in the evening. I also wrote about a lady who was
the owner of a woodcarving workshop in the village who dyed her hair
reddish brown and looked very than-samai or ‘modern’ indeed (1996).
But while there were already elements in the village of the quick tempo
of modern life, a high degree of poverty was still quite persistent. There
was, for instance, an old couple who had already passed their sixties but
who still had to engage in daily wage work to earn cash to buy food.
There was another old man in his seventies who was still then working
for wages, also to support himself. One of his daughters had just re-
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turned from a ‘job’ in Bangkok, and then found unskilled work in wood-
carving which she alternated with casual labour in the fields at harvesting
times. People had to be very mobile in order to earn a living. The other
village I studied, near a forest reserve, had been quite recently settled
and people were still moving in and out, engaging in all kinds of activ-
ities off-farm and on-farm, including illegal logging, in order to earn cash
and sustain livelihoods. Many people in their thirties whom I talked to
expressed the wish for their children to get educated so that they would
have better lives and not the hard lives of farmers. (1996).
In his thesis, Turton (1976b) had already talked about how ‘clock
time’ and ‘money time’ had become more intertwined into the peasant
lives of the sixties, during the time of his fieldwork. But most important
for him, too, was the high incidence of poverty, which was frequently
talked of by the peasants. As he put it later, ‘In talking about the pro-
blems of livelihood and the struggle for survival, poor farmers almost
invariably refer to “the problem(s) of the market (phanha talat)”’, above
all, ‘the low market price for agricultural commodities, but also the clo-
sely related problem of high prices of agricultural inputs, and of other
commodities, including food, which the producers must buy for their
subsistence’ (1984: 35). Peasants were constantly complaining that cash
was hard to find.
This transformation of rural subjects, charted by Turton and also by
my own fieldwork, is truly a critical issue. The contrasts between mod-
ern life and traditional life, the rapidly changing tempo of rural life, the
hard lives of the rural poor and their often expressed difficulties of find-
ing cash, all reflect a much more general change towards commercial
relations of production, and this in itself raises important issues of the
nature of the subject of change.
The concept of ‘subject’
Turton (1984) himself was much indebted to Althusserian concepts of
the subject, tempered by those of Foucault. A subject, in these views, is
not only a free human agent but also a product of social and cultural
construction; being subjected to a certain regime of rules, regulations,
values and ideology.
The strength of the Althusserian thesis lay in its concept of ‘interpel-
lation’ (addressing, recruiting, emphatic intervention or even interrup-
tion), as in the recruiting poster ‘Your Country Needs You’ – that pro-
cess of hailing whereby a patriotic and obedient social subject is pro-
duced (Turton 1984: 42; see also Tapp, this volume). However, there
were aspects of the Althusserian formulation that Turton found to be
too static, i.e. rather ‘formal and functionalist’ whereas, as he argued,
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‘... ideological domination, the production of forms of social conscious-
ness, mentalities and subjectivities, may occur in any or every sphere of
existence’ (1984: 38). Suggesting that relations of domination were not
‘univocal’, Turton found Foucault’s notions (1977: 27) of the flexibility
of subjects and the contestation of power relations more useful. As he
put it: ‘The concept of the ideological is used to refer not to fixed or sys-
tematic meanings, but to the moment of the formation of conscious-
ness in practical activity: in work, social and cultural reproduction, and
in struggle’ (1984: 19).
E.P.Thompson (1968) had provided an example of a more classic
Marxist approach in understanding how the transformation of the sub-
ject accompanied a capitalist production system, or what Turton
phrased as the ‘inculcation of new patterns and ideas, norms and va-
lues, of work and consumption, ideas which can be conceptualised as
being simultaneously both forces of production and ideology’ (1988:
207). However, while Thompson’s model of the making of the English
working class was interesting in that he gave a convincing account of
how modern working man had been constructed through inculcation to
match the new rhythms of the capitalist demand for work, what was
still lacking in much of these works was perhaps a discussion of the
role of inner spiritual conflicts.
The inner spiritual conflict that took place in the Thai context was ac-
tually pointed out in Turton (1988). Now, as I will argue below, it has
become even more salient. Turton turned our attention toward the fact
that fleets of vans selling merchandise were marching into the villages,
and that under these pressures even the Sangha (Buddhist monkhood)
was becoming fairly secularised. Turton wrote at that time that, ‘In local
terms this consumerism can be criticised in the light of Buddhist va-
lues, as fostering “greed” …’ (1988: 208). Money was entering into all
spheres, not only into the sphere of economic exchange. Indeed, many
scholars not necessarily belonging to the community culture school
now came to lament the loss of the good old days when labour had
been cooperatively exchanged in rice-producing activities. It seemed
clear that cash had thoroughly penetrated the traditional exchange sys-
tem and was now completely destroying traditional social bonds.
The modern crisis in the Thai political situation
When Thaksin became prime minister in 2002, he implemented a ma-
jor restructuring of the bureaucratic system. A system based on the
CEO (chief executive officer) was introduced into the bureaucracy,
wherein prompt decision-making would rest upon the executive man in
charge. The government administrative system was to be managed
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more efficiently to cope with rapid economic transformation. The over-
all aim was to run the government system as a business. On the other
hand, attention was also paid directly to rural development. A large
amount of money was spent on the health programme and on revolving
village funds. Scholarships were given for children in rural areas to
study abroad. Everywhere people were talking about the thirty baht
health-for-all programme, as well as the one million baht village revol-
ving funds. The ‘One Tambon One Product’ (OTOP) development pro-
gramme set out to promote sales of village-level specialised crafts pro-
ducts based on ‘indigenous knowledge’ and local skills.
Thaksin’s projects injecting money into the rural areas, however,
caused alarm in some academic circles. And it was at this point that
money and materialism once again became more general issues of con-
cern. A certain sector of the middle class began to worry that votes had
been bought through these programmes, and such alarm further
strengthened the position of the Thai Rak Thai party, and of Thaksin
himself.
Thaksin first came to power in 2001, after the 1997 financial crisis in
Thailand, when the country had run short of foreign reserves and had
to borrow from the IMF. Thaksin’s famous statement that ‘the IMF is
not our father’ was an artful rhetorical move that provoked nationalistic
sentiments within a certain section of the population, including some
of the middle class. The very name of his political party, Thai Rak Thai
(‘Thai Love Thai’), could be understood as ‘because we are Thai, we
have this natural love for Thai and Thai-ness’.
However, the selling of Shin Corporation – Thaksin’s telecommuni-
cation company which also owned satellites under the name Thaicom –
to Temasek of Singapore was a real blow to the Thai public. Although
owned by Shin, the satellite company was a matter of national pride
and was thought of as national property. In addition, the sale involved
an astronomic amount of money (73 billion baht tax-free, or over US$2
billion at current rates).
Though Thaksin won his second term in office, with the majority of
his support gained from rural areas, there was growing dissatisfaction
with his regime. The sale of Shin to a foreign company was used as a
weapon to disprove his avowed love of the nation. In Bangkok, the Peo-
ple’s Association for Democracy instigated protests against Thaksin, all
wearing yellow shirts; while on the other hand, Thaksin loyalists, wear-
ing red shirts, also demonstrated in great numbers in Thaksin’s sup-
port (see Keyes, this volume). Some analysts have since argued that the
situation reflected a class conflict, with the urban middle class (the yel-
low shirts) pitted against the rural lower class (the red shirts). The mid-
dle class was seen in such analyses as traditionalists who wanted to
hold on to power, whereas Thaksin was understood as representing the
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new movement of the masses in the sense that he knew their problems
and was willing to solve them.
However, I find it difficult to agree with such a simple kind of class
analysis. Rather than using a rudimentary class analysis of this nature,
Turton had instead much earlier employed the concept of the ‘power
bloc’. By this he meant a combination of groups of different power
holders, employing new sets of relations of production with a different
form of ‘ideological domination’, which he saw as a more appropriate
concept for the analysis of modern Thai power structures (1984). Even
though this was put forward in the quite different context of the 1980s,
I still think it provides a most appropriate way in which to analyse the
current crisis in Thai politics, as we will see below. What we have here
is an ideological battle, cross-cutting class in the formation of a con-
flicted modern subject.
The modern project in Italy at the turn of the twentieth century:
Croce and Gramsci on class and ideological formations and
battles
In order to understand better the current Thai context, we may be able
to learn from the historical case of Italy (a comparison explicitly made
in Turton [1984] but not elaborated on there). Italy at the turn of the
twentieth century was embarking on modernity accompanied by a cer-
tain crisis of the state. The north was an industrialised prosperous zone
while the south still consisted of a poor agrarian sector. Even before the
First World War, the ruling class was held in public contempt by some
of the younger generation. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti launched the fu-
turist movement with the Futurist Manifesto of 1909, expressing his
loathing of everything old, especially political and artistic tradition, as
we saw above. Yet these futurists were also passionate nationalists. At
the same time, fascism began to emerge as early as 1914 under Benito
Mussolini, attracting young nationalists to join for the supposed sake of
the prosperity of the country. The fascists came into power in 1922 after
marching into Rome in blackshirted uniforms, propagating statism, na-
tionalism and militarism. Mussolini gained public support by institut-
ing massive public works and building projects. During the fascist peri-
od, the liberal critic Benedetto Croce, who was to form such an impor-
tant influence on Gramsci, remained anti-fascist. Partly following
Croce, Gramsci believed that the use of coercive force must imply a cri-
sis of traditional authority, and that consensus and unity had been lost:
That aspect of the modern crisis which is bemoaned as a ‘wave
of materialism’ is related to what is called the ‘crisis of authority’.
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If the ruling class has lost its consensus, that is, is no longer ‘he-
gemonic’ (dirigente), but only ‘dominant’, living by power of coer-
cive force, this means precisely that the great masses have be-
come detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer
believe what they used to believe, etc. The crisis consists pre-
cisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be
born; in this interregnum a wide variety of morbid systems ap-
pear.1
Croce had felt, as Adamson (2002: 485-6) puts it, that what a trans-
forming society of this kind needed was a ‘religion of liberty’, a ‘teacher
for the masses’. Gramsi partly agreed. Italy at that time needed, in
Gramsci’s words, a ‘coherent, unitary, nationally diffused “conception
of life and man”, a “lay religion”, a philosophy that has become pre-
cisely a “culture”, that is, generated an ethic, a way of life, a civic and
individual form of conduct …’ Gramsci had even considered this in
partly religious terms. Thus he considered that ‘the writer and critic Re-
nato Serra … had taught the people in the same way as had Saint Fran-
cis of Assisi: both knew that to make “God disappear behind syllo-
gisms” would “kill feelings … strangle the ardor of faith”, and that the
true teacher was a “humble soul, a simple spirit” who could “reanimate
in each soul a divine inebriation”’ (ibid. 485).2
Although Gramsci accepted Croce’s analysis of the significance of the
moral-political contest, what he felt Italy needed was a Marxist philoso-
phy of praxis, defined as the ‘absolute secularization and earthliness of
thought, an absolute humanism of history’.’ He saw this as ‘… a philo-
sophy which is also a politics, and a politics which is also philosophy.’3
The working class should be responsible to undertake this.
Of course for Gramsci, any class or combination of classes that
aimed to establish its dominance in a society must ‘… stress and devel-
op the twin moments of economic and political alliances on the one
hand, and on the other, of moral and cultural appeals’ (Turton & Tanabe
1984b: 5). Thailand in the 2000s has already passed the era where the
use of coercive force directly supports the ruling authorities, but the
ideological battle in the emerging civic sphere has now become fierce
and intense, similar to the Italian case much earlier, and morality and
politics have, in this new conjuncture, become closely interwoven.
The moral and cultural contest: money and frugality
The Thai anthropologist Sanit Samuckakarn borrowed the title for one
of his books from a Thai proverb, mii ngoen kau nub wa nong; mii thong
kau nub wa pii, which literally translates as ‘having silver maintains the
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status of a younger kin; having gold will maintain the status of an older
kin’. The title pointed to the significance of patron-client relations in tra-
ditional Thai society, which has always been built around a strong re-
spect for people with wealth and power. While political scientists and
earlier anthropologists such as Hanks (1962) had emphasized the im-
portance of patron-client relations in Thai politics and social organisa-
tion, Turton had tried to point to the emergence of ‘local intermediaries’
who linked state power at the top with the locality at ground level. We
have already noted how his 1976 thesis mentions rich peasants associat-
ing themselves with traders and petty officials. This was an accurate ana-
lysis. With the ‘community development’ policies initiated by the state
since the 1960s, new community leaders were being created as agents
of state development, and some of these became ‘vote bosses’ (hua ka-
naen) at election time, building social networks ‘vertically from below at
village levels with provincial and national politicians’ (Turton 1989a:
86). Arghiros (1993), whose doctoral thesis was on politics and elections
in a central Thai plain village, has discussed the ease with which Thai
people can accept money as a kind of gift, at a wedding, at a funeral or
at an election. In Arghiros’s interpretation, money can act as a kind of
social cement facilitating assistance among members in the community.
Thai politicians seem to understand such patron-client relations and be
able to manipulate the displays of wealth that support them. They make
sure they appear in community ceremonies and donate money to ensure
respect. Thaksin’s rural development programmes of course involved a
relatively large budget, which his public relations team ensured would
be well publicized in the press. Of course, Thaksin also portrayed him-
self publicly as a successful rich businessman. This went well with basic
Thai perceptions of money. The roof of a Thai temple is usually deco-
rated in gold, a symbol of the wealth of the community. In the traditional
pha pa ceremony of giving alms to the temple, which usually takes place
after the period of Buddhist Lent, bank notes are displayed on small cer-
emonial trees so that all participants in the ceremony can admire the
trees and the money that adorns them before they are donated to the
temple. Displays of wealth can be used to establish social position as
well as to attract followers.
Although Thais may admire money-decorated trees at the pha pa
ceremony, I would argue that charity and modesty also remain impor-
tant virtues at a more abstract spiritual level beyond this mundane dis-
play of wealth. People are also expected to be persistent in their good
deeds. Bloch and Parry (1991) suggest that all societies have systems of
morality sanctioning money transactions, which determine how much
wealth one can expect to accumulate and distribute. Thai society is re-
plete with examples and models of these virtues. Maha Vessandorn is
one well-known example in Thailand of a ‘holy soul’ who did not accu-
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mulate but gave away wealth in order to achieve greater spiritual en-
lightenment. The personality of Maha Vessandorn continues to repre-
sent an ideal of modesty and self-sacrifice that Thais of all classes have
been brought up with.
An account of the less well known Mahachanok, another Buddhist
figure, was translated by His Majesty the King and came into print after
the IMF incident. This gave an example of the importance of the virtues
of enduring hardship and of modesty. A cartoon version was made to
reach younger audiences. It was also famously performed on stage
when a popular young male actor played the role of Mahachanok (rather
than an actor from the Department of Fine Arts in the Ministry of Cul-
ture). And the ‘self-sufficiency economy’ advocated by the King was pre-
sented, in tandem with this, as a form of everyday practice in which the
virtues of frugality and modesty could be applied. With Gramsci’s
words about the need for a true teacher who is a ‘humble soul, a simple
spirit’ in mind, we may recognise in such examples and models the im-
portance of the fierce cultural and moral political contest between va-
lues of wealth and modesty which is now occurring in Thailand.
The 2007 modern crisis, in my view, cannot be interpreted in simple
class terms. It is much more an ideological battle that cuts across class
lines. It involves the construction of a subject who is, on the one hand,
a free agent who acts, but on the other hand is a container of certain
kinds of values, with an inner life, we may say, that can be conflicting.
In Berman’s All that is Solid Melts into Air (1990), he shows concern
about ‘… the immense power of the market in modern man’s inner
lives: they look to the price list for answers to questions not merely eco-
nomic but metaphysical – questions of what is worthwhile, what is hon-
ourable, even what is real’ (1990: 111). He adds that ‘to be modern is to
live a life of paradox and contradiction. … It is to be both revolutionary
and conservative …’ (ibid. 13).
Conclusion
I have chosen to title this paper ‘Modernising Subjects’ since I see the
issue of modernity as ongoing and crucial to the anthropology of Thai-
land; it is also crucial to understand how and in what aspects and with
what emphasis the construction of a modern Thai subject has been un-
dertaken. From the work of Turton we saw something of how the mod-
ern subject has been constructed through state encroachment upon the
rural area, and how a patriotic social subject was produced and made to
fit with the capitalist production system, as money began to enter into
all spheres of life. Though there have been analyses of simple class con-
flict as a constitutive factor of political unrest in the current Thai situa-
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tion, these confrontations and accommodations between modernity and
tradition are multi-dimensional. In these confrontations and accommo-
dations, ideological battles cut across class lines to involve traditional/
modern values and norms, and classes may be split along vertical lines
comprising ‘power blocs’ within factions, each contending to exert su-
premacy in the interpretation of cultural righteousness and to achieve
ideological domination. But this is still an unfolding project in which,
as Turton once said, ‘norms and regulations are not yet settled’.
Notes
1 As cited in Adamson (2002: 485-86) from Gramsci (1971: 276).
2 Adamson draws on Gramsci’s obituary of Serra here.
3 Ibid.
‘MODERNISING SUBJECTS’ 87
Farewell party for Turton, 1970
7 An Early Critical Foray into Participation
in Thailand
Jonathan Rigg
Introduction
The term ‘participation’ has been problematic due to its multiple inter-
pretations and because its meaning has been compromised by the iro-
nic, but common, process of mainstream appropriation of a once-
radical development concept. Wider debates around participation have a
salience and a purchase in Thailand. In this short paper I am interested
in putting these debates in context, in particular through an examina-
tion of Andrew Turton’s (1987) book Production, Power and Participation
in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups and its relevance
to subsequent applications of the term ‘participation’ in national devel-
opment plans, critical literature and alternative development pro-
grammes. I thereby wish to consider the sequel to the ‘story’ that Tur-
ton tells in terms of Thailand’s development trajectory – and in particu-
lar, rural development trajectory – in the more than two decades since
the book was published. The date of its publication, after all, marks the
beginning of Thailand’s so-styled economic ‘boom’ (Pasuk & Baker
1996). In essence, I seek to consider three questions in this chapter:
– How far do later debates about participation and participatory devel-
opment, whether within Thailand or in wider terms, resonate with
themes anticipated in Turton’s work of the 1980s?
– To what extent does the Thai state’s vision of participation – in the
guise of the NESDB’s five-year national economic and social devel-
opment plans – conform with or undermine the transformative and
yet materialist interpretations of participation in Turton’s work?
– What reflections on participation, as it was considered in an earlier
development era, does hindsight offer us through a reflection on
Turton’s book?
Background to the book
In the early 1980s, the United Nations Research Institute for Social De-
velopment (UNRISD) established a multi-country research project that
defined participation as ‘the increase of control over “resources and reg-
ulative institutions” by excluded and less privileged groups’ (Turton
1987: 48). The project on which Turton’s book draws formed the Thai-
land section of this programme, and it was ‘committed to a ‘‘participa-
tory action” research style and methodology’ (ibid. 4). There were six
field sites: in the Sanpathong and Samoeng districts in Chiang Mai pro-
vince; in the Kalasin, Udon and Yasothorn provinces in the Northeast;
and in the Sanamchaiket district of Chachoengsao province in the east.
The book also drew on separate work in Korat and Uthai Thani (the lat-
ter by Philip Hirsch; see Hirsch 1990).
Popular participation in Thailand
Popular participation (PP) is translated into Thai as kan mii suan rûam
khong prachachon. The key words are suan rûam which mean part or
share and common, mutual or sharing. Turton notes (1987: 10, fn 6)
that rûam with a falling tone means ‘to share’ or ‘to join in’, which is
closely related to ruam with a mid tone which is usually translated as
‘to combine’, ‘to add’, or ‘to sum up’ (Haas 1964). Thus we have two
subtly – but importantly, given the discussion here – different intepreta-
tions. Suan ruam (สว่นรวม) is equivalent to the English term ‘the com-
mon good’ or ‘the public good’, which Turton takes to mean ‘the sum
of individual interests’. But suan rûam (สว่นรว่ม) he suggests involves a
‘more subjective and involuntary involvement in activity of a more of
less collective nature’ – i.e. participation. He also notes that at the time
he was writing, the concept of popular participation was ‘probably not
familiar to the majority of the rural poor’ (ibid. 10).
Turton (ibid. 12) reflects on how participation means different things
to different people in different contexts (see Table 7.1):
– Merely creating a sense of participation
– Bridging the communication gap between the state and the people
– Improving access to resources by poor people
– Decentralisation
In noting these differences, Turton anticipates some later debates about
scales (see e.g. Michener 1998; Agarwal 2001; Cornwall 2003), forms
and intensities of participation. It is clear that he was aware, even in the
mid-1980s, that participation was in danger of slipping through the fin-
gers of scholars – and being co-opted by the state for its own (often
non-participatory and even anti-participatory) purposes. But for Turton
and the UNRISD project, participation involved the fundamental re-
structuring of power, and therefore control, through collective action
(Turton 1987: 12). Although Turton does not use the term in the book,
this is empowering, and therefore transformative.
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Michener, in the context of her case study in Burkina Faso, writes of
‘planner-centred’ and ‘people-centred’ participation (1998: 2105). Plan-
ner-centred participation focuses on the need for projects and interven-
tions to be efficient and effective; this can be aligned with Turton’s types
2, 3 and 4 in Table 7.1. Participation becomes the means by which plan-
ners can increase the likelihood of success. Local people are more likely
to accept development interventions and associated technologies if parti-
cipation occurs. This is often the way in which multilateral organisations
and, increasingly, government agencies see participation. People-centred
participation, by contrast, is an end as well as a means. Radical, transfor-
mative participation is likely to be seen at the local level in the efforts of
grass-roots activists – although this division is far from being a reliable
one. In Table 7.1, this accords with type 5 and, perhaps, type 1.
Popular participation in National Economic and Social
Development Planning
Turton (1987) notes that PP entered the mainstream planning process
from the 5th Five-year plan (1982-1986). Nonetheless for the NESDB,
as for the World Bank, ‘participation’, Turton argues, mainly means par-
ticipation in the market economy. It is worth reflecting on how the
terms and their meaning have changed in mainstream development
discourse in Thailand. This can be achieved through the lens of the
NESDB’s national development plans (Table 7.2).
Table 7.1 Linking Turton’s participation types to other typologies
Forms of participation Essence Turton’s critique
1. ‘Merely’ creating a sense
of participation
(Pseudo-)participation
masquerading as
transformative
2. Bridging the
communication gap
between the state and the
people
Instrumental – aimed at
efficiency issues
This ignores the fact that
the state penetrates into
people’s lives
3. Improving access to
resources by poor people
Nominal – focused on
issues of access
Needs are historically and
culturally determined and
awareness arises from
contest and conflict
4. Decentralisation Legitimation – gives the
(false) impression of
reallocating power and
control
Often results in increasing
the power of local elites
5. Re-structuring of power
through collective action
Empowering and
transformative
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Table 7.2 Participation and Thailand’s national development plans (1982-2006)
Plan Statements and definitions regarding
participation
Tenor of the plan
5th Plan
(1982-1986)
‘Participation’ is central to the ‘new’ rural
development strategies: ‘the chief aim of
the Fifth Plan is people-oriented so the
rural poor will be able to help themselves’
(page 278). Five salient features are
identified of which #3 is ‘to initiate
people’s self-help programmes’, #4 is to
‘solve problems [through] self-help
techniques’ and #5 is ‘to encourage the
maximum participation by the people’
(page 278).
Focus on poor people and
poor regions but in an
instrumentalist manner; the
plan stresses ‘mobilisation’.
Self-help and participation
are seen as means to the
achievement of the ends of
development.
6th Plan
(1987-1991)
In the rural development section, the plan
states that the public will be encouraged to
find solutions to their problems through
‘self-reliance’ (page 338). Popular
participation is not highlighted; rather the
‘participation’ of the private sector (page
338-9).
The plan notes that ‘despite some
success in promoting people’s participation
in rural development during the Fifth Plan
period, most development efforts
introduced are still at the initial stages ...’
(page 344); but, the plan goes on to say,
‘the private sector, on the other hand, has
played an increasing role in supporting
rural development activities ...’ (page 344).
‘The role of people’s organisations and
the general public in deciding how to solve
their own problems and those of their
communities will be encouraged, thus
increasing self-reliance’ (page 345).
Participation is widened
beyond ‘people’s
participation’ to the
participation of the people +
public sector + private sector
(i.e. agribusiness).
Participation becomes a
tripartite enterprise.
The sixth plan begins the
process of the
commercialisation of
participation in Thailand.
7th Plan
(1992-1996)
The seventh plan emphasizes the
promotion of QoL and better living
conditions of poor people in rural areas,
but sees this as best achieved through the
promotion of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (page
133).
‘People’s organisations and the private
sector, in particular, will be encouraged to
participate in rural development to improve
quality of life and security of income of the
rural poor’ (page 133).
Emphasis on ‘participation in national
development’. People’s participation (page
136) becomes an instrument to achieving
basic needs.
Focus on market integration,
commercialisation and
commodification of rural
production. The
commercialisation of
participation is taken one
step further from the 6th
Plan.
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Plan Statements and definitions regarding
participation
Tenor of the plan
8th Plan
(1997-2001)
Key development terms are used with
abandon: decentralisation, popular
participation, empowerment, fair
distribution, stakeholders, people-centred,
holistic, (popular) governance, NGOs,
sustainable and trust.
Promoting popular participation is a
major sub-theme in area development
(page 59) and is given its own (short)
‘chapter’ in Part VII of the plan on
‘Managing implementation of the Eighth
Plan’ (pages147-8). The meaning of PP,
however, is not defined and the statement
that the plan will promote ‘two main
systems for popular participation in
development activites’ (page 147) indicates
how PP is still viewed as an instrument for
development.
Most ‘participatory’ plan to
date – public and NGOs
involved. Plan is ‘people-
centred’ rather than ‘growth-
oriented’ (page iv).
Formulated at the height
of the ‘miracle’;
implemented (or not) during
the ‘crisis’.
9th Plan
(2002-2006)
The plan includes ample discussion of
popular participation: ‘mobilizing
participation of all stakeholders in
community development is a priority target’
(page ix); ‘alleviation of rural and urban
poverty through the process of popular
participation’ (page ix); ‘popular
participation will encourage people from all
walks of life to take part in the
decisionmaking processes for national
development’ (page 26)
Like the 8th Plan, the 9th Plan utilises
the full range of development jargon:
empowerment, sustainable development,
holistic, self-reliance and grassroots (for
instance); along with that can be seen as
linked to the King’s sufficiency economy
such as: balanced, moral, spiritual,
moderate, just, stable, ethical and
harmonious.
The plan was prepared on
the basis of a ‘broad people-
participation process’ and
guided by the King’s
‘sufficiency economy’ – of
which ‘participants from
every segment of society
share a unanimous consent’
(preliminary sections).
The plan was formulated
post-crisis, and reflects that
crisis in its reflections on the
risks of global economic
integration and the
attractions of stable and
balanced development
Note: The 5th, 6th and 7th plans do not define ‘participation’. It is used as a
catch-all term. But the tone of the plans indicates that participation undergoes a
progressive transformation from ‘self-reliance’ to ‘market integration’.
Sources: NESDB national economic and social development plans (NESDB nd
[a]–nd[e])
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The plans never define what is meant by participation or people’s par-
ticipation. One can only assume the meaning from the context in which
it is being used. The idea of participation is most radical, surprisingly,
in the 5th Plan, where it is used as a way of boosting self-reliance and
self-help. This needs to be understood, however, in the context of na-
tional economic conditions in Thailand in the early 1980s, when the
plan was drawn up. Economic growth was slow and halting (see Figure
7.1), poverty was entrenched (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) and the state lacked
the resources to make much difference. Successive oil price rises, a re-
latively stagnant economy in the context of rapid population growth,
and an inefficient and overly bureaucratic state apparatus created a pes-
simistic outlook on the ability of the state to orchestrate development.
‘At the close of the 1970s ... Thailand was experiencing serious econom-
ic problems and signs of increasing political and economic instability.
... [these] were magnified into a major crisis by the 1979-80 oil price
rise’ (Dixon 1999: 111). In this context, the focus on self-reliance was
perhaps understandable. If the state was not in a position to make a
substantive difference to people’s lives, then perhaps they needed to un-
dertake the role themselves?
The 6th (1987-1991) and 7th (1992-1996) plans show a significant
shift in the meaning of participation; no longer does it mean self-
reliance but rather participation in the modern, market economy
Figure 7.1 GDP economic growth and poverty, Thailand (1962-2009)
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through an engagement with commerce and commercial actors. The
term is the same; the context within which it is used is very – arguably
profoundly – different. So, for the early 1980s, participation = self-reli-
ance, to build (more) productive livelihoods; for the late 1980s and early
1990s, participation = market integration. It is tempting to see this shift
in national plans and planning in Thailand in terms of wider debates in
the institutions of the Washington Consensus, and particularly in the
World Bank. Increasingly, routes out of poverty were being seen in
terms of processes of market integration and incorporation.
The 8th Plan (1997-2001), formulated at the height of the Thai eco-
nomic miracle, really does embrace the whole panoply of developmen-
tally-correct terminology. The plan outlines a radical shift from ‘growth
orientation’ to ‘people-centred development’, central to which was great-
er participation in numerous guises from political participation to invol-
vement in community groups. But as Thailand’s economic crisis was
just over the horizon, the plan was effectively shelved before it could be
fully implemented. The 9th Plan (2002-2006) is again very much a
product of its time. Conceived in the aftermath of the economic crisis,
Figure 7.2 Poverty in Thailand 1975-’76, 1980-’81, 1985-’86, 1990 and 1994
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it integrates participation with the sufficiency economy – and thereby
with the King of Thailand’s vision of development:
The Sufficiency Economy is an approach to life and conduct
which is applicable at every level from the individual through the
family and community to the management and development of
the nation. It promotes a middle path, especially in developing
the economy to keep up with the world in the era of globalisa-
tion. Sufficiency has three components: moderation; wisdom or
insight; and the need for built-in resilience against the risks
which arise from internal or external change (UNDP 2007: 29).
Participation is now held hostage to a much wider set of meanings and
objectives framed through the sufficiency economy.
Shortcomings of participation (in Thailand)
Turton (1987: 12-13) notes that in some areas of Thailand, farmers have
no tradition or experience of collective action, and participation is not
something that sits easily or neatly into existing structures. He also ar-
gues that ‘popular participation and conflict are inseparable ... because
(1) the topics of concern already contain conflicts of interest; and (2) in
the (participatory) process of overcoming these conflicts ... new or more
overt and occasionally heightened conflicts may be produced ...’ (ibid.
14). What is distinctive in Turton’s account is the way in which PP is
perceived as a threat by the government and others in positions of
authority. The term is seen as linked to the wider communist threat
(see ibid. pp. 14-15) and considered fundamentally destabilising and
therefore, from a state-perspective, threatening.
Perhaps as a result, discussion of participation in the book is used as
a springboard into a discussion of grass-roots political action through
rural working class movements such as the Peasants’ Federation of
Thailand (PFT) (Turton 1987: 35-43). What the PFT did was to establish
class-based links between rural and urban producers, between peasants
and workers, as well as with students and intellectuals. Participation,
therefore, becomes re-framed in the book in two senses: first, popular
participation becomes re-framed as the basis for a popular, and broad-
based political movement; and second, participation becomes re-framed
as a challenge to the existing structures of power in Thailand and to the
elites that have dominated the country.
Considering participation in Thailand today, it is clear that this radi-
cal and de-stabilising (in a positive sense, at least for Turton) take on
the approach/process no longer resonates particularly strongly. Partici-
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pation, importantly without the ‘popular’, has become shorn of its poli-
tical power and the threat it originally posed to the establishment. The
fact that everyone is doing participation is part of the issue: if the Thai
government, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, NGOs and
all bilateral donors are either ‘doing’ participation or at least strenuously
encouraging it, then it is no surprise that it has lost its cutting edge and
its potential to destabilise the status quo. But it is not just that everyone
is doing it, and that familiarity breeds banality; one senses that the very
essence of the process has been compromised. Participation has be-
come just another method in the development tool kit, just one more
instrument to achieve material ends; an empty vessel in political terms
(see Ferguson 1990; Mosse 2005; Li 1999, 2005, 2007):
Policy discourse generates mobilising metaphors (‘participation’,
‘partnership’, ‘governance’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack
of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differ-
ences so as to allow compromise and the enrolment of different
interests, to distribute agency and to multiply the criteria of
success within project systems. (Mosse 2005: 230, original em-
phasis)
But while Turton is interested in power, he still takes the normative
view that participation should lead to productivity increases for the rural
poor (see Turton 1987: 50). In this sense, his book mirrors official docu-
ments (such as the five-year plans of the NESDB) in that participation
is seen in instrumental and materialist terms (as a means to an end); it
is just that Turton’s means of achieving this are very different from the
mainstream. That said, he argues (ibid. 72) that official development
schemes with participatory elements have not been concerned with pro-
duction. This official approach – of participation as an end in itself –
could be seen, paradoxically, to be closer to how participation tends to
be viewed today by activists.
So it seems to me that in the book, Turton is rather torn between the
political possibilities of participation – to sideline and go beyond and
behind the state (in line with Friedmann’s [1992] alternative develop-
ment) – and the development possibilities of the process, namely to de-
liver better living conditions for the poor and the marginalised. The fact
that he entertains both these angles, without considering whether he is
really thinking and writing about two participations that may be in con-
flict is, I think, significant.
Turton (1987) provides one example of a Farmers’ Group in Yasothon
in northeast Thailand that, through its size, was able to bargain collec-
tively for better terms (such as for the prices of inputs). Participation, in
this way, becomes reduced to collective bargaining power as a means of
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extracting greater profit/return for its members (ibid. 63). In another
section of the book, participation is seen through the lens of coopera-
tion – such as reciprocal labouring and collectively owned livestock
(ibid. 67). Why this might be seen as ‘participation’ is not elaborated. It
is noted, however, that from the perspective of the state, such collective
production arrangements tend to be negatively viewed because of their
communist undertones.
Participation is about the inclusion, in production terms, of the rural
poor (ibid. 74). At points in the book, participation and non-participa-
tion become reframed as inclusion/exclusion (ibid. 74). Even village lea-
ders ‘are expected to participate not only in poor farmers’ activities but
also in official ‘volunteer’ activities and in community work ... (ibid.
110).
Turton does explore the ways in which community or collective deci-
sionmaking and action are pseudo-collective: poor farmers are pre-
sented with proposals which are de facto fait accompli (ibid. 82). Sponta-
neity is limited and decisions are taken at higher levels. The system is
highly bureaucratic, with only a facade of community action. Rural peo-
ple are deferential and passive. When rural people are drawn into offi-
cial ‘participatory’ structures these will tend to be, in Turton’s view, ‘de-
mobilizing’ (ibid. 102) rather than transformative. Turton refers to one
official ‘participatory’ project in Uthai Thani (ibid. 104) and notes that it
suffers from many of the criticisms raised earlier in the book: ‘bureau-
cratic standardization, co-optation of village leaders, marginal, if any, re-
levance to local needs. It also introduces a new theme of increasing im-
portance, namely, competitiveness’. These discussions anticipate later
debates over participatory exclusions which emerged as the first wave of
participation euphoria receded and some scholars and practitioners be-
gan to embrace a more critical stance on participation and the participa-
tory process.
Reflecting on Production, Power and Participation in Rural
Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups
Conditions in rural Thailand in the 1980s
To a significant extent, Turton bases his account of participation within
the context of a particular view of the rural economy and rural society.
To begin with, rural society is an agricultural society: ‘It may be held to
be axiomatic that production is the basis for livelihood, and that control
over production is inextricably linked with control of other social re-
sources and powers of decision-making’ (Turton 1987: 48). The book
tends to portray rural society as consisting of sedentary peasants, with
small producers responding to the challenge of incorporation into the
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market economy through defensive survival strategies linked to subsis-
tence rice production (ibid. 51, 72). Opportunities outside farming are
seen to be limited to middle and rich peasants; poor farmers ‘have vir-
tually no other commercial or economic opportunities ... which might
serve as sources of income ...’ (ibid. 65). When farmers do engage with
wider opportunities – such as working in the Middle East – this is seen
only as creating a new cycle of indebtedness (ibid. 52-3). Furthermore,
the integration of farmers into capitalist production is portrayed as in-
imical to their interests, leading to a loss of control and uncertainty.
This ties in quite nicely with the more recent promotion of the suffi-
ciency economy by activists, the Thai government (through the NESDB)
and multilateral organisations such as the UNDP. So, for Turton, parti-
cipation becomes a mean by which poor peasants can improve their liv-
ing conditions based firmly on traditional rural activities – i.e. farming.
Multiple participations
Turton’s book was published at a time when participation was in its in-
fancy. It was also written at a time when Thailand’s modernisation pro-
cess appeared stalled and the country consigned, it seemed, to a long-
term condition of underdevelopment. Finally, it was conceived during a
period when a small farmer development ethos held sway. The partici-
patory development paradigm being promoted by Robert Chambers,
Gordon Conway and others was still regarded as radical, while in Thai-
land, scholars like Terry Grandstaff, who was working in Khon Kaen on
various participatory initiatives, were also rather out on a limb. The
Thai economic ‘miracle’ had yet to be recognised as such and the Thai
state regarded participation as a front for (dangerous) political action. If
we place Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand in this
wider national and international context, then it becomes a debate-
changing piece of work, at least for Thailand. What it also becomes,
however, is a child of its time.
One can see, for example, that Turton does not adequately pin down
the multiple (potential) meanings of ‘participation’. We have in the
book, participation as empowerment, participation as collective action,
and participation as development. What is noteworthy – and in this
sense Turton also anticipates many of the later criticisms of what parti-
cipation has become – is that, notwithstanding the multiple meanings
of participation in the book, the politics of action comes through very
clearly.
Participation, in its original guise, was highly political: socially acti-
vist, anti-state and often anti-capitalist, participation emerged as a radi-
cal alternative to existing approaches. This is certainly the background
tenor of the book (toned down, perhaps, for UN consumption). What
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happened, of course, is that when participation became embraced by
government and mainstream development agencies, it became a tech-
nocratic and apolitical exercise. It has, one might argue, been emascu-
lated. Chhotray, in her study of a participatory watershed development
project in Andhra Pradesh (India), writes:
In KWO’s [Kurnool District Watershed Office] scheme of things,
participation in the project is structured as an itemized protocol
akin to the physical and financial targets of the action plan. …
KWO’s protocol is essentially designed to secure the consent of
village based participants, both at individual and collective levels.
The centrality of consent to this entire framework rests on a lib-
eral view of individuals as both autonomous and rational, free
and willing to demonstrate their consent or, alternatively, to with-
hold it if necessary (2004: 343-4).
Participation has become, often, organised and structured within quite
rigid protocols. Furthermore, participation is not something that
emerges out of contexts of social, economic and political inequality but
is regarded as something that everyone can ‘do’. The politics of partici-
pation is excised from the equation, and development becomes, in the
process, depoliticised. Development is no longer a struggle between
classes and between local people and the state, but something that can
be reduced to a simple economic activity where technical solutions are
sufficient to deal with the problems that arise. This is certainly not an
accusation that can be levelled at Turton’s account which, like so much
of his work, is combative and socially activist.
Summary
This chapter has argued, through the lens of Turton’s Production, Power
and Participation, for the importance of taking a historical perspective
not only in terms of understanding contemporary conditions of devel-
opment and underdevelopment, but also in terms of the lexicon of de-
velopment terminology. There is, as has been noted elsewhere (see Rigg
et al. 1999), a cross-cultural component to languages of development;
there is also, though, an inter-temporal perspective. Turton’s book,
though not very widely read either in Thailand or beyond, is an impor-
tant text in the context of the wider and longer debate over (popular)
participation. As this short commentary has observed, in some respects
it was ahead of its time – and it continues to highlight visions of partici-
pation that have resonance some two decades after it was published. It
can also be used as an entry point into a debate over how development
100 JONATHAN RIGG
terminology becomes shaped and re-shaped over time, and sometimes
‘highjacked’ by powerful actors.
While Turton’s book is important for the reasons outlined above, I
also think – and here I must stress that this critique comes with the
benefit of hindsight – there are evident gaps: the failure to define and
pin down participation and what it means and entails, in particular.
There is also little consideration of gender issues and wider concerns
for so-called ‘participatory exclusions’ (see Agarwal 2001; Mosse 1994,
2001; Resurreccion et al. 2004). Indeed, the politics of rural Thailand
at this time seems to push gender out of the frame, in favour of a class-
based analysis. In addition, there is a tendency to essentialise rural Thai
society, or at least the peasant part of it. ‘Poor farmers’ are represented
as an undifferentiated group. In the early 1980s this might have (just)
still been largely true, although I doubt it; today, of course, participation
occurs in a context of considerable rural differentiation.
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8 Thai Institutions of Slavery:
Their Economic and Cultural Setting
Craig J. Reynolds
One of the many values of revisiting the work of a senior scholar is that
we have a chance to consider the political and social circumstances of
the historical moment in which the research was originally conducted
and written up. This exercise may bring to light ideas and insights that
have new significance in this contemporary moment. Too often, it
seems to me, citations to important research refer merely to little
known facts or details and fail to take account of the overall impact of
the research, or how it has subsequently developed. For reasons I do
not entirely understand, subsequent work on the same topic may ne-
glect to mention earlier studies that have put their stamp on the topic
or charted new courses in the field. This is certainly the case with An-
drew Turton’s article ‘Thai Institutions of Slavery’, published in 1980 in
a volume on Asian and African systems of slavery (Turton 1980).1 For a
teacher of modern Thai history, Turton’s analysis is the work of choice
for beginning and advanced students about these institutions of bon-
dage that affected political, social, economic and financial life in pre-
modern Thai society.2 In the following discussion, I will place Turton’s
study of slavery in a broad context and assess its impact on subsequent
work. Moreover, as I am going to suggest in my conclusion, aspects of
Thai institutions of slavery are very much alive today, despite the much-
heralded emancipation of Thai slaves between 1874 and 1905 by the
fifth Bangkok king.
Turton’s ‘Thai Institutions of Slavery’
What does Turton say in ‘Thai Institutions of Slavery?’ The essay is
lengthy partly because Turton is so scrupulous about drawing into the
discussion previous classics in this field. For Southeast Asia, Bruno Las-
ker’s comparative study in 1950 is one such foundation text, and for
Thailand the work of Robert Lingat (1931), a French legal scholar and
adviser to the Thai government, is another. After a succinct account of
pre-modern Thai history, Turton gets down to business by discussing
different categories of slaves and different types of servitude and bon-
dage, hence the plural noun in the title, institutions.
There were war slaves, combatants who were pressed into slavery fol-
lowing their capture and sometimes given to nobles as gifts, thereby
serving as a form of currency in political transactions. Wars seem to
have been little more than slave raids, a routine exercise during the dry
season. The numbers involved could be huge. When they took Vien-
tiane in 1826, the Siamese captured some six thousand families and re-
located them to the central plains. In the late thirteenth century the wife
of King Mangrai brought five hundred slave families as part of her
dowry, and later in the small Lannathai kingdom many thousands of
slaves were said to be owned by the aristocracy, contributing protection
as bodyguards and serving as retinues that signified royal or noble rank
(Turton 1980: 255-256; 275). Katherine Bowie is even more emphatic on
this point for northern Thailand, arguing that at least half of the popula-
tion were war captives (1996: 105). Turton himself recently returned to
the theme of violence in the acquisition of people for exchange in an es-
say showing the similarities between state-centred Tai slaving raids and
those of the Karen (2004).
In addition to war captives, there were also monastery slaves. These
were individuals or entire families donated to monastic establishments
for the cultivation of land and the care and upkeep of the monastery
and its inhabitants. In frontier regions these labour endowments to
monasteries (lek phra; kha phra yom song) facilitated new settlements
and the expansion of the kingdom (Turton 1980: 259; Reynolds 1979).
Judicial slaves were those punished for a crime and condemned to ser-
vile status and hard labour for the extent of their natural lives and
sometimes of their descendents (Turton 1980: 261). In addition to these
types of slaves, there was an active slave trade that brought upland min-
ority peoples into the lowland states. The hill people were valued for
their ‘uprightness’ and, lacking kinsmen in close proximity, were prized
because they were less likely to escape. While slave raids were often in-
ter-ethnic, it seems traders on occasion were quite capable of acquiring
people from their own ethnic group as slaves for exchange (ibid. 257-
258).
Turton’s account proposes that an important change took place
around the beginning of the nineteenth century. Slaves in all categories
gradually became ‘slaves by purchase’, meaning that they could poten-
tially be redeemed if someone was willing to pay out their price or ex-
tinguish their debt. He discusses at some length, and intermittently
throughout the rest of the essay, ‘debt slaves’ or ‘debt bondsmen’, which
have been studied extensively by historians of India where agricultural
labour was indentured and became the object of British scrutiny and re-
form (Prakash 1990). People were used as collateral, and were in effect
mortgaged against debts. In Siam during the first half of the nineteenth
century, ‘the overwhelming majority of slaves’ (that) was redeemable.
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They were that as a result of indebtedness. The number of such slaves
was increasing – largely, according to many commentators including
Akin (1969), because they willingly sold themselves into the condition.
Akin’s 1969 study had given ample evidence of free persons, or phrai,
especially phrai luang or king’s phrai, who preferred servitude as that
rather than submit to the corvée obligation or to the harsh treatment of
a cruel master.
This line of argument leads Turton to assess the extent of cruelty and
abuse as best he can, given the scanty evidence available about the ac-
tual conditions in which slaves lived.3 Generally he advances the view,
correct in my opinion, that while it is important to understand the local
nuances of that in the context of Thai social organisation, slavery (kan-
penthat) was ‘a form of bondage in which human beings are a form of
property’, as Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst would put it. Because they
were a form of property, they could be treated as chattel. Jit Poumisak
pointed out that the word for ‘lord’ and for ‘owner’ in Thai was, and is,
the same word, jao. Turton cites Hindess and Hirst again to demon-
strate that the master of the slave is the slave’s owner, not the slave’s
lord. Extending Turton’s line of thought, one can see that the Thai lan-
guage fuzzied up this difference in a clear case of what Marxists used
to call accusingly, and often too gleefully, mystification (Turton 1980:
264). In a critical essay clearly informed by Turton’s work, Bowie,
whose evidence is based on archival sources and oral accounts in north-
ern Thailand, also challenged the benign portrayal of Thai institutions
of slavery by envoys, travellers and academics. She tracked down a le-
gacy of complacency beginning with the nineteenth-century accounts of
Bishop Pallegoix, Sir John Bowring and Archibald Colquhoun and con-
tinuing through the academic studies of Akin (1969), James Ingram
(1971) and R. B. Cruikshank (1975) and argued that more people were
enslaved by physical force than by economic circumstances (1996: 131).
One of Turton’s conclusions, which helps to illuminate the role of
slaves in Thai society, is that slaves did not constitute a distinctive
socio-economic class. They tended to be found in the less productive as-
pects of the economy, but no labour process was exclusive to slaves.
Although he found no slaves engaged in mining or administration, they
were employed in craft production of all kinds, domestic service and
any other kind of service such as the owner (nai) might require, and
sometimes in public works (building fortifications, canals and roads)
and as bodyguards and soldiers (1980: 278, 281-282).4 Some of these
tasks were also performed by free persons, especially phrai luang but
also by wage labourers as the nineteenth century proceeded. He con-
fronts the question of whether Thai slaves were employed in agriculture
and advances the idea, more by hypothesis than by empirical verifica-
tion, that ‘some slaves were engaged in agricultural production’, in
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which he includes irrigation, the maintenance of paddy fields and the
production of livestock (ibid. 278). His argument here seems to be that
if the agricultural economy is envisioned in a comprehensive way, slav-
ery was indirectly used for agricultural production. While there has
been debate on this point, in fact, most Thai and Western economic
historians seem to agree that slaves were rarely used in agriculture, and
if they were so used, only on a small scale (Brummelhuis 2005: 43).
Only in the Rangsit irrigation scheme that developed north of Bangkok
at the end of the nineteenth century were slaves under the control of
aristocratic landowners used for rice cultivation (Sunthari 1987). Over-
all, he stresses that the difference between slaves and other types of la-
bour is that that were ‘regarded not merely as an inferior, unfree hu-
man subject, but even to some extent as less than fully human’ (Turton
1980: 288).
Another conclusion that should be highlighted at this point is that it
was not the productive capacity of Thai that that was important in pre-
modern times and through the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was
the significance of slaves as indicative of wealth and status, an asset that
could be displayed in retinues and entourages. Slaves were assets that
signified prestige; they were visible signs of wealth and power. When a
dignitary moved, ‘every emblem of rank and office (sword, betel boxes,
cushions, fans, etc.)’ accompanied the person, requiring the labour of
the servile classes. Slaves were producers of a mode of consumption
that the noble and royal families sought to monopolise and display for
maximum effect to express their status as the ruling class (phu phokkh-
rong in Thai). Social scientists writing in the wake of Turton have taken
up this point, noting that value in the Siamese world was not deter-
mined exclusively by economic scarcity and economic utility (Brummel-
huis 2005: 41).
A particular strength of Turton’s account, and here his anthropologi-
cal training gives him advantages that historians do not necessarily en-
joy, is his observation that the Thai bilateral kinship system afforded
‘ease of entry or committal into slavery by persons of both sexes’ (1980:
273-4). Because of the bilateral system, slaves were more easily assimi-
lated into new communities or into their owner’s households without
stigma than would be the case in unilineal systems such as the Chi-
nese. James Watson, the editor of the book in which Turton’s essay ap-
peared, proposed a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems of
slavery, the Thai case being an instance of the former. This distinction
was picked up subsequently by both anthropologists and historians and
now seems to be conventional wisdom (Evans 1993: 218-219; Reid
1983a).
Another strength of Turton’s analysis is that the anthropologist is
more aware than the historian of the extent to which one must speak of
106 CRAIG J. REYNOLDS
‘Tai [as opposed to Thai] institutions of slavery.’ Partly this stems from
the nature of his source material, which includes French and British
nineteenth-century accounts of the region beyond the present-day bor-
ders of the Thai nation-state, and partly it stems from his general un-
derstanding of the highland-lowland, dominant-subordinate relations
and ethnic dynamics that characterise northern mainland Southeast
Asia and southern China. Turton’s understanding of social identity in
Tai states is on display in the 2000 volume he edited, Civility and Sava-
gery (cf. Reynolds 2003).
Finally, in considering how Turton approaches ‘Thai institutions of
slavery’, it might be helpful to note that in the Thai language, that is
sometimes translated with inverted commas as ‘slavery’. The punctua-
tion around the term points to the lack of equivalence of that with slav-
ery and implies that the Thai institution should not really be considered
slavery in all respects. Perhaps we should simply refer to that as ‘unfree
labour’. Turton quotes Akin (1969), who echoes Bowring and others in
saying that, ‘the necessity to use the word ‘slave’ for that is very unfor-
tunate.’ Writing about forms of debt bondage in the following reign,
King Vajiravudh argues that Thai forms of slavery were ‘lighter’ (bao is
the Thai word here, indicating freer, less coercive) than was the case
with slavery in the southern American states, another instance of the in-
stitution being cast in a benign light (Vajiravudh 1951: 54; Bowie 1996).
It needs to be recalled in this context that servitude as a general cate-
gory is the product of a post-Enlightenment ‘discourse that discovered
humanity, and liberty as the essence of humanity’ (Prakash 1993: 143).
This line of thinking suggests that we need to be careful in applying
modern understandings of freedom and servitude to earlier times. Tur-
ton argues that insisting too strongly on the cultural specificity of Thai
slavery, which is a slightly different point, renders more difficult the
comparative study of slavery in Tai and other contexts, including the
European one. The ‘theory’ of slavery is also more difficult to apply if
that cannot be translated as slavery (Turton 1980: 263-264). Moreover,
the evidence suggests that the Siamese elite in the decades of the late
nineteenth century – when the institution was being critically assessed
– certainly had no problems understanding the equivalence of that and
slavery, whatever the variations in degrees of freedom and room for ne-
gotiation and dispensation that existed, particularly in pre-modern times
(Brummelhuis 2005: 44).
Why did Turton publish his piece on slavery in 1980? The simple an-
swer is that he was invited to contribute to the volume by Watson, the
editor, but there were also other factors that moved him in this direc-
tion. For one thing, he worked on slavery in what I would call his ‘red’
period in the late 1970s through the mid-1980s. After hearing him give
a very spirited talk on ‘praxis’ in Chiang Mai in January 2008, I am not
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certain he has emerged from his ‘red’ period. In any case, although he
almost certainly was not a card-carrying member of any extreme left po-
litical party, the marks of Marx in terms of frameworks of analysis, ap-
proach and vocabulary are evident in his work at this time. In 1978
when he reviewed the political programme of the Peasants Federation
of Thailand in his ‘Current Situation in the Thai Countryside’, Turton
talked about ‘contradictions’ in Thai society (see Jamaree, this volume).
He analysed the peasantry and other groups, such as the new rural capi-
talists, as a class (1978a). He took the Socialist Party and the Commu-
nist Party of Thailand seriously and related the agrarian policies of
these parties to the contemporary historical moment, thus laying the
groundwork for a history of radical agrarian activism in Thailand dur-
ing the heyday that has yet to be written.5 Personally, I found ‘Current
Situation in the Thai Countryside’ a breath of fresh air, because by the
time it was published in 1978, it was clear that American social scien-
tists, particularly the political scientists, had lost their way with Thai-
land, having failed to acknowledge – let alone study – the dramatic eco-
nomic and social changes that had been taking place since the 1950s.
In ‘Thai Institutions of Slavery’, Turton speaks unselfconsciously of
relations of production and the social formation and several times cites
the influential work of Hindess and Hirst, Pre-capitalist Modes of Produc-
tion (1975), the bible of radical social scientists at that time. He does his
best to assess the extent of coercion and violence in the treatment of
slaves, and he gives the reader his judgement on whether or not a dis-
tinctive socio-economic class of slaves existed in Thai society. He pays
his respect to the British Marxist historian, Perry Anderson, and he is
familiar with Jit Poumisak, one of the two most astute Marxist histor-
ians of Thailand, who wrote ‘The Real Face of Thai Feudalism Today’
(Reynolds & Hong 1983). At the time Turton was writing, Marxist voca-
bulary and frameworks of analysis were second nature to many aca-
demic authors, similar to the way the vocabulary and frameworks of
analysis of Michel Foucault have inflected academic discourse today.6
However, Turton cannot be accused of crude Marxism; unlike Jit, he
does not come close to finding a slave mode of production in Thai his-
tory. Towards the end of his ‘red’ period in 1984, these tendencies be-
came even more pronounced in his work. He was much taken by
Althusser, Maurice Bloch and Gramsci, and published ‘Limits of Ideolo-
gical Domination and the Formation of Social Consciousness’ (1984).
Although the article contains a little too much Althusser, Bloch and
Gramsci at an abstract level, this introduction to the Osaka volume is
certainly required reading for anyone trying to understand the way so-
cio-economic change in Thailand allowed new hegemonies to build
which are still visible in Thailand today.
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Subsequent studies of Thai slavery
In a way, the appearance of Turton’s ‘Thai Institutions of Slavery’ and
other works on Thai slavery that followed in its wake was predictable.
Fundamental research on American slavery in the 1960s and 1970s
had turned academic attention to the African slave trade across the
Atlantic and to the meaning, and especially the economics, of slavery in
all societies in which it is found. The volume edited by Watson emerged
in the long afterglow of Fogel and Engerman’s Time on the Cross (1974),
which itself followed on the heels of work by David Brion Davis, Eu-
gene Genovese and others on American institutions of slavery (Davis
1967; Genovese 1969). Anthropologists, sociologists and historians
such as Orlando Patterson in Of Human Bondage, Slavery and Social
Death: A Comparative Study (1982) were keenly studying slavery com-
paratively.7 The little cluster of studies on Thai slavery must be seen as
a niche in this larger historiography of slavery, bondage and depen-
dency. Terwiel’s essays (1983, 1984) and the University of Michigan the-
sis by Chatchai Panananon (1982) all fall within the decade after the
publication of Time on the Cross.
Of the studies of Thai slavery that followed Turton’s essay and built
on his research, by far the most detailed and well-documented is
Chatchai’s thesis, which took account of the Thai archival material in a
way that Turton’s essay did not. As a historian, Chatchai also dealt more
thoroughly and patiently than Turton did with the dissolution of slavery
as a formal, legal and therefore legitimate institution until its abolition
in the last third of the nineteenth century. The story of the dissolution
of the corvée system takes a similar trajectory, ‘hovering’ by the end of
Mongkut’s reign between forced labour and the poll tax (Terwiel 1984:
31). King Chulalongkorn’s first decree announcing the gradual abolition
was issued in 1874 around the time of the so-called Front Palace crisis,
which is usually seen as evidence of the nobility’s resistance to the
emerging power of the king and his numerous talented younger broth-
ers. It was clear that as he prepared to dissolve the institution, the king
was striking at one of the material assets of his political opponents, the
large number of people in servitude who were a visible sign of power,
status and wealth in Thai society.
It took thirty years, or longer if one considers slavery in the pro-
vinces, before the institution was formally and legally extinguished.
Land became a more valuable asset than people with the expansion of
rice production as a result of the Bowring Treaty provisions, the con-
struction of the Suez Canal and the international commerce stimulated
by Western colonialism in the region. The value of people as a material
asset declined in favour of land, and it became more socially and eco-
nomically advantageous to be a peasant than a slave in the emerging
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economy. Labour power was thus drawn away from institutions of bon-
dage by the rapidly rising value of land (Chatchai 1982: ch. 7).
The other major study in English to account for the abolition of insti-
tutions of slavery is by the economic historian, David Feeny, in his ‘The
Demise of Corvée and Slavery in Thailand, 1782-1913’ (1993), which ap-
peared in a volume more deliberately concerned with emancipation,
and with the end of institutions of slavery, than Watson’s 1980 edited
collection.8 More or less in keeping with the drift of scholarly opinion
on the Thai case that stresses Chulalongkorn’s humanitarian principles,
Feeny proposes that ‘domestic and international motives rather than
economic incentives appeared to have played the most direct role’ in
ending institutions of slavery in Thailand (1993: 100). While Feeny does
acknowledge that the ‘domestic acceptability of the gradual abolition of
slavery was enhanced by economic change’ (ibid. 99), this conclusion
strikes me as surprising coming from an economic historian, especially
one who adeptly makes use of Chatchai’s argument that the rice boom
and the rising value of land undercut the economic grounds for the re-
lations of servitude we are calling slavery. Other social scientists have
concluded that bonded labour or slavery-like relations had simply be-
come unprofitable (Brummelhuis 2005: 64). Feeny himself acknowl-
edges that the change in property rights in human beings over the peri-
od occurred during rapid commercialisation (1989: 287). As the Thai le-
gal system was reformed in response to pressures from the Western
imperialist powers, it became more and more difficult to enforce prop-
erty rights in human beings that upheld Thai institutions of bondage
and servitude.
Future prospects for research
How might the complexity of Thai institutions of slavery, upheld by po-
litical, social, economic, legal factors and even moral principles, be re-
thought? What is the state of the field now, and where might new lines
of inquiry take us?
On the very eve of issuing the edict abolishing slavery in 1905, King
Chulalongkorn appeared to acknowledge that while the buying and sell-
ing of that had ceased to exist, the practice of giving wages to workers
in advance was, in effect, a new kind of servitude that perpetuated bon-
dage in a different form. The king apparently did not object to this prac-
tice, raising the possibility that his humanitarianism in seeking the end
of Thai institutions of slavery was governed as much by realpolitik with
respect to Western imperial pressures as by moral vision. Siam’s status
as an independent kingdom was ‘qualified’ as a consequence of these
pressures, a split domain in which the sovereign agent was both colo-
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nised and coloniser (Loos 2006: ch. 1). The British everywhere in their
empire were known for exerting diplomatic pressure for the suppres-
sion of the slave trade, as they did in the Ottoman world earlier in the
nineteenth century (Toledano 1993: 39). They abolished slavery in India
in 1843, and one suspects that they made their views on this issue
known to King Chulalongkorn.
It would be interesting to know more precisely what was being said
to the Siamese elite through the decades of most intense pressure, and
just how these people were reacting to British attitudes towards Thai in-
stitutions of slavery. I have seen no study of the Thai case that has taken
full account of British anti-slavery policies, or the French for that matter.
Chatchai has a few pages on the matter with respect to the French, and
he does begin to ask questions with respect to the British in terms of
Chulalongkorn’s own thinking (1982: 266-267, 219). Surely there is
material from the British and French archives that would tell us more.
Siam was forced to make a number of adjustments, such as abolishing
slavery, if it was to extricate itself from the extraterritorial treaties and
regain its sovereignty, but the source material for this conclusion has
been raked over many times and is now threadbare (Feeny 1989: 295).
It is time to revisit the topic anew with fresh eyes and newly discovered
documents.
Chatchai (1982: 268) perceptively identifies the practice of advancing
wages on labour yet to be completed as ‘a form of slavery in disguise’, a
practice that ran parallel to and eventually superseded the formal insti-
tutions of slavery that were being phased out in the 1890s. Even after
thirty years of gradualism in the abolition of slavery, the new accounting
systems for keeping track of people through censuses, identity cards
and certificates of citizenship, as well as the mechanisms for raising le-
vies, such as the military conscription act of 1905 that emerged in the
early twentieth century, did not spell the end of slavery in disguise.
Debt bondage continued in various forms through the following dec-
ades. Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925), Chulalongkorn’s son and successor, dis-
cussed the practice of purchasing young women as mistresses, a cause
for public concern because of the vulnerability of the women and the
abuse that sometimes resulted. Vajiravudh wrote in great detail about
the practice, citing a price of about 400 baht for a young woman paid
through a broker, which could be bargained down if the woman was an
orphan or her family were indigent.9
Nowadays, about a century hence, the dynamic economies emerging
in East Asia and northern mainland Southeast Asia – as well as the
‘closed’ economies of countries such as Burma/Myanmar – are creating
new imbalances in value, which in turn stimulate flows of goods and,
of special interest to us here, people. As a result, the long durée of debt
servitude in northern Southeast Asia, which Turton documented from
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the early nineteenth century, has yet to run its course. Indeed, in the
amended version of his essay published in 1998 in a French volume,
Turton brings up the export of coerced labour from Southeast Asia. He
suggests that while the long durée might be investigated, the circum-
stances of neo-slavery might be ‘quite specific to a new historical con-
juncture’ (1998: 441).
I am not in bibliographic control of all the recent work done in
this field, and I might not be informed of important research that
bears on this issue. But there is enough news in the international
media and film documentaries about trafficking in human beings to
suggest that many of the people being moved around the world
nowadays are bound by debt to gangsters, people smugglers and
brothel owners. That is to say, the ‘owner’ of a person has paid a
sum of money against future wages to a family member, such as a
parent, or to a previous creditor, in exchange for the rights to that
person’s labour. The lump sum may pay for passage across national
borders and a ‘package’ that includes work, room and board, some-
times under coercive and abusive conditions. The interest on the
principal advanced to initiate the transaction accumulates so rapidly
that the indentured person has little chance of paying off the loan
and is effectively bound in servitude indefinitely. Children and wo-
men, and the poor more generally, are particularly vulnerable to this
kind of debt servitude. The call by Grant Evans fifteen years ago
(1993: 220) for ethnographic research on debt servitude may not have
been answered simply because the conditions in which such research
is undertaken are violent and personally dangerous for the ethnogra-
pher. What creditor who owns property rights in human beings, now
illegal in most countries, is going to hospitably open the door to a
visiting anthropologist to inspect ledgers containing details about
costs, dates of transactions and terms of contracts? I say ‘ledgers’ fig-
uratively, as there may be no written records of these transactions.
One of the curious things about the scholarship on slavery is the way
historians, anthropologists and sociologists are invited into a compara-
tive project to write about a specific society. The editor brings to bear
his or her wealth of knowledge and experience on the comparative con-
text and writes an illuminating introduction that is quoted for years to
come. But the individual essays on each society are almost never really
comparative, however much they might have been informed by the
other essays in the volume. Authors stick to the terrain they know best,
and it is left to the reader to make the connections and comparisons
across time and place, a formidable task considering the complexity of
the case studies. This is a feature of edited volumes on many topics,
and it is a feature of the three volumes on institutions of slavery edited
by Watson (1980), Reid (1983b) and Klein (1993) cited here.
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Debt bondage is a case in point, for it occurred – and still occurs – in
many parts of the region, as does forced labour. To take just one exam-
ple, an economic historian, Dharma Kumar, has said of India:
In some cases, so-called debt bondage may have been a cloak for
a hereditary relationship not based on a loan, but debt bondage
in its true sense was found all over India and not just in agricul-
ture. Men, and more rarely women, contracted a loan without se-
curity, frequently on the occasion of their marriage, and their la-
bour was mortgaged until they repaid the loan. Since their wages
were extremely low, they were frequently unable to do so. Parents
could also mortgage the labour of their children against a loan,
as parents doubtless do today, not only in India. (1993: 121)
The relevance of the Indian case, even when all the obvious differences
such as caste and colonial history are taken into account, is that British
anti-slavery sentiment and policy had a great impact in colonial India
through the application of law to the institutions of slavery, which the
British eventually abolished in 1843.
Even in Australia, debt bondage has been an issue in recent years as
women have been found in sexual servitude. In May 2008 the Austra-
lian High Court heard a case in which five Thai prostitutes were forced
into brothel work to repay an AU$40,000 debt before they received any
wages.10 Debt bondage had not been eradicated. It is an effect of the
contemporary globalising world that deserves fresh scholarly attention
from historians and social scientists.
Notes
1 Surprisingly, neither of the two articles written by Terwiel in 1983 and 1984 cites Tur-
ton’s comprehensive and illuminating analysis, nor does Chatchai 1982. Turton’s es-
say was reprinted with some minor and some significant amendments in Condomi-
nas et al. 1998.
2 I am not the only historian who notes the value of this work. For their discussion of
Thai slavery, Baker and Pasuk cite Turton’s essay as the standard reference on servi-
tude and unfree labour (Baker & Pasuk 2005: 42, n25).
3 Turton does not provide many examples of abuse, but other historians of the institu-
tions of slavery have found several cases using archival evidence; see Chatchai 1982
and the essay on Thai social history in Reynolds 2007: 72-77.
4 Subsequently, he found evidence of that in gold mining along the Maeklong River,
and he reported this in the slightly revised edition of the paper (Condominas 1998:
n4).
5 I say this notwithstanding Bruce Missingham’s fine study on the Assembly of the
Poor (2003).
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6 Some would say ‘infected’. This was true for Thailand too. When the Chiang Mai
anthropologist, Anan Ganjanapan, a contributor to this volume, returned from Thai-
land after his Cornell PhD (1984), his own doctoral dissertation steeped in economic
anthropology, he found the Thai academic world rife with Marxist debates (conversa-
tion with Anan Ganjanapan, Chiang Mai, 11 September 2007). See also Reynolds &
Hong (1983).
7 See the review by David Brion Davis of Patterson 1982 in the New York Review of
Books 30.2 (17 Feb 1983), 19-22.
8 The book, edited by Martin Klein, began life at a conference of economic historians in
Budapest in 1982 and was only published eleven years later; see Klein 1993.
9 ‘On the Trade in Young Women’ appears in one of Vajiravudh’s civilizational treatises,
‘Clogs on Our Wheels’, first published in English in 1915, later in Thai (Vajiravudh
1951).
10 See Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Law Report on Radio National for 13 May
2008, available at www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2008/2241462.htm.
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9 British Diplomatic Missions to Tai States in the
Early Modern Period: A Reappraisal
Volker Grabowsky
Introduction
On 21 January 1830, a unique cross-cultural encounter took place in the
small town of Lamphun, situated twenty miles to the south of Chiang
Mai. A 33-year-old Anglo-Scottish army doctor, David Richardson, ac-
companied by some three dozen traders from Moulmein as well as five
Indian soldiers, was received at an audience by the local ruler, Cao
Luang Nòi In. This was the first encounter in over two centuries of a
European with a Tai prince in the heartland of mainland Southeast
Asia. In the next ten years, Richardson revisited the Tai speaking areas
in present-day northern Thailand (‘Siamese Shan’) several more times
and, in 1839, even had an audience with King Rama III in Bangkok.
When Richardson started his fourth mission in mid-December 1836, he
was accompanied by another young Anglo-Scot, Lieutenant William
Couperous McLeod, who was three years his junior. Two weeks later,
the group split up. Whereas Richardson took a northern route through
the much-feared Karenni region, making his way to the Shan areas on
the west bank of the Salween and from there to Ava, McLeod’s group
travelled to Chiang Mai and from there to Chiang Tung and Chiang
Rung where no European had been before (Grabowsky & Turton 2003).
Since the 1950s, Richardson and McLeod’s travel diaries or journals
– most of which had remained unpublished – were rediscovered by a
number of Western and a few Southeast Asian scholars for their aca-
demic research. Ma Thaung (1954) and Dorothy Woodman (1962) were
the pioneers using the journals for British interest in trans-Burma
trade. Other scholars drew on the journals to study such diverse sub-
jects as politics, economy and society of Tai states, Tai-Karen relations,
forced population movements in nineteenth-century Lan Na, or British
colonial history. Nigel Brailey (1968) made extensive use of the journals
in his endeavour to reconstruct the political dynamics in Chiang Mai
before its integration into the Siamese state, and Andrew Turton (1980,
1998b) used the material as a source on Tai practices of slavery. It was
Turton who years later discovered its significance for opening up a new
field of research in Thai Studies, which he ingeniously called ‘ethnogra-
phy of embassy’. In October 1996, he first presented the theoretical
frame of his then still ongoing research to a wider audience in one of
the three ‘special lectures’ delivered at the Sixth International Confer-
ence on Thai Studies in Chiang Mai (a slightly revised version of the
conference paper was published in 1997).
In this article I first provide an account of how Turton developed the
concept of ‘ethnography of embassy’ and how my own research inter-
ests as a historian coalesced with his anthropological approach to this
field. Then I discuss from a wider historical perspective how the field
has developed more generally.
Ethnography of embassy
What does Turton mean by ‘ethnography of embassy’? First of all, in
the early modern period, which came to an end in Southeast Asia only
around the middle of the nineteenth century, permanent missions of
European powers in Asian countries were still a rare exception. The
missions of that period were rather ‘travelling embassies’ and given
their particular context, extraordinary kinds of transcultural encounters
(Turton 1997: 178; cf. Pratt 1992; Schwartz 1994). Turton strongly em-
phasizes that these particular diplomatic encounters constitute a con-
tested zone, as both sides – the early modern farang diplomat-explorer
as well as his Tai hosts – shared the mutual interest of acquiring first-
hand knowledge from one another. The accounts of both sides thus re-
flect ‘a kind of robust honesty about self-interested purpose and difficul-
ties of “translation” in various senses’ (ibid.). When Turton speaks of
‘embassy’, he uses the word in a very broad sense, defining it as ‘one
discursive entity, extending from the inception of the mission at home,
to post-mission commentaries and publications’. In a sense, the whole
time spent in Tai territory might appear ‘as a single ceremony, contain-
ing the focused ritual of royal diplomatic audience’ (ibid. 179).
Central to Turton’s methodology is the identification of recurrent
themes or tropes, rhetorical figures of speech, which appear in the ac-
counts of the travelling embassies. These topoi comprise, on the one
hand, tropes in European perceptions of Tai diplomatic practice such as
complaints about excessive ceremony and protocol, unnecessary delays
or unwarranted control and surveillance. The tropes in Tai perceptions
of European diplomatic practice, on the other hand, focus on fears of
spying or even invasion and conquest, or highlight unusual behaviours
and manners that were often considered rude. Finally, a recurrent
theme that points at mutual perceptions of Western (farang) guest and
Tai host is friendship. Not unlike the Chinese diplomatic practice of
‘cherishing men from afar’ that Hevia (1995) discusses in his Qing
Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Turton has studied this
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groundbreaking work carefully), the Tai rulers developed an elaborate
system of treating foreign guests with cordiality and friendliness.
Friendship and general goodwill were also criteria by which Richardson,
McLeod and others judged the success or failure of their missions.
However, European perceptions and expectations of ‘friendship’ dif-
fered from what their Tai counterparts labelled ratchamaitri (royal
friendship or state-to-state relations) or maitricit (friendliness), giving
rise to occasional suspicion of the other side’s sincerity (Turton 1997:
196).
Turton’s concept of ‘ethnology of embassy’ became more elaborate
when, in early 1998, he embarked on a study of the journals of McLeod
and Richardson’s 1837 diplomatic missions to Tai states in more depth.
That was the moment when Turton’s and my research interests crossed
each other. My familiarity with the journals goes back to 1990 when I
began my post-doctoral research on the political, social and population
history of northern Thailand in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. On reading the original text, I was impressed by the wealth
of information about Lan Na society (especially in McLeod’s journal)
during a period when the area of present-day Thailand’s upper north
still consisted of largely autonomous and semi-independent states. In
1995, I sent copies of the journals to Saraswadee Ongsakul, a leading
scholar of Lan Na history at Chiang Mai University, who recognised
their originality and brought them to the attention of Winai Pongsri-
pian, a historian at Silpakorn University and a member of the Historical
Commission at the Prime Minister’s Office. In late 1996, Winai asked
me, at that time based in Vientiane, to edit the journals for publication
in Thailand. Having just finished a first draft in the summer of 1998, I
received a letter from London. I considered it a lucky coincidence to
learn that Turton was working on exactly the same material that I was
editing. Without hesitation, I accepted Turton’s kind offer to join the
project, realising that the editing of the journals could benefit from a
joint endeavour combining different research interests, approaches and
disciplines.
A year later, back in Germany, our joint effort gained momentum.
While I contextualised the diplomatic and political history to which the
missions contributed, building on my familiarity with the indigenous
histories of the Tai states and knowledge of their languages and scripts,
Turton took the opportunity to conduct new research into the biography
of the two envoys and the context of the new British colony in peninsu-
lar Burma and its relation with the government of British India in Cal-
cutta. By the way, Turton’s ‘rediscovery’ of the Maulmain Chronicle and
other sources, kept in the Oriental and India Office Collections of the
British Library, enabled him, the anthropologist-turned-historian, to
write the first social and economic history of early colonial Moulmein
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and the Tennaserim provinces. Furthermore, we both traced and evalu-
ated the various uses of the journals in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. In the end, we had written two books in one: the annotated
journals including various glossaries, and a history of Richardson and
McLeod’s pioneering ‘travelling embassies’ to Tai states. This is in short
the rather intricate but most enjoyable journey towards our book The
Gold and Silver Road of Trade and Friendship which – thus was our hope
at least – might serve as a state-of-the-art-example of how to make archi-
val material like the Richardson and McLeod diary journals accessible
to a broad audience.
Deliberately chosen was the title of this first monograph-length study
of an ‘ethnography of embassy’ that took place in an early-nineteenth
century Tai context. ‘The gold and silver road of trade and friendship’,
or some variant of this alluring phrase, epitomizes, in a way, the intents
and aspirations of our two soldier-diplomats as well as the expectations
of their Tai hosts. At Dr Richardson’s first audience with a Tai ruler,
mentioned at the start of this article, the cao chiwit (‘Lord of Life’, i.e.
the King) of Lamphun said to his European guest that ‘he was happy
that the gold and silver road had been opened’ (Farrington 2004: 27).
There are several more local instances confirming that the Lan Na-Te-
nasserim borders were indeed considered ‘golden, silver paths, free for
traders’ (Thongchai 1994: 73). The trade routes were also, in a very lit-
eral sense, gold and silver travelled, whether as currency or as tribute.1
One central objective of the British missions of the 1830s, at least with
regard to trade issues, was to secure the free cattle trade with Chiang
Mai, Lamphun and other Tai Yuan principalities. Already during his
first mission in early 1830, Richardson had become aware of serious
disagreements among members of the Tai Yuan ruling elite. The ruler
of Lamphun was receptive to British demands of free cattle trade with
Moulmein and lower Burma but his relative in Chiang Mai, the ener-
getic and powerful King Phutthawong (r. 1826–1846), was much more
reluctant as he harboured deep suspicions against all things Burmese.
Given the political tensions between Lamphun and Chiang Mai, Ri-
chardson was not even allowed to continue his journey to Chiang Mai.
Instead, he had to wait until his second mission, four years later, to ne-
gotiate directly with Phutthawong and his ministers.
The British envoys did not always fully understand the political back-
ground of the internal conflicts in the Tai states they visited, nor were
they aware of the need of their hosts to consult with their superiors in
Bangkok, Ava or Pu’er. For example, when McLeod arrived in Chiang
Rung, he was not allowed to continue his journey to Pu’er, the first ma-
jor Chinese town beyond the borders of Sipsòng Panna. What had hap-
pened? Sipsòng Panna was one of the many smaller Tai states recognis-
ing the double suzerainty of two overlords, in her special case of China
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and Burma (conceptionalised as Sipsòng Panna’s ‘father’ and ‘mother’
respectively). Unfortunately, one of the frequent dynastic feuds between
a Chinese-backed and a Burmese-supported faction of the ruling house
had flared up again. McLeod even learned some interesting details of
that conflict from members of the ‘pro-China’ faction during his two-
week long stay in Chiang Rung (Grabowsky & Turton 2003: 377). In re-
turn, his Tai Lü counterparts, especially the ruler (cao fa) of Chiang Lò,
who was the chief minister in charge of foreign affairs, interrogated the
British envoy on political events in Burma. It would be logical for the
Chinese authorities in Pu’er to be suspicious of any foreigner with con-
nections to Burma, and he was therefore reluctant to give McLeod per-
mission to proceed on his journey. The Burmese suspected McLeod as
well. During his ninth night in Chiang Rung, a Burman offical visited
McLeod, informing him ‘in confidence, that orders had been received
from Kiang Túng on no account to permit me to proceed beyond the
Mé Khong, and if I attempted to cross the river to take my head off; that
the Burmans look upon me as a spy, and the Shans were partly inclined
to do the same’ (ibid. 382).
Tai records of the embassies
Given the historical context of the Richardson and McLeod missions as
well as the circumstance that in several cases (like in Chiang Tung and
Chiang Rung) they were even the first official encounters of a European
power with these Tai states, one might expect that the missions were
not only remembered but also recorded by the Tai themselves. We know
from members of the French Mekong Exploration Commission who re-
visited many places in the Upper Mekong region thirty years after
McLeod and Richardson that the ‘white strangers’ were vividly remem-
bered by their former hosts even after such a long time. In August
1867, de Lagrée and another French officer met in Chiang Tung cao fa
Maha Phom (1814/15-1876), who was a 22-year-old young man at the
time of McLeod’s visit. Maha Phom ‘often spoke of the English officer,
about his costume and his instrument, [as if ] … all these details had
been to him the revelation of a superior civilization’ (Garnier 1996, vol.
2: 65). Garnier does not tell the reader what kind of instrument the
Chiang Tung ruler had exactly in mind. McLeod, however, recalls that
he was asked by Maha Khanan ‘to procure for him a four-barrel gun, a
watch, compass, and twelve English sword blades, that would cut
through a musket at a blow’! And he continues to wonder that Maha
Khanan’s eldest son ‘wanted a double-barrel gun and watch for himself,
a pair of pistols for his brother, and Puniah (Phaña) Wang a compass
and thermometer’. De Carné, who himself was not present at the audi-
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ence with Maha Khanan and his sons, was thinking more of dining
utensils (knife, fork, spoon and wine glass) as the ‘instruments’ that
had left a lasting impression on the people in Chiang Tung. Maha
Phom also vividly remembered McLeod’s awesome appetite: ‘The king
of Sien-Tong (Chiang Tung) remembered having seen a European offi-
cer, who passed his days in looking about him, and absorbing with a
curious instrument [a fork?], three times more nourishment than a vig-
orous Laotian. This officer, with a robust appetite, was no other than
Major M’Leod’ (de Carné 1995: 195).
Do we find such remembrance also in indigenous records such as
chronicles or other official writings? Let us start our investigation with
the Chiang Tung Chronicle, the official annals of the Tai Khün state
which records the political events until the establishment of British
rule. Though the establishment of a British protectorate under J.G.
Scott in 1890 is briefly recorded,2 there is no entry on the McLeod’s
mission half a century earlier. However, we can find a short reference
to it in the chronicle of one of Chiang Tung’s dependencies. The
Müang Yòng Chronicle has for the year lai san (AD 1836/37) the follow-
ing entry: ‘In that very year, a Kula came up to Chiang Tung as our state
guest (khaek müang)’.3 Kula, or its variant Kala, is a Tai (Yuan, Lü,
Khün) generic term that designates western neighbours of the Yuan po-
pulation of Lan Na like the Toung-su and the Shan.4 Although British
and other Europeans were generally called kula khao (‘white stranger’),
it seems highly probable that ‘Kula’ in the above quotation refers in fact
to Captain McLeod.
On the last day of his sojourn in Chiang Rung, McLeod asked the
chief minister for ‘the history of the place’, i.e. for a copy of the offical
chronicle of Chiang Rung and Sipsòng Panna (Moeng Lü). Confronted
with the foreigner’s request, the minister ‘looked serious’, notes
McLeod, commenting on the minister’s reaction: ‘[A]fter considering a
short time he asked me whether I wished he should lose his head; that
there was but one copy, and that lodged in the palace, and though he
afterwards promised to have extracts made for me from it, he never did
so’. McLeod’s entry of 25 March 1837 is the earliest confirmation of the
existence of the Sipsòng Panna Chronicle, the oldest extant version of
which was probably composed in 1864/65, not long after the death of
Cao Suca Wanna (r. 1834–1864), who was the incumbent king (or saen-
wi fa) of Sipsòng Panna at the time of McLeod’s visit.5 There is little
doubt that the European envoy’s request embarrassed the minister, who
might have considered the ruling dynasty’s official history a kind of
state secret, especially in such turbulent times of intra-dynastic con-
flicts. Neither the oldest extant version of the Sipsòng Panna Chronicle
nor any later version mentions the appearance of a ‘white stranger’ in
Chiang Rung in a single word. Though certainly a memorable event, at
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least in the eyes of all those Tai Lü nobles who personally encountered
McLeod, the first European embassy to Chiang Rung was obviously not
considered significant enough to be incorporated into the narrative of
the country’s official political history.
Whereas McLeod’s travelling embassies to Chiang Tung and Chiang
Rung were relatively brief, lasting only a period of about two weeks, Ri-
chardson’s five missions to Lan Na (Chiang Mai, Lamphun and – on
his third mission – also Lampang) added up to more than two years.
Therefore, we might expect some mention in contemporary northern
Thai sources. The Chiang Mai Chronicle, the most obvious choice for
such a source, was composed probably in 1828 or perhaps a year later.
Richardson’s first mission of 1830 thus came a bit too late to be men-
tioned in the Chiang Mai Chronicle, whose narrative ends with the ‘re-
bellion’ of the Lao king Cao Anu in 1827. Half a century later, in 1875,
just one year after the conclusion of the first Chiang Mai Treaty, King
Chulalongkorn commissioned Phraya Maha Ammattayathibòdi to write
a Chronicle of Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lamphun. Starting with the
Burmese invasion of Siam in 1767, the chronicle records the subse-
quent political history of western Lan Na until 1875/76 in the context of
an anti-Burmese alliance between Bangkok and the Tai Yuan elite under
the hegemony of the Siamese monarch. Neither the British missions of
the 1830s nor those later missions of the 1860s and 1870s (Schom-
burgk, Edwardes) find a place in the chronicle’s narrative. By the same
token, Phraya Prachakitkòracak’s influential Yonok Chronicle (1907),
which heavily draws on the Chiang Mai Chronicle and Maha Ammat-
tayathibòdi’s work (1963 [1876]), among a number of other local
sources, is completely silent on the McLeod and Richardson diplomatic
missions.
However, there is one most interesting mention in a rare Tai Yuan
manuscript of Dr Richardson’s first visit to Lamphun in early 1830. The
undated palm-leaf manuscript, the original of which is kept in Wat Phu-
min, Nan province, contains the following short statement: ‘In CS 1191,
a kat pao year (AD 1829/30) a Kula came to the town (wiang) of Lam-
phun’.6 We do not know the author of the manuscript nor do we know
its title.7 The text has brief entries of memorable events for every year
between 1728 (beginning of a successful anti-Burmese uprising in Lam-
phun) and 1854 (third Chiang Tung war). Most entries are not in parti-
cular concerned with ‘big politics’, and if so in a rather unorthodox
manner. For example, we are informed that the Chiang Mai rulers
maintained a kind of secret diplomacy with Burma, which might not
have amused their Bangkok overlord: ‘In CS 1243, a ka mao year […], on
the fourteenth day of the waning moon in the eighth month (27 May
1843), the Burmese king (cao man) arrived in Ciang Mai where he [and
his retinue] stayed in five pavilions (sala)’. The bulk of the record, how-
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ever, pertains to events that affected the people’s daily life or were con-
sidered auspicious or unauspicious, such as foreign invasions, earth-
quakes, cholera epidemics and solar and lunar eclipses. Strongly resem-
bling the Siamese Astrological Records (cotmaihet hon), the cumulative
nature of the text points to several annalists primarily concerned with
recording events for a kind of astrological calender. In this particular
context, the first visit of a European to Lamphun in January 1830 was
apparently of some significance for the annalist(s).
Richardson’s 1839 mission in the eyes of Bangkok
The Tai Yuan principalities of northern Thailand were chief exporters of
cattle to Moulmein. The procurement of cattle from these areas, linked
with trade in horses and elephants for transport, was for the travelling
embassies of Richardson and McLeod ‘of equal if not greater impor-
tance than the possibility of trade with Yunnan’, argues Turton in his
discussion of cattle trade as a major theme of all British missions from
Moulmein (Grabowsky & Turton 2003: 78). In the 1830s, epidemics like
rinderpest and anthrax had dramatically reduced the cattle stock not
only in Tenasserim, where it was insufficient to supply the growing de-
mands of the British colony anyway, but also in Chiang Mai and other
areas of the north. Disputes between the ruling elite of Chiang Mai, re-
luctant to allow any sale of cattle to British-Indian and Mon-Burmese
traders, and the chiefs of Lamphun and Lampang, more flexible on this
issue, had to be settled by their Siamese overlord. This was the main
reason for Dr Richardson’s final mission in 1839 which led him first to
Bangkok via Nakhòn Chaisi. The Siamese government must have kept
records of the diplomatic mission since the Chronicle of the Third Reign,
written by Caophraya Thiphakòrawong in 1869/70 (Somjai 1983), con-
taining a lengthy discussion of Richardson’s audience with King Rama
III, including a detailed list of gifts exchanged on that occasion; it also
provides some background on the complicated negotiations between
the British envoy and the Siamese authorities.8 The Thai National Ar-
chives contain a contemporary source which might have been used by
Caophraya Thiphakòrawong when writing his chapter on the British
mission. It is an official, sealed letter (san tra) of Phraya Chakri to
Chiang Mai ‘concerning the prohibition to sell elephants, cows, and
buffaloes to English traders (phò kha)’. The letter was issued ‘on Sun-
day, the twelfth waning day of the fourth month, CS 1200, the year of
the dog and first year of the decade (cò samrittisok)’ or – if calculated in
the Gregorian calendar – on Tuesday, 12 March 1839.9 In a straightfor-
ward and unambiguous manner it takes the British request as serious
as the arguments of the Chiang Mai ruler:
122 VOLKER GRABOWSKY
The Governor General of Bengal (cao müang mangkala) has sent
a letter to the ministers (senabòdi) in Bangkok with the intention
of promoting friendship (camroen thang maitri). He ordered Mr.
Richardson to take [this letter] to Kanburi (Kanchanaburi). In this
letter the Governor General of Bengal states that the English,
Mon, and Indian (khaek) merchants, who came both by land and
by sea to trade in the territory of Bangkok (i.e. Siam), relied on
the mercy of His Majesty the King for buying and selling goods
in a peaceful and normal way. The Governor General of Bangkok
was aware of the power and benevolence of His Majesty the King
and thus ordered Mr. Richardson to present this letter to His Ma-
jesty the King in a spirit of friendship. Mr. Richardson informed
the high-ranking ministers that the English would like to sell
goods in Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lamphun. The English tra-
ders said that they asked [to buy] elephants, cows, and buffaloes
from the local population who would sell elephants, cows, and
buffaloes to the English traders. [But] the ruler of Chiang Mai
forbade his subjects, who were the owners of the elephants,
cows, and buffaloes, to sell them to the English traders. Mr. Ri-
chardson asked for the purchase of the elephants, cows, and buf-
faloes from the owners at the price [which had been agreed
upon]. The response of the ministers to Mr. Richardson said that
they were well aware that in the past English traders had come
many times to Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lamphun to make
business and buy elephants, cows, and buffaloes from the local
population. As to Mr. Richardson’s allegation that Chiang Mai
prohibited its citizens to sell elephants, cows, and buffaloes to
English traders, the lord of that country (cao khòng ban müang)
realised that elephants, cows, and buffaloes were dwindling in
number. Since elephants, cows, and buffaloes were not normal
goods, they should not be sold to outside the country. Elephants,
cows, and buffaloes were of vital importance for the country. In
times of war elephants and cows would transport provisions and
therefore should be considered part of the military forces. Buffa-
loes were animals needed to do farming and thus secure the live-
lihood of the population.
Then Phraya Chakri affirms the King’s commitment to maintain
friendly relations (ratcha maitri) between Siam and England. These rela-
tions must not be put at stake by any high-handed attitudes towards the
English envoy:
Thus a letter should be sent to Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lam-
phun that a few (literally, ‘two or three’) elephants should be ar-
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ranged for [Mr. Richardson] in a spirit of friendship. The minis-
ters talked to Mr. Richardson in this way. Mr. Richardson agreed
with that proposal. […] We have to maintain friendship [with Eng-
land] continuously. This friendship must not be destroyed. Phaya
Chiang Mai, Phaya Lakhòn, Phaya Lamphun and Phaya Uparat
[of Chiang Mai], Nai Phimasan, who are all relatives, and the of-
ficials (saen thao) have to talk with the Englishmen, thus the
friendly relations will not suffer. Elephants, cows, and buffaloes
have to be kept in sufficent numbers for the country (ban-
müang). The elephants, cows, and buffaloes must not decrease in
numbers, otherwise the country’s future will be jeopardised.
In the end, the authorities of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Lampang had
to pay compensation to the British traders for their financial losses
caused by the ban on the exports of cattle mentioned in Phraya Chakri’s
letter. Richardson was not unsatisfied with the results of his negotia-
tions with the Bangkok government. Putting all the blame on the vice-
roy (cao hò na) of Chiang Mai, ‘being just now the obstacle and most
anxious to put a stop to the trade altogether’, he remained cautiously
optimistic about the long-term prospects of the cattle trade, though he
did not overlook the ‘jealousy’ of the Siamese government concerning
‘our influence’ in the Siamese tributary states of western Lan Na (Far-
rington 2004: 222).
Conclusion
How should the Richardson and McLeod diplomatic missions be put
into a wider historical perspective? In how far were they mere agents of
British colonialism and imperialism in their manifold encounters with
local people of different social, ethnic and geographical backgrounds? It
is true that the official publication of the 1837 journals of Richardson
and McLeod as British Parliamentary Papers in 1869 was influenced by
the public debate in Britain about the feasibility of a railway route from
British India to southwestern China, but this debate already belongs to
a new stage of imperialist ambitions in the Far East. In the 1820s and
1830s, the geopolitical context was still very different (see Grabowsky &
Turton 2003: 3–21). The attitute of the two soldier diplomats towards
the ‘indigenous peoples’ and their cultures was likewise a far cry from
what the reports of late-nineteenth-century travelling diplomats exhibit.
Turton himself discussed this important aspect in his perceptive review
of G. H. Younghusband’s (1888) The Trans-Salwin State of Chiang Tung
(2007), noting that there could be no sharper contrast between
McLeod’s mission to Chiang Tung in 1837 and Younghusband’s visit
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half a century later. McLeod ‘spoke excellent Burmese, and perhaps a
little Tai. Younghusband knew almost nothing of the situation, spoke
no relevant languages, and, moreover despised his interpreter, whereas
McLeod’s interpreter deputised for him and was of great assistance’
(Turton 2007: 226). I fully agree with Turton’s suggestion that we
should think about the early modern ‘ethographies of embassy’ in a
kind of post-colonial or even revisionist spirit, refraining from making
‘anachronistic assumptions of imperialist teleology’, and attributing
agency and relative autonomy to both sides of a ‘specific pre-imperialist
encounter’ (Turton 1998a: 21). Turton’s passionate and somehow provo-
cative plea for his approach to an ‘ethnography of embassy’ should be
taken seriously.
Notes
1 Tribute missions from Tai tributary states, such as Babai (Lan Na) and Cheli (Sipsòng
Panna) to Ming China almost regularly included gold and silver utensils of various
kinds. See Liew-Herres & Grabowsky 2008: 31–33; and Grabowsky 2008: 56–59. As
for the rhetorical use of the metaphoric phrase ‘gold and silver road of trade and
friendship’, especially by Richardson, see Grabowsky & Turton 2003: xix.
2 ‘In the year [CS] 1252 the Gala Ingalik entered the state’. Quoted from Sao Saimöng
1981: 276.
3 Tamnan Müang Yòng, in Thawi 1984: 69–70 (in the original manuscript f˚ 99) ) [ดั่ง
กูลาก็ขึ้นมาเป็นแขก เมืองเราเชียงตุงปีนั้นหั้นและ].
4 Kula (Transcription คุลา) is the Burmese word for foreigners (/k∂`la/ kula;), notably na-
tives of India. It is often written kala (Tr. คะลา). Later on, the word was misapplied to
English and other Westerners who were sometimes called kala/kula khao, ‘white stran-
gers’.
5 The oldest extant version of the Moeng Lü Chronicle was discovered in 1940 by Li
Fuyi, a Republican official in Chiang Rung (Jinghong) who translated it into Chinese
a few years later. During the final phase of the war, however, the original manuscript
got lost. For details, see Liew-Herres et al. forthcoming.
6 Saraswadee 1991: 28 (f˚ 34/3) [สักกะ 1191 ตัว ปีกัด เป้าแล คุลามาเวียงลพูนแล, sakka
1191 tua pi kat pao lae kula ma wiang lapun lae].
7 The title Cotmaihet lan na (Records of Lan Na) is an artificial one given by the staff of
the Social Research Institute, Chiang Mai University, where a microfilm-copy is kept
under the code number SRI 82.107.05.048-048.
8 Thiphakòrawong 1961: 196–99. The Chronicle of the State Reception of European Am-
bassadors in the Early Bangkok Period, first published in 1936, has reproduced Thipha-
kòrawong’s record of the 1839 Richardson mission almost verbatim. See Thailand
1969: 286–292.
9 The document (สารตราเจ้าพระยาจักรีถึงเมืองเชียงใหม่ เร่ืองห้ามขายช้าง โค
กระบือให้พ่อค้าอังกฤษ จ.ศ. ๑๒๐๐, santra cao phraya cakkri thüng müang chiang mai
rüang ham khai chang kho krabü hai phò kha angrit c.s. 1200) is published in Winai
1999: 33–44.
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Kengtung: sawbwa’s haw or palace, c. 1890
Source: British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections (Sir J. George Scott
collection)
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